What Best Explains the Discrimination Against the Chinese in New Zealand, 1860s-1950s?

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Dominating the relatively substantial literature on the history of the Chinese in New Zealand is the story of their mistreatment by white New Zealanders from the late 1860s through to the 1950s. However, the study of discrimination against the Chinese has now reached something of an impasse, one arising from the strong tendency of researchers in the area to advance their favourite explanations for discrimination without arguing why they prefer these to the alternatives. This practice has led to an increase in the variety of explanations and in the weight of data supporting the explanations, but not to their rigorous appraisal. In consequence, while researchers have told us more and more about which causal factors produced discrimination they have little debated or demonstrated the relative importance of these factors. As there is no reason to believe that all the putative factors are of equal importance, knowledge about the causes is not progressing.

The object of this paper is to break the impasse by engaging in a systematic comparative evaluation of the different explanations to determine which one might be considered the best. The best explanation is, of course, not perfect by definition. Moreover, in all likelihood an even better explanation will consist of a combination of that best and one or more of the others. But to find the perfect explanation or a combination of explanations we have to start somewhere. Thus, the process of determining the best explanation of all that have been put forward so far is a crucial step, but only one of many, in the growth of knowledge. To improve upon existing explanations, we must first find the one with the fewest faults and the greatest strengths then build on it.

The paper begins with a discussion of the criteria to be used in comparatively evaluating the different explanations. It then sketches and appraises in turn the competing explanations that have been advanced for anti-Chinese feeling in New Zealand. Finally, it demonstrates why one is preferred above the others, but also identifies its weaknesses. For the most part, the focus will be on the explanations for the most visible forms of discrimination – the legal and institutional – and the collective protest that
What Best Explains the Discrimination Against the Chinese?

In the first place, the best explanation should have more capacity than its competitors to account for comparable cases of discrimination that occurred elsewhere. Such comparable cases include Australia (especially the eastern colonies/states from the 1850s to the Great War), British Columbia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and California from 1852 to about the 1880s. What makes these cases comparable is that they were all white settler societies; in all instances their Sino-phobia began when their respective gold rushes attracted considerable inflows of Chinese immigrants for the first time; much of their anti-Chinese legislation was similar and indeed was copied from each other; also, their Chinese immigrants came from the same part of China (the Pearl River delta region near Canton); and, as we shall be shown later, had remarkably similar demographic traits. This is not to suggest that the cases are the same. Take collective violent protest against the Chinese during the gold-rush era: whereas forcible expulsions of Chinese from the gold-fields by white miners were very rare in New Zealand (which experienced about two such incidents) and British Columbia, about a dozen episodes occurred in Victoria and New South Wales in the 1850s and 1860s (including the infamous riots at Lambing Flat), and myriads in California from the 1850s to the 1880s. Another significant variation across the cases is the constitutional capacity of their respective governments: the New Zealand government and the Australian governments before federation had more authority to pass exclusionary legislation against Chinese immigrants than the British Columbian provincial and Californian state governments, the latter being constrained by federalism. Even so, there are sufficient similarities between the cases to test the power of the explanations for the New Zealand case by considering which are extendable to the other cases and which are not.

In the second place, the best explanation will be defined as the one that accounts for more of the trends in discriminatory responses in New Zealand than the competing explanations. These trends consist of: a considerable degree of acceptance when Chinese immigration to the goldfields began in the late 1860s; a rising level of hostility and the rapid formation of a negative stereotype in the 1870s, culminating in the passage of the first discriminatory legislation in 1881; the hardening of attitudes from the 1880s to the 1920s, which was associated with the racialisation of the stereotype and the imposition of further legal disabilities; and finally the gradual easing of racism from the mid-1930s onwards, which manifested itself in the piecemeal abolition of the legal disabilities.

The third way in which comparatively the explanatory power of the competing explanations will be assessed is by determining which of them accounts for the exceptions — that is, for the white New Zealanders who were not hostile to the Chinese. Although there is no real indication as to how many such colonists there were, we certainly know that at least some defended Chinese immigration, befriended the Chinese (a few even intermarried with them) or at least were indifferent toward them. James Ng’s close research has found obituary notices in local newspapers featuring former Chinese residents and paying tributes to them. A mark of the best explanation thus is that it possesses a superior capacity to account not only for the antagonism (perhaps expressed by the many) but also for positive and neutral sentiment (perhaps expressed by the few).

