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Sir Frank Holmes Memorial Lecture, April 2024

Democracy and te Tiriti

Ko te wai e hora rā, ko Raukawa-moana. Ko te marae e takoto rā, ko te Whare Pī. Ko koutou āku rangatira kua pae nei i te pō nei, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā tātou katoa.

My thanks to the School of Government for their very kind invitation. I guess I ought to feel at home here in the shadow of Parliament, because, as they say, in politics it's dog eat dog, whereas in academia it's precisely the reverse. It's a good recipe for humility, in any case.

In this lecture in honour of Sir Frank Holmes, with his exceptional contributions to both academia and politics, I'd like to offer some thoughts, well researched I hope. It's not a matter of 'laying down the law', but of sharing ideas about matters of national importance.

In 1992, during its hearings on the Muriwhenua land claim, the Waitangi Tribunal asked me to give evidence on Māori understandings of te Tiriti o Waitangi when it was signed in 1840 (Salmond, 1991). I had trained as an historical linguist, and had recently published *Two Worlds: first meetings between Māori and Europeans*, a book that explored the beginnings of our shared history in New Zealand. Not wanting to tackle this task on my own, I worked closely with Merimeri Penfold and Cleve Barlow, friends and colleagues in the Department

of Māori Studies at the University of Auckland. Cleve was a fluent native speaker of northern Māori who had recently published a book on tikanga, while Merimeri, also a fluent speaker from Tai Tokerau, was a brilliant translator of te reo into English.

Merimeri, Cleve and I worked through the text of te Tiriti, word by word, drawing on their deep understandings of tikanga and te reo, Cleve's database and my own work on the historical records, including the debates at each of the northern sites where te Tiriti was signed. One of the first things we noticed was the use of the term 'tuku' – to give or release – throughout the text of te Tiriti, a term used in chiefly gift exchange.

In the debates over te Tiriti, each rangatira spoke for their own hapū, weighing up the risks and benefits of

forging a closer relationship with Queen Victoria, Governor Hobson and the British. Some drew on direct experience of visits by themselves or their predecessors to Britain or British colonies, where they'd met governors or monarchs, while others had studied the Bible and learned about governors in that context.

For the Queen's part, te Tiriti begins with a statement of care. In her mahara atawhai (caring concern) for the rangatira and hapū of New Zealand, it says, the Queen has decided to tuku or give a rangatira as a kai whakarite or mediator, literally 'one who makes things equivalent', to preserve their rangatiratanga and their land, to bring peace and tranquil living, and to avoid the evils arising from indigenous persons and settlers living without law.

In the debates over te Tiriti, the rangatira argued over whether or not to accept Hobson as a governor, and what that might mean for their people and their mana as rangatira. Since the first arrival of Europeans in Tai Tokerau, inter-hapū fighting had spiralled out of control through uneven access to muskets, the missionaries were challenging tapu and many tikanga, unruly settlers from Britain and elsewhere were difficult to control, and pressure from land speculators was intensifying. Life in 1840 was changing at a furious pace, and for the rangatira, leadership was increasingly

fraught. From their speeches, it is clear that they were not sure about what signing te Tiriti might mean. Eventually, however, almost all were persuaded by the missionaries, Hobson and various fellow rangatira to put their trust in the Queen's promises that they and Hobson would be equals, that their mana, lands and tikanga would be protected, and that it was in their best interests to sign te Tiriti.

Pivotal to these debates was the balance between 'kawanatanga' in ture 1 of te Tiriti and 'tino rangatiratanga' in ture 2. After a forensic analysis of these terms in many early texts in Māori, including the Bible

rangatira to cede their rangatiratanga. He had just returned from Port Nicholson, where New Zealand Company representatives who had just arrived on the *Tory* were buying up large areas of land, and was fearful about what that might mean for local kin groups. For that reason, I think, he softened his translation of the English draft of the Treaty to make it acceptable to the rangatira. Instead of using 'mana' and 'kingitanga' to translate 'sovereignty', as he had done in He Whakapūtanga, he used 'kawanatanga' or governance instead, a lesser power.

In 1992, when we gave evidence to the Tribunal that in te Tiriti o Waitangi the

In both hearings, not much attention was paid to ture 3 of te Tiriti, which was assumed to be a fairly accurate translation of the English draft: 'Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects.' On closer inspection, however, ture 3 puts it differently. Here, in exchange for their agreement to kāwanatanga, the Queen promises to care for 'nga tangata maori katoa o Nu Tirani' – the indigenous inhabitants of New Zealand – and tuku or gives to them 'nga tikanga katoa rite tahi' – tikanga exactly equivalent (not the same) – as to her subjects, the inhabitants of England. This was her return gift to the rangatira.

