COMMENT ON CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW: TWO DIFFERENT PATHS LEADING TO THE SAME GOAL

Luke Nottage*

"Medio Tutissimus Ibis"**

This comment attempts to place in broader context the article in this issue by Caslav Pejovic, "Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal". The latter draws on several decades of his academic research and practical experience in navigating among differing legal systems, particularly in maritime law. This area of law requires an appreciation of both substantive and procedural law, how general principles come to be applied in evolving transactional contexts, and pressures towards – and sometimes against – the unification and harmonisation of normative frameworks.1

Not surprisingly, then, the core of his article surveys a wide range of issues where common law and civil law traditions begin, at least, with quite different approaches. Part III addresses points not only of contract law, but also property law and general commercial

---

* Jean Monnet Fellow, European University Institute Law Department, Barrister of the High Court of New Zealand. A much more detailed exposition of the conceptual framework presented in the latter half of this Comment is provided in L Nottage "Convergence, Divergence and the Middle Way in Unifying or Harmonising Private Law" (EUI Working Paper LAW No 2001/1, European University Institute, Florence, 2001, freely available at <http://www.iue.it/PUB/EUI_WP.html>).


law, while Part IV deals with issues in civil procedure. After noting some tendencies towards convergence in outcome regarding several of these issues, Section 5 summarises some of the broader pressures drawing civil and common law closer together. Pejovic argues that the common law is increasingly hemmed in by legislation, including specific intervention as well as attempts to codify broad areas of law, while civil law jurisdictions increasingly rely on precedents set by the courts. The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (CISG) promotes uniformity in substantive sales law. The partially overlapping UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts advance broader harmonisation in contract planning and resolution of disputes involving more than just sales. Other normative frameworks bridging differences, such as those involved in the international commercial arbitration, are also mentioned. Finally, attention is paid to legal developments in the European Union, including the possibility of Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) elaborated by a study group headed by Professor Ole Lando being "upgraded" into a binding European Civil Code - a possibility, one should add, which has

---


recently become much more real. Pejovic concludes that while some significant differences remain, which practitioners in particular need to be aware of, there is remarkable convergence or *rapprochement* between the common law and civil law traditions. Arguably, this is underscored by similarities in the subject matter of regulation and in underlying values.

In the final analysis, Pejovic therefore aligns himself with probably a majority view among contemporary commentators on unification or harmonisation of private law globally and, especially, in Europe. One characteristic of this scholarship is the focus primarily on convergence or similarities in actual results in particular litigated cases or the like (notably in the work of Basil Markesinis); in developing a "common core" of concepts

---


5 On the latter aspect, compare generally the survey by C Schmid “The Emergence of a Transnational Legal Science in Europe” (2000) 19 OJLS 673.

derived from such comparisons (notably, the Trento project),\textsuperscript{7} in synthesising mainly doctrinal developments (Christian von Bar),\textsuperscript{8} and in promoting a broader legal "grammar" or shared vocabulary (Reinhard Zimmermann,\textsuperscript{9} or the "European Casebooks" project\textsuperscript{10}). Another characteristic is attention to "the law in books" rather than the "law in action", despite some commentators (such as Hein Koetz) proclaiming the latter's importance in comparative research.\textsuperscript{11}

Recently, however, vigorous counter-arguments have been presented which uncover and defend diversity and divergence. These often arise precisely regarding the Europeanisation (or otherwise) of private law, with Pierre Legrand (in)famously insisting on an irreducible differences between English common law and civil law on the Continent.\textsuperscript{12} However, such arguments raise or implicate issues in comparative law methodology more generally. Most adopt an expansive view of law, sometimes radically so – especially Legrand,\textsuperscript{13} but also Hugh Collin’s relatively early contribution to the


\textsuperscript{9} R Zimmermann “Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a European Legal Science” (1996) 112 LQR 576;


\textsuperscript{11} H Koetz “Comparative Law in Germany Today” [1999-4] RIDC 753, 755.

\textsuperscript{12} P Legrand “European Legal Systems Are Not Converging” (1996) 45 ICLQ 52; P Legrand ”Against a European Civil Code” (1997) 60 MLR 44.