In addition, the relative explanatory capacities of the different explanations will be appraised by determining which of them can account for the content of the negative stereotype of the Chinese (or can account for more of the content than other explanations). Thus the best explanation in this regard will account not just for the discrimination against the Chinese but also for the common beliefs that the Chinese carried infectious diseases, were dirty and unhygienic, unfairly undercut wages and prices, threatened to swamp the European population, engaged in gambling and opium smoking, sexually corrupted young European women, and were ‘locusts’ or parasites (lacked social duty, contributed nothing to New Zealand’s economic development, and were predators on New Zealand’s natural resources).
What Best Explains the Discrimination Against the Chinese?

The best explanation for anti-Chinese feeling is whether it is more useful, does more work, can solve more problems, than its competitors can. It should not just explain why discrimination occurred but also perform a greater number of other tasks related to the problem than do the rival explanations.

In the first place, the best explanation should have more capacity than its competitors to account for comparable cases of discrimination that occurred elsewhere. Such comparable cases include Australia (especially the eastern colonies/states from the 1850s to the Great War), British Columbia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and California from 1852 to about the 1880s. What makes these cases comparable is that they were all white settler societies; in all instances their Sino-phobia began when their respective gold rushes attracted considerable inflows of Chinese immigrants for the first time; much of their anti-Chinese legislation was similar and indeed was copied from each other; also, their Chinese immigrants came from the same part of China (the Pearl River delta region near Canton); and, as we shall be shown later, had remarkably similar demographic traits.

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Another criterion of a powerful explanation is that, unlike a weak one, it should be able to demonstrate why, although all non-white immigrants were subjected to discriminatory legislation, the Chinese were subjected to the most. Certainly, the Lebanese, Indians and other Asians, not just the Chinese, were excluded from state pensions until 1937; and all non-European non-British immigrants were subject to the reading test from 1907 to 1920. Moreover, all non-whites regardless of whether they were British subjects were the target of the White New Zealand immigration policy introduced in 1920. But the Chinese alone were banned from naturalisation (1908-1952); only the Chinese were required to have their fingerprints taken when entering and leaving the country (1900-1920); and only Chinese immigrants were the victims of the poll tax and tonnage restrictions (1881-1944).

Furthermore, a superior explanatory theory should be able to demonstrate why the discrimination did not go to extremes, had certain upper limits. For example, it would have to explain why, although the Chinese were ineligible for old age pensions, they were not disqualified from receiving the alternative to the pension, charitable aid, when elderly and infirm. It would also have to explain why, given the general racist climate the state fostered, the Chinese were not the victims of the most obvious forms of institutionalised racism: their rates of arrests, convictions and imprisonment, instead of being higher than those for the population as a whole, in fact were generally lower. The state certainly maltreated the Chinese in many ways, but not to the point of persecuting them by, for example, seizing their property, punitive taxation, or sanctioning violence and disorder against them. Nor did it curb the considerable vigour with which they sued Europeans, testified against Europeans in criminal cases, and made formal protests about the poll tax and arbitrary action by goldfields’ wardens. Indeed, by the standards of other settler societies, New Zealand’s discriminatory legislation was relatively restrained. It chose not to follow the examples of British Columbia in 1874 and all the Australian colonies in the late nineteenth century in disenfranchising the Chinese. It did not forcibly repatriate the Chinese, in contrast to Transvaal that did this to its Chinese indentured labourers from 1910, and Queensland which did the same to its Kanaka (Melanesian) immigrant workers after 1906. Unlike nearly all the other Pacific rim settler societies, New Zealand did not legislate to prohibit or restrict the entry of the Chinese into any occupation or deny them access to government land. It did not infringe the liberties of its Chinese population with curfew, pass, liquor and segregation laws, as did Natal with its Indian population and, to a lesser extent, Queensland with non-whites as a whole in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

This leads us to the seventh criterion. Historians often suggest that the Lionel Terry case (1905) and the vituperative language applied to the Chinese indicate that they were hated and deeply feared by white New Zealand. But this is going too far. The Lionel Terry case is unique in the New Zealand context and vituperation was not uncommon in colonial public discourse. Moreover, the vituperation was disproportionate to the way white colonists actually behaved towards the Chinese. The relatively restrained nature of anti-Chinese legislation and the virtual absence of collective violent protest against them scarcely indicate that the mass of colonists hated the Chinese. A more tenable inference from the behaviour would be to say that the mass of colonists was hostile to the Chinese and mistrusted them. Thus, what should distinguish an explanation with superior problem-solving abilities is that unlike its rivals it can explain why the level of anti-Chinese feeling while high was not extreme.