There are several other things to note about ture 3. While in English there is only one definite article, 'the', in te reo there are two, 'te' and 'nga', singular and plural. Thus, when the Queen promised to give 'nga tangata maori katoa o Nu Tirani', the indigenous inhabitants of New Zealand, tikanga (right ways of doing things) exactly equal to her subjects, the inhabitants of England, that gift was made to them as persons in the plural. Although the phrase 'nga tangata maori' has often been read as 'the Māori people', or, in the Lands case judgement in 1987, as 'the Maori race' in the singular, this is a translation error.

This insensible slip from plural to singular has contributed to the interpretation of te Tiriti as a binary 'partnership between races', or between 'the Māori race and the Crown', or 'Māori and Pākehā'. A small grammatical difference between te reo and English has contributed to constitutional confusion.

Throughout the text of te Tiriti, from the first line of the preamble onwards, its parties are named as Victoria, the Queen of England; the kāwana or governor; the rangatira; the hapū; and nga tangata in the plural. There is no mention of 'te iwi Māori' or anything that could be translated as 'the Māori people' or 'the Māori race' in the singular. Hapū are the largest collectivities mentioned.

In ture 3, furthermore, when the Queen gives nga tangata maori katoa o Nu Tirani (the indigenous inhabitants of New Zealand) as persons nga tikanga katoa rite tahi, tikanga absolutely equivalent to those

As Tāmāti Waka Nene said in one of the last speeches at Waitangi in 1840, speaking in favour of the governor, 'You must be our father! You must not allow us to become slaves! You must preserve our customs, and never permit our lands to be wrested from us!'

and He Whakapūtanga (the Declaration of Independence), like many scholars before us we concluded that in ture 1, the rangatira tuku or gave Queen Victoria absolutely and forever the right to have a governor in New Zealand, and to govern. This was a substantial gift, but less than the cession of sovereignty (in the sense of an indivisible, overarching power) claimed in the English draft of the Treaty.

Henry Williams, the British missionary who translated the English draft into te reo, had translated He Whakapūtanga, the Declaration of Independence, into Māori five years earlier. In He Whakapūtanga he used the words 'kingitanga' (kingship) and 'mana' to translate 'sovereign power and authority'; while 'kawanatanga' was used to translate 'a function of government', a lesser power that the rangatira might delegate to a person of their own choosing. The word 'rangatiratanga' was used as a translation equivalent for 'independence'.

Williams, who had lived in the north for 17 years, knew it was pointless to ask local

rangatira and hapū did not cede sovereignty to the British, the timing was awkward, and our report was quietly shelved. It was not until 2009, in the Te Paparahi o te Raki claim, that the Tribunal finally tackled the issue of sovereignty and its relationship with tino rangatiratanga in te Tiriti head on, and I was asked to revisit that earlier submission (see Salmond, 2023, pp.337–450).

By that time Cleve had died and Merimeri was not well, and with guidance from close colleagues, including Hone Sadler, Manuka Henare and Patu Hohepa, I carried out further research that upheld those earlier findings. This time, too, evidence given by hapū experts greatly enriched our understandings of the text of te Tiriti o Waitangi, and the context in which it was signed. In its stage one report, the Tribunal itself concluded that when they signed te Tiriti, the rangatira did not cede sovereignty to the Queen. They did give her absolutely and forever the right to govern in all their lands, however.

of her subjects, nga tangata o Ingarani, the inhabitants of England, this is a relationship of equivalence, not identity, with the governor sent as a kai whakarite, one who creates order and balance.

Rite in ture 3 is a word that means equivalent, not the same – equality in difference. As Tāmami Waka Nene said in one of the last speeches at Waitangi in 1840, speaking in favour of the governor, ‘You must be our father! You must not allow us to become slaves! You must preserve our customs, and never permit our lands to be wrested from us!’ When Nene’s elder brother Patuone spoke at Waitangi, the last of the manuhiri to address the gathering, Bishop Pompallier reported that ‘he spoke at length in favour of Mr. Hobson, and explained, by bringing his two index fingers side by side, that they would be perfectly equal, and that each chief would be similarly equal with Mr. Hobson’ (Low, 1990, p.192; Colenso, 1890, pp.26–7).