Europeanisation debate. Gunther Teubner takes a more sociologically informed approach, which leads mainly to a stress on differences between English and continental European law, but some potential for "irritation" and co-evolution. Christian Joerges develops a more normative vision of law, seeing further evidence of - and scope for - indirect cross-fertilisation primarily through the institutions of the European Union. Collins recently has taken more interest in the interaction between law and expectations or practices of businesses, although primarily only in England, in arguing for more generally stated principles to be included in any eventual unification of private law in Europe.

At the risk of serious oversimplification, the primary orientation of the main commentators discussed above can be summarised along two dimensions, as depicted in the following Figure. One dimension is whether the primary focus remains on rules and the law in books, as opposed to the law in action. The former focus, covering the two main schools of comparative law scholarship already identified by Gunther Frankenberg by the mid-1980s, can be rephrased a "Rules-Plus" orientation. Although this allows for some variation in how much "plus" may be added to the comparative analysis of rules, a qualitatively and often quantitatively different orientation is evident among those who begin with an expansive view of "law in context". A second dimension is the extent to which these various commentators perceive - and, usually, advocate - similarities and convergence as opposed to difference and divergence.

Crudely, to be sure, situating in this way the approach of these various comparativists first shows quite clearly that narrower views of law tend to be associated with a focus on convergence; and expansive views, with divergence. However, the correlation is neither a logical nor a necessary one. On the one hand, this is shown by the studies of Alan Watson, who analyses historical transplants of legal rules "out of context", yet is unafraid to discuss differences.19 On the other, Lawrence Friedman takes an expansive view of law as "legal culture", but stresses convergence even on a global scale.20

Secondly, this depiction should remind us that although "convergence theorists", focused mainly on the law in books, form now the majority view, a significant body of scholarship has developed explicitly or implicitly questioning both major premises of their work.

Thirdly, this conceptual framework and the present state of comparative law scholarship – mainly dealing with private law – suggest in the possibility of developing a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convergence</th>
<th>Lando (recently)</th>
<th>Markesinis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zimmermann (recently)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trento group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kötz (in practice)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casebook project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zweigert/Kötz (in practice)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divergence</th>
<th>Watson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collins (recently)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joerges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teubner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Curran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legrand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 Arguably, Watson's writings have put this argument in both 'strong' and 'weak' versions, with only the former implying that the broader social context deserves no attention: see W Ewald "Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants" (1995) 43 AJCL 489. However, Watson's subsequent writings eg *The Evolution of Western Private Law* (John Hopkins UP, 2000) indicate that he himself holds to the 'strong' view.

"middle way" along both dimensions. Ultimately, a comparative lawyer – qua lawyer – must begin with some theory of what constitutes law, even if this comes to be reformulated in the light of an ongoing praxis in comparing legal systems. Few legal theorists now subscribe to a narrow positivist view of law as a system of rules, and many would add more to the picture than "Rules-Plus" comparativists. But few would conflate law with culture, morality, or the like. The middle way therefore justifies close attention to legal rules and normative discourse more generally, as well as their development and application in a range of institutional and transactional contexts which are often not usually defined – or explored – as "legal", at least by "Rules-Plus" comparativists. Broader analysis also makes it more likely that new complex relationships between these components will be uncovered. It may remain possible to summarise this in parsimonious theories, and we should recall that the admonition to "keep it simple" has long been the watchword of many (practising) lawyers as well as scientists and medieval clerics. But we should resist the tendency to oversimplify, ignoring or downplaying phenomena which cannot be readily explained. The "Rules-Plus" comparativists who advance strong claims of convergence appear to be falling into this trap, even after having delimited the scope of their enquiries through the various practices described above. Emerging debate on enactment of a European Civil Code may well bring this all to light.

As noted already by John Henry Merryman at an early international conference held at the European University Institute (EUI), in 1977:

In some cases the desire for convergence of legal systems merely expresses a yearning for simplicity. It responds to popular discontent with complexity and seeks to impose order where there is untidy diversity. This approach to legal diversity would hardly merit recognition and discussion, since it is little more than an expression of frustration at the fact that the world is complicated, disorderly and uncertain, were it not so firmly rooted in human psychology. It is closely related to an exaggerated demand for certainty in the law.

