Much Ado about Nothing: Steele v Serepisos and a Notice Requirement for Contingent Conditions

Authors

  • Sarah Leslie

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v39i2.5463

Abstract

In the 2006 case of Steele v Serepisos, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the law on contingent conditions. The issue was whether a party seeking to cancel a contract for its failure to fulfil a contingent condition first had to give notice to the other party. The purpose of the notice would be to give the other party an opportunity to fulfil the condition. A majority held, correctly in the author's view, that such a notice was not required. However, the majority went to some lengths to distinguish Cooke J's judgment in the 1978 case of Hunt v Wilson. This paper revisits Hunt v Wilson and argues that Cooke J's judgment was wrong. It further argues that the majority's failure to recognise this, coupled with general judicial confusion with respect to contingent conditions, made a simple issue much more difficult than it need have been.

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Published

2008-09-01

How to Cite

Leslie, S. (2008). Much Ado about Nothing: Steele v Serepisos and a Notice Requirement for Contingent Conditions. Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 39(2), 319–342. https://doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v39i2.5463