According to this reading of te Tiriti, when each rangatira signed the parchment they forged their own alliance with Queen Victoria. In the Northern Wars which followed five years later, after Treaty promises were broken, some rangatira and hapū fought with British troops, while others fought against them. The same thing happened in the Land Wars in the 1860s.

Rather than a bilateral partnership between ‘the Māori race’ and the Crown, then, te Tiriti is a multilateral agreement in which each rangatira and their hapū gave kāwanatanga, the right to govern, to Queen Victoria, while retaining their tino rangatiratanga, their independent right to manage their lands, ancestral treasures and relationships with the Crown. At the same time, the indigenous inhabitants of New Zealand with their tikanga were placed on an equal footing as persons with the inhabitants of England. In this arrangement, the mana of all parties is respected.

Is this compatible with democracy? I would say so, absolutely. Indeed, in 1840, life in te ao Māori was in many ways more democratic than it was in Europe. As Frederick Maning, an early settler in the Hokianga, observed,

The natives are so self-possessed, opinionated, and republican, that the chiefs have at ordinary times but little

control over them, except in very rare cases, where the chief happens to possess a singular vigour of character to enable him to keep them under. (Maning, 1863, p.37)

Or as Francis Dart Fenton, a distinguished judge of the Native Land Court, remarked,

No system of government that the world ever saw can be more democratic than that of the Maoris. The chief alone has no power. The whole tribe deliberate

In 1840 the trader Joel Polack wrote:

it is not uncommon to see young children of tender years, sitting next to their parents in the councils, apparently listening with the greatest attention ... They ask questions, [and the chiefs] answer them with an air of respect, as if they were a corresponding age to themselves. I do not remember a request of an infant being treated with neglect, or a demand from one of them being slighted. (Polack, 1840, I/378–9)

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on every subject, not only politically on such as are of public interest, but even judicially they hold their ‘komitis’ on every private quarrel. No individual enjoys influence or exercises power, unless it originates with the mass and is expressly or tacitly conferred by them. (Fenton, 1860, p.11)

At a time when European married women did not enjoy property rights or the vote, Māori women inherited land from their parents and grandparents, and female rangatira and tohunga exercised considerable influence. Contrary to contemporary *Once were Warriors* myths, too, European eyewitnesses reported that family life in Māori communities was generally affectionate, and children were cherished. According to Samuel Marsden, for instance, a leading missionary who visited New Zealand for the first time in 1814 (and could never be accused of being a ‘bleeding heart’), ‘I saw no quarreling while I was there. They are kind to their women and children. I never observed either with a mark of violence upon them, nor did I ever see a child struck’ (Marsden, 1832, p.479).

In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, discipline through the criminal code and in everyday life was harsh, and often very violent. Under the doctrine of ‘coverture’, women and children were legally ‘covered’ by their husbands and fathers, who were entitled to use corporal punishment as a form of discipline, and married women had no independent property rights. The King or Queen was the head of state, and governance was shared between the House of Lords or the ‘upper House’, and the House of Commons, reflecting a powerful class system. At that time the franchise was limited to men, and only men with a certain amount of property. In 1833 in England and Wales, for instance, only about one in 17 men who lived in towns and one in 24 men in rural areas had the franchise, while in Ireland, about one in 26 urban men and only one in 114 male country dwellers could vote (Hoppen, 1985, p.204).

In Ireland and in Highland Scotland, too, imperial rule was brutal. In the Highlands, for instance, the Gaelic language and culture were suppressed as ‘one of the chief and principal causes of barbarity and incivility’, and resistance brutally smashed in battles such as Culloden, after which lands were

confiscated and their leaders were hung, drawn and quartered. This was followed by the Highland Clearances, in which my own forebears, formerly seanachaidh or keepers of traditional lore for kings of Scotland and the lords of the Isles, were driven from their ancestral lands into exile.¹

For all of these reasons, article 3 in the English draft of the Treaty, in which the Queen of England gave the indigenous inhabitants 'all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects', was not really much of a gift. Under English rule, like the Highland Scots and the Irish, tāngata Māori – especially women – lost many of their

Around the end of the 19th century, however, as groups of MPs rallied around particular policies, political parties began to form. Under the 'first past the post' system (FPP), the candidate in an electorate with the most votes won the seat, and the party with the most seats won the election. This soon evolved into a two-party system which often polarised decision making, and the party that won the most votes did not always win the election.