Thus, the wisest course for comparative private lawyers nowadays probably involves first addressing as much attention to (a) the exegesis of statutes, case law, and legal doctrine as to (b) underlying patterns of legal reasoning, with their supporting institutional infrastructure, and (c) how this interacts with the wider socio-economic context. Secondly,

22 Above n 4.
this probably will involve differentiated appraisals of convergence and divergence. My own work has tried to follow both strictures, although doubtless with variable success.24 This would place me somewhere near the centre of the Figure above; my work probably draws closest to that of Joerges.

Taking "the middle way", in these respects, should hold a more universal appeal. The position was advocated not only by Ovid two millennia ago; moderation was advocated by both Solon and Gautama Buddha in the sixth century BC, and in a Japanese expression probably borrowed from China around this time; and now the British Prime Minister seeks


This has encouraged me to develop new dimensions in formal versus substantive reasoning, bringing out similarities between English and New Zealand law on the one hand, and US and Japanese law on the other (these two often still being seen as worlds apart); and the possibility of an emergence of "neo-procedural" elements apparent in all four systems, albeit perhaps to varying degrees and without requiring that this lead to convergence even over the long term (see "Proceduralisation of Japanese Law in Comparative Perspective: Product Liability and Contract", paper presented at the annual meeting of the Law & Society Association, Chicago, 27-30 May 1999). However, because so much of the received wisdom from comparative lawyers – often unfamiliar with Japan (eg U Mattei "Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems" (1997) 45 AJCL 5, 28, 36-40; K Zweigert & H Koetz Introduction to Comparative Law (T Weir trans, Clarendon, Oxford, 3rd ed 1998), 295-302) – stresses ostensible differences between "Western" and Japanese law, much of my writing on the latter has tried to balance this by identifying and scrutinising convergent elements and forces (see eg "Japanese Corporate Governance at a Crossroads" (Paper presented at the conference on 'Economic Law Reform in the Aftermath of the Asian Crisis: Experiences of Japan and Thailand', Thammasat University, 20-21 March 2000, revised for proceedings edited by Thammasat University Law Faculty; and the revised paper with the sub-title "Variation in 'Varieties of Capitalism?'", presented at the University of Victoria, Canada, 14 February 2001, available through <http://www.capi.uvic.ca/nottage/>).
a "third way". But my great-grandfather – whose family emigrated from England to New Zealand via Australia – apparently used to urge "everything in moderation, including moderation", which the family has interpreted as allowing the occasional bout of extremism. And a German saying, popular in the student demonstrations in the 1960s, warns us that: "In danger and greatest need, the middle way leads to death". American political leaders are sceptical too. John Adams wrote in 1776 that "in politics ... the middle way is none at all", while George Shultz has cautioned recently that: "He who walks in the middle of the road gets hit from both sides". More divergence, as well as convergence, in Europe and world-wide! QED.

---

25 See respectively Ovid, above n **; "Nothing in excess" (also attributed to others around the 6th or 7th centuries BC; J Bartlett's Familiar Quotations (Little Brown, Boston et al, 16th ed 1992) 134); M Carrithers The Buddha (Oxford UP, Oxford, 1983) 72, 76; *chuyo* or "moderation"; T Blair The Middle Way: New Politics for the New Century (The Fabian Society, London, 1998). Thanks to Neil Walker and Seiji Morikawa for some of these.

26 This appears to be an interesting variation on the rather ambiguous saying attributed to the British politician, Benjamin Disraeli (1804-81): "There is moderation even in excess". See J Bartlett's Familiar Quotations (Little Brown, Boston et al, 16 ed 1992) 501.

27 "In Gefahr und grösster Not, führt der Mittelweg zum Tod." Thanks to Christian Joerges for this.

28 Quoted respectively in Bartlett, above n 26, 338; and K Mohler (ed) Webster’s Electronic Quotebase (1994). Thanks to Peter Whisker for the latter.