The next criterion for differentiating a powerful explanation from one less powerful is its ability to account for the specific content of New Zealand’s discriminatory legislation. That is, it would not only have to account for the motives behind discrimination but also the specific mechanisms of legal discrimination.

Finally, it will be suggested that the best explanation of discrimination will surpass its rivals if it makes sense of a greater number of important trends and events in New Zealand’s history. Indeed, we could go further and define the best explanation as the one that provides the most interpretive insight into ethnic relations or immigration history in general.

Having laid out the criteria, let us now take all the competing explanations and see how well each measures up to them. There are seven altogether. The best explanation, it should be remembered, is not expected to tackle all the additional tasks successfully – that is asking too much – but to tackle more of them successfully than its rivals can.

Let us start with what could be called the ‘swamping explanation’, the idea that behind the discrimination was the fear that hordes of Chinese would enter New Zealand, take control and become the dominant culture. On the face of it, this seems an implausible explanation. For one thing, the proportion of Chinese in the total population was always tiny, peaking at around two per cent in 1871. For another, the Chinese population declined in both absolute and relative terms from the 1880s to the late 1940s. As against that, it should be remembered that racial intolerance is not a respecter of population size. Very small ethnic minorities have often been the butts of persecution. Eliminationist anti-semitism, for example, festered in Germany from the late nineteenth century, even though the Jews, the most assimilated in Europe, comprised only about one per cent of the total German population. In addition, Brian Moloughney and John Stenhouse state, quite rightly, that we must see the swamping issue in its own context, from the perspective of colonists. The fear of swamping was rational from
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What Best Explains the Discrimination Against the Chinese?

31

argument are that anti-Chinese protest during the Otago gold rush era seems consistent with extensive evidence that the Chinese did tend to undercut primarily caused by economic competition.

The next explanation, the oldest of the seven, is that discrimination was mostly caused by economic competition. Indirectly, the argument is consistent with extensive evidence that the Chinese did tend to undercut European wages and prices. The positive examples that support the argument are that anti-Chinese protest during the Otago gold rush era seems to have risen as the boom waned; that the peak of trade union protest against the Chinese occurred during the Long Depression (1879-1895); that much of the discriminatory legislation was passed during this period as well; and the study by Jacqueline Leckie of the outbreak of protest in Pukekohe against the Chinese in the late 1920s, showing that it was led by white market gardeners hurt by the cheaper prices of their Chinese counterparts.

In addition, economic downturn is associated with anti-Chinese collective protest in California in the 1870s, 1884-6 and 1893-6; and in Australia in the 1890s. A further virtue of the argument is its capacity to account for at least some of the exceptions. Although many Europeans would have been the losers from Chinese wage- and price-cutting, others of course would have gained from these lower wages and prices. Indeed some Europeans (notably employers) wanted Chinese immigrants precisely because they were a source of cheap labour.

But there are many counter-examples to the economic competition argument. For a start, on the goldfields Chinese miners posed little competition to Europeans since they confined themselves to the ‘poor man’s diggings’ that Europeans generally avoided. Also, there is ample evidence that the segmented labour market and the relatively minute size of the Chinese labour pool minimised downward pressure on European wage and employment levels. The argument fails to account for the considerable number of Europeans who were not in economic competition with the Chinese yet were amongst their most vociferous opponents. Moreover, James Ng’s study of the Otago goldfields points out that in net terms the Chinese served the economic interests of European wage-workers. Although the Chinese undercut wages, they produced cheap vegetables and fruit that were otherwise in short supply; they did not compete with white employees for state support because they depended so little on state services; and they saved white workers from higher taxation because they generated more than their share of state revenue through customs revenue and the poll tax. The fact that almost no protest against the Chinese occurred during the great depression of the 1930s is another counter-example for the argument. Similarly, in the other Pacific rim countries, the relationship between economic trends and outbursts of anti-Chinese are not close: there are many examples where economic depressions and outbursts do not occur together and many where phases of economic growth and outbursts do occur together.