In 1993, as we all know, this was changed to a mixed-member proportional system (MMP), in an attempt to achieve a more representative government. Under

In te Tiriti, the honour of Queen Victoria and her descendants is at stake, along with the mana of the rangatira who signed it, and theirs. In 1975 when the Waitangi Tribunal was established to try and make amends for this dishonourable history and uphold the Queen's promises, that was democracy in action, supported by the wider electorate.

Throughout our shared history, there have been intermittent struggles between those who try to uphold the Treaty of Waitangi and the honour of the Crown, and those who wish to disregard its promises. When hapū have united to uphold their mana, in the Kingitanga and Kotahitanga movements, for instance, this has almost invariably been in response to radical breaches of te Tiriti – from the time of the Northern Wars and the Land Wars to the present.

It is important to understand this dynamic. While te Tiriti itself is a multilateral agreement between the various rangatira, their hapū and Queen Victoria, the Crown has always found it convenient to try and deal with hapū in larger groupings, whether as iwi, iwi groupings, 'the Māori race' or 'the Māori people'. At the same time, when Treaty promises are broken, hapū leaders join together to defend their people. The greater the threat, the wider the net is cast in forging these alliances. This process is very visible in New Zealand at present.

Given these converging dynamics, it is not surprising that in recent times te Tiriti has often been recast as a binary pact between 'the Crown and the Māori race' or 'Māori and Pākehā', as in the 1987 Lands case, rather than a set of multilateral alliances between Queen Victoria and the rangatira of the various hapū.

This kind of biracial framing has its dangers, however. Global studies of a process called 'pernicious polarisation' have examined how self-interested parties may play upon such divisions by 'stoking fears, anxieties and resentments that then become expressed as hostility, bias and eventually enmity. By choosing the cleavage or grievance to highlight, they drive the polarization' to amplify their power (McCoy and Somer, 2019, p.240). Identities – political, ethnic or religious – may be reduced to simple binaries: left versus right, Democrat versus Republican, black versus

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ancestral freedoms, and any idea that the Treaty introduced modern democracy to New Zealand is mistaken.

When the first election was held in New Zealand in 1853, for instance, only men had the right to vote. They had to be British citizens, 21 years old or more, and, as in Britain, own property over a certain value. That excluded most Māori, whose land was held in common by kin groups. The right to vote was extended in 1867 to all Māori men, who elected four Māori MPs to the House of Representatives; and in 1879 to all European men. In 1893, women, including Māori women, finally won the right to vote in national elections. This world-leading shift came about in part because Māori women enjoyed leadership roles and property rights at a time when these were denied to European women.

At first, New Zealand citizens voted for individual MPs based on their character, values and the policies they supported.

This system, citizens have two votes, one for a party and one for their local MP. Parties are elected to Parliament if they win at least 5% of the party vote or at least one electorate. Under MMP, parties or interest groups are intended to command influence roughly proportionate to their electoral support. When that ceases to be the case, MMP is failing.

Given this historic background, there are many ironies in current debates about democracy and the Treaty. Under the Queen's promises in te Tiriti o Waitangi, a democracy might have emerged in New Zealand that was freer, more accountable and more just than that in Britain at the same time. Instead of peace and tranquil living, however, there was war, followed by large-scale confiscations of land, and harsh cultural repression. From that time until now, the promise of equality for indigenous persons in New Zealand has not been delivered, as contemporary statistics attest.

white, Catholic versus Protestant, iwi versus Kiwi. In this polarising process, ‘identity can become all-encompassing as people view those in the “Other” camp with distrust, suspicion, or fear, and cease to interact with them – even segregating themselves in their neighborhoods, social relationships, and news-feeds with like-minded people’ (ibid., p.236).

The middle ground becomes a battleground (sometimes literally); moderate voices are silenced, and those with cross-cutting loyalties are cancelled. This undermines good governance by making parties less likely to compromise, or to reach a consensus.² If left unchecked, this kind of polarisation can split societies, devastate nation states, wreck their economies and destroy the lives of their people.

This has happened in many countries – Serbs and Croats in Bosnia; Catholics and Protestants in Ireland; Israel and Palestine in Gaza; Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, and in many other African nations. Many analyses are being written about ‘pernicious polarisation’ in America at present.

As for political parties involved in such processes, ‘[i]ncumbent polarizing parties typically attempt to govern on their own and eschew norms for bipartisan or multi-partisan decision-making’ (ibid., p.249). That may include governing with an absolute majority without consulting the opposition or the wider electorate; forging alliances with smaller, more extreme parties; or governing by autocracy and repression.

No country is immune from this kind of politics. After the 2020 election in New Zealand, for instance, when Labour won an absolute majority, the government engaged in unilateral decision making that accentuated existing social cleavages – central versus local government, rural versus urban communities, and Māori versus other New Zealanders in relation to Te Tiriti, for instance. In their turn, other political agents played upon these divisions. While in the past, genuine grievances and structural disparities have been addressed with bipartisan support through the Waitangi Tribunal, equal opportunities programmes or the creation of ministries to address the needs of women, Pacific Islanders and Māori, some politicians now depict these as forms of privilege, stoking popular resentment.

In the face of rising tensions, strong democratic checks and balances are needed. In New Zealand, those inside Parliament include the scrupulous avoidance of conflicts of interest, opportunities for public input and informed advice, select committees, and cross-party co-operation on matters of national importance. Those outside Parliament include a politically neutral public service, independent bodies such as the ombudsman, the auditor-general, the Waitangi Tribunal and the Climate Change Commission, a free, independent press, an independent judiciary, and universities as ‘critic and conscience’ of society.

campaigns, undermines democratic checks and balances. If wealthy citizens, corporates and think tanks can gain disproportionate influence through media campaigns, lobbying and campaign donations, and policies can be purchased as part of the electoral process, that undermines public trust in good governance.

A combination of these risks and failures has led to a catastrophic collapse of faith in democracy in many countries around the world, with authoritarian regimes a common outcome. As Benjamin Franklin, another of the founding fathers of democracy, once observed, ‘[a

In Tairāwhiti in the wake of Cyclone Gabrielle, we saw how an unholy alliance between lobbyists, politicians and extractive industries can play out, when forestry waste swept downriver destroyed roads, bridges, fences, paddocks, orchards, vineyards, homes, livelihoods and lives.

In recent times, however, almost all of these checks and balances have been weakened. Inside Parliament, urgency has been used to avoid public input and rigorous debate; ministers are awarding themselves powers to make unilateral decisions; and cross-party co-operation on matters of national interest is uncommon.

Outside Parliament, the investigative role of the press is being undermined by the rise of social media, where misinformation freely circulates; the impartiality of the public service has been compromised by direct ministerial controls; the statutory role of universities as ‘critic and conscience of society’ is challenged; and politicians are attacking the judiciary and independent bodies, including the Waitangi Tribunal and the Climate Change Commission.

At the same time, increased inequality in power and wealth, along with lobbying and the private funding of political

democratic] government is not establish’d merely by *Power*; there must be maintain’d a general Opinion of its *Wisdom and Justice*, to make it firm and durable.’³ What would a wise and just government look like here in Aotearoa New Zealand?

To begin with, I think a wise and just government would seek a balance between collective responsibility and individual freedoms, rather than seeing these as ideological opposites. Both are fundamental to a thriving democracy.

Polarisation around ethnicity or ‘race’ is also dangerous. Unilateral decision making – in whatever direction – sparks the resentment that ignites ‘pernicious polarisation’. Discussions that exclude the descendants of the various rangatira and hapū who signed Te Tiriti, or the descendants of the incoming settlers, are cases in point. Te Tiriti is a relational pact, and all parties involved in its promises must be respected. Once again, it is a question of balance.

A wise, just government would also pursue long-term policies aimed at delivering thriving landscapes and communities across Aotearoa New Zealand. In Tairāwhiti in the wake of Cyclone Gabrielle, we saw how an unholy alliance between lobbyists, politicians and extractive industries can play out, when forestry waste swept downriver destroyed roads, bridges, fences, paddocks, orchards, vineyards, homes, livelihoods and lives. Industrial forestry, having lobbied long and hard to avoid environmental controls, inflicted crippling long-term costs on the local community and the regional economy (Salmond and Caddie, forthcoming).

Such policies are also self-defeating, with forestry companies in Tairāwhiti now losing their international certification for sustainability and access to key markets. The same could happen to agriculture and horticulture in New Zealand if we're not careful.

A wise, just government would also conduct its business out in the open. Like many others, I think that the links between politicians, lobbyists and funders in New Zealand are too opaque at present. It would be good to know, for instance, where the funding for the current, multi-stranded and very costly campaign to rewrite te Tiriti o Waitangi is coming from, when this is channelled through groups that are not currently required to report on their sources of income. The same applies to campaigns to weaken anti-smoking policies and environmental protections.

With well-designed processes, democracy can work at pace, and trading freedom for speed is dangerous. Furthermore, as we've seen in Tairāwhiti, destroying the environment for short-term profit is economically as well as ecologically self-destructive. It is also the opposite of localised democracy, where local people have a real say in decision making. Under such a regime, the likelihood of conflicts of interest is obvious. No government, I think, should be trusted with this kind of power.