In response to these problems, Andrew Markus has modified the argument by claiming that what made white colonists hostile to the Chinese was not the actuality of economic competition but irrational fear of it – irrational because it was greatly exaggerated and largely groundless. Discrimination against Chinese immigration, he argues, was part and parcel of a defensive reaction by the labour movement against unemployment. It sought to restrict
their point of view, given that China was the most populous country in the world, that it had experienced a population explosion from the mid-eighteenth century, and that it had adapted to its population pressures through relatively high rates of emigration which in turn had created a large international diaspora.\footnote{23} Furthermore, although the Chinese population in New Zealand fell after the early 1880s, it was also rapidly moving out of Otago into many other parts of New Zealand, thus becoming more visible.\footnote{22}

A key fact supporting the swamping thesis is that three bursts of discriminatory legislation – 1881, 1888 and 1920 – occurred just after relatively sharp increases in the levels of Chinese immigration. Moreover, an advantage of the thesis is that it can account for a major image in the negative stereotype of the Chinese – the fear of swamping itself. In an obvious sense, furthermore, there is a broad causal relationship between anti-Chinese feeling and Chinese immigration since there would have been little or no anti-Chinese feeling without Chinese immigration.

Yet there are some serious anomalies in the thesis. By the 1920s, the Chinese were living in about eighty boroughs and counties they had not lived in before the 1880s; yet as Charles Sedgwick has pointed out, there is no evidence of anti-Chinese feeling in most of these localities.\footnote{21} A further anomaly is that anti-Chinese popular protest failed to occur in 1947 after one of the biggest short-term increases in the Chinese population took place, about 1300 Chinese (mainly refugees) on temporary permits being granted permanent residence, equal to about one quarter of the total New Zealand Chinese population at that time.\footnote{24} Also, Charles Price’s comparative study of the settler societies in the Pacific rim shows that there is no simple relationship between the outbursts of Sino-phobia and fluctuations in the levels of Chinese immigration.\footnote{25}

Apart from these anomalies, the swamping thesis has limited explanatory power. True, it seems to be able to explain most of the content of the discriminatory legislation, since with the exception of the pension ban the legislation was mainly concerned with limiting the inflow of Chinese. In addition, it can explain why the Chinese were subject to more discrimination than other non-European immigrants, given that they were the largest minority. But the thesis cannot explain the exceptions; the content of most of the negative stereotypes; the relative restraint of the discriminatory legislation; the fact that ill-feeling does not appear to have gone to extremes; and other important phenomena in New Zealand history.

The next explanation, the oldest of the seven, is that discrimination was primarily caused by economic competition.\footnote{26} Indirectly, the argument is consistent with extensive evidence that the Chinese did tend to undercut European wages and prices.\footnote{27} The positive examples that support the argument are that anti-Chinese protest during the Otago gold rush era seems to have risen as the boom waned; that the peak of trade union protest against the Chinese occurred during the Long Depression (1879-1895); that much of the discriminatory legislation was passed during this period as well; and the study by Jacqueline Leckie of the outbreak of protest in Pukekohe against the Chinese in the late 1920s, showing that it was led by white market gardeners hurt by the cheaper prices of their Chinese counterparts.\footnote{28} In addition, economic downturn is associated with anti-Chinese collective protest in California in the 1870s, 1884-6 and 1893-6; and in Australia in the 1890s.\footnote{29} A further virtue of the argument is its capacity to account for at least some of the exceptions. Although many Europeans would have been the losers from Chinese wage- and price-cutting, others of course would have gained from these lower wages and prices. Indeed some Europeans (notably employers) wanted Chinese immigrants precisely because they were a source of cheap labour.

But there are many counter-examples to the economic competition argument. For a start, on the goldfields Chinese miners posed little competition to Europeans since they confined themselves to the ‘poor man’s diggings’ that Europeans generally avoided.\footnote{30} Also, there is ample evidence that the segmented labour market and the relatively minute size of the Chinese labour pool minimised downward pressure on European wage and employment levels. The argument fails to account for the considerable number of Europeans who were not in economic competition with the Chinese yet were amongst their most vociferous opponents. Moreover, James Ng’s study of the Otago goldfields points out that in net terms the Chinese served the economic interests of European wage-workers. Although the Chinese undercut wages, they produced cheap vegetables and fruit that were otherwise in short supply; they did not compete with white employees for state support because they depended so little on state services; and they saved white workers from higher taxation because they generated more than their share of state revenue through customs revenue and the poll tax. The fact that almost no protest against the Chinese occurred during the great depression of the 1930s is another counter-example for the argument. Similarly, in the other Pacific rim countries, the relationship between economic trends and outbursts of anti-Chinese are not close: there are many examples where economic depressions and outbursts do not occur together and many where phases of economic growth and outbursts do occur together.\footnote{31}

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the supply of people entering the job market, not only by preventing Chinese immigrants entering the country but also by curbing the participation of married women and the elderly in the paid workforce, government assisted immigration, the employment of minors, and so on.\textsuperscript{32}

The virtue of Markus's explanation is its capacity to cohere with a major area of New Zealand history. Although not explicitly applied to New Zealand labour history, his explanation nonetheless enhances understanding of it, since the New Zealand labour movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had exactly the same preoccupation as its Australian counterpart: preventing unemployment by restricting the supply of people competing for work, including Chinese immigrants.\textsuperscript{33} That said, a major objection to Markus's proposition is that it is not testable. Colonists might well have irrationally feared that the Chinese were undercutting their wages; but fear as a motive for action cannot be observed, particularly if possessed by dead actors, and if it cannot be observed, propositions about its existence are not empirically falsifiable.

An additional objection is that if fear of Chinese economic competition lay behind the hostility towards the Chinese, then it is illogical that the hostility, and by implication the fear, occurred in several places where perception of competition might be expected to arise but did not. For example, protest against Chinese market gardeners arose in Pukekohe, but apparently not in several localities where there were also high concentrations of Chinese market gardeners, for example, Wanganui, Ohau, Levin and Oamaru.\textsuperscript{34}

Lastly, a major deficiency of Markus's argument is that it fails to satisfy most of the outlined explanatory power criteria. Irrational fear of Chinese economic competition does not seem able to explain the exceptions; the content of most of the derogatory ideas about the Chinese; the change over time in attitudes; why there was more discrimination against the Chinese than against other non-European immigrants; why the discriminatory legislation had certain upper limits; the relative moderation of the ill-feeling towards the Chinese; and the specific content of the legislation (if fear of economic competition caused anti-Chinese feeling then why was none of the legislation concerned with keeping the Chinese out of the occupations where they allegedly posed the greatest threat to European job security?).

A quite different – non-materialist – explanation for discrimination against the Chinese in New Zealand has recently been put forward by John Stenhouse and Brian Moloughney.\textsuperscript{35} They maintain that anti-Chinese feeling was driven by colonial nationalism. According to their argument, the antagonism was part of a general movement in late nineteenth and early twentieth century New Zealand to eliminate elements alien to the colony's identity as prosperous, socially just and egalitarian – God's Own Country. Besides the Chinese, the enemies of the ideal society included Te Whiti and Rua, the large estate owners, the biologically unfit, Irish Catholics, conscientious objectors in the First World War, Red Feds and so forth. The great virtue of the colonial nationalist explanation, thus, is that it has the potential not just to explain prejudice towards the Chinese but also all kinds of other social movements at this point in New Zealand history.

A relatively minor problem with the Moloughney/Stenhouse theory is that it is very thin. They impart no sense of the history of colonial nationalism, no indication of its antecedents, of when and how it first arose, and what key figures and institutions were responsible for the subsequent course of its development. A more serious problem is the logic of the theory. The authors inferentially deduce that colonial nationalism existed in people's minds from its alleged consequences – the antipathy of colonists towards the Chinese, towards Maori separatists, Irish Catholics, the large estates and so on. But these outcomes do not entail colonial nationalism. Such behaviours could also imply that the elite (like elites anywhere) was preoccupied with social order,\textsuperscript{36} or that colonists wanted to preserve the purity of New Zealand as the Britain of the South.\textsuperscript{37} A related problem is that in its present form the theory does not appear to be testable. Taking parliamentary debates as their source, Moloughney and Stenhouse view colonial nationalism as consistent with such a wide variety of utterances that it is very difficult to think of any that could act as (to use Popper's term) potential falsifiers to their argument. In Australia, perhaps the strongest indication of when colonial nationalism lay behind anti-Chinese feeling is where discrimination was justified with the slogan 'Australia for Australians'.\textsuperscript{38} Yet the authors cite only one instance where the equivalent New Zealand slogan – 'New Zealand for New Zealanders' – crops up in the masses of parliamentary speeches on Chinese immigration in the late nineteenth century.

Like the other explanations so far discussed, the colonial nationalist claim fails to satisfy most of the explanatory power criteria. The authors talk at some length about the elements who defended the Chinese (notably the Christian humanitarians) but their colonial nationalist model does not have a logic which covers exceptions such as these. Furthermore, their theory seems unable to explain trends in attitudes over time; the specific content of any of the images in the anti-Chinese stereotype; why the Chinese were subjected to more intolerance than any other immigrant minority; why extreme measures were never taken against them; why the ill-feeling stopped short of mass hatred; and why the content of the discriminatory legislation took a certain form and no other.

The next explanation is that hostility to the Chinese was ideological in origin, and that it sprang from the general climate of popular racist ideas.\textsuperscript{39} The explanation is based on the assumption, which has become very fashionable with the rise of cultural history, that ideas are not simply
the supply of people entering the job market, not only by preventing Chinese immigrants entering the country but also by curbing the participation of married women and the elderly in the paid workforce, government assisted immigration, the employment of minors, and so on.\textsuperscript{32}

The virtue of Markus's explanation is its capacity to cohere with a major area of New Zealand history. Although not explicitly applied to New Zealand labour history, his explanation nonetheless enhances understanding of it, since the New Zealand labour movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had exactly the same preoccupation as its Australian counterpart: preventing unemployment by restricting the supply of people competing for work, including Chinese immigrants.\textsuperscript{33} That said, a major objection to Markus's proposition is that it is not testable. Colonists might well have irrationally feared that the Chinese were undercutting their wages; but fear as a motive for action cannot be observed, particularly if possessed by dead actors, and if it cannot be observed, propositions about its existence are not empirically falsifiable.

An additional objection is that if fear of Chinese economic competition lay behind the hostility towards the Chinese, then it is illogical that the hostility, and by implication the fear, occurred in several places where perception of competition might be expected to arise but did not. For example, protest against Chinese market gardeners arose in Pukekohe, but apparently not in several localities where there were also high concentrations of Chinese market gardeners, for example, Wanganui, Ohau, Levin and Oamaru.\textsuperscript{34}

Lastly, a major deficiency of Markus's argument is that it fails to satisfy most of the outlined explanatory power criteria. Irrational fear of Chinese economic competition does not seem able to explain the exceptions; the content of most of the derogatory ideas about the Chinese; the change over time in attitudes; why there was more discrimination against the Chinese than against other non-European immigrants; why the discriminatory legislation had certain upper limits; the relative moderation of the ill-feeling towards the Chinese; and the specific content of the legislation (if fear of economic competition caused anti-Chinese feeling then why was none of the legislation concerned with keeping the Chinese out of the occupations where they allegedly posed the greatest threat to European job security?).

A quite different – non-materialist – explanation for discrimination against the Chinese in New Zealand has recently been put forward by John Stenhouse and Brian Moloughney.\textsuperscript{35} They maintain that anti-Chinese feeling was driven by colonial nationalism. According to their argument, the antagonism was part of a general movement in late nineteenth and early twentieth century New Zealand to eliminate elements alien to the colony's identity as prosperous, socially just and egalitarian – God's Own Country. Besides the Chinese, the enemies of the ideal society included Te Whiti and Rua, the large estate owners, the biologically unfit, Irish Catholics, conscientious objectors in the First World War, Red Feds and so forth. The great virtue of the colonial nationalist explanation, thus, is that it has the potential not just