Under MMP, too, with coalition governments, the relationship between the votes cast for particular parties and policy outcomes can be tenuous. Small parties hitch their wagon to larger ones and force through policies that at the time of election attracted very little support from the

electorate. Such disproportionate empowerment corrodes trust in Parliament and the democratic process.

Democracy is under siege in many countries, and the stratagems being deployed are well documented. Although the authors of studies of 'pernicious polarisation' offer no silver bullet for combating its threats to democratic checks and balances, they warn that responding in kind with vilification and reprisals only speeds up the process. Rather, they suggest casting light on such devices and those who deploy them; greater transparency and oversight of links between funders and politicians; and the deliberate strengthening of the middle ground through bipartisan policymaking, with wide civic engagement that reaches across ethnic and other boundaries, and well-moderated, inclusive conversations about divisive matters, in citizens' assemblies or on marae, for example.

In New Zealand, many of our ancestors came to create better lives for themselves and their children. This led to a robust independence coupled with a sense of social responsibility and the idea of a 'fair go' – a powerful combination. As citizens, we have the right and duty to demand honest, wise and fair governance from our leaders; and to help devise solutions.

As Pita Tipene has said,

The hapu is the chief of the chiefs. This is how it has been from time immemorial ... a rangatira is a person who weaves people together ... The rangatira is not above the hapu. The rangatira must listen to the people, in

Whakarongo! Whakarongo! Whakarongo!
Ki te tangi a te manu e karanga nei
Tui, tui, tuituiaa!
Tuia i runga, tuia i raro,
Tuia i roto, tuia i waho,
Tuia i te here tangata
Ka rongo te pō, ka rongo te pō
Tuia i te kawai tangata i heke mai
I Hawaiki nui, i Hawaiki roa,
I Hawaiki pāmamao
I hono ki te wairua, ki te whai ao
Ki te Ao Mārama!

¹ For an account of the experiences of the Scottish Highlanders, who were treated as 'barbarians' and 'savages', had their Gaelic language and customs suppressed and their lands taken, and many of whom were forced into exile, see, for instance, Hunter, 1995, pp.19–39.

accordance with tikanga. If they do not listen, they will be cast aside. (Waitangi Tribunal, 2014, p.31)

That is the true promise of te Tiriti. Instead of trying to divide us, we need leaders who will look far into the future, listen to the people, take the best strands of our ancestral legacies and weave us together.

What would this look like? I think that there are many examples of this kind of leadership in Aotearoa New Zealand. Think, for instance, of the multitude of charities across the country that work across these boundaries, caring for those in need, restoring local landscapes, supporting the arts and sport and strengthening community networks. Or the marae that in times of crisis, whether floods or earthquakes, open their doors to the wider community, so that people have food to eat and a place to sleep. Or the catchment groups where people from different backgrounds come together to heal our waterways.

This is democracy at the flax roots and grass roots, led by people trusted by their peers, who know how to make a positive difference. It is the opposite of top-down, divisive politics where self-interest rules and power and wealth are highly concentrated.

A number of community-based leaders have made their way into Parliament, across the political spectrum. I hope they will stand tall, and fight for wise, just governance in New Zealand – the kind that cares for land and people, and binds us together. Nā reira, e āku rangatira, kia kaha, kia toa! As my mentor Eruera Stirling used to chant:

Listen! Listen! Listen!
To the cry of the bird calling
Bind, join, be one!
Bind above, bind below
Bind within, bind without
Tie the knot of humankind
The night hears, the night hears
Bind the lines of people coming down
From great Hawaiki, from long Hawaiki
From Hawaiki far away
Bind to the spirit, to the day light
To the World of Light.

² Many thanks to Chris Wilson for making this point.

³ Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Galloway, 9–28 February 1769, Clements Library, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-16-02-0008>.

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These Brown Bag sessions are held the first Monday of most months, over lunchtime. Past topics have included:

- Intergenerational wellbeing and public policy
- A visual exploration of video surveillance camera policy and practice
- The role of financial risk in the New Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy

- Strategic public procurement: a research agenda
- What role(s) for Local Government: 'roads, rates and rubbish' or 'partner in governance'?
- Human capital theory: the end of a research programme?
- How do we do things?

We would welcome your attendance and/or guest presentation, if you are interested.

Contact us to go on the mailing list for upcoming sessions at sog-info@vuw.ac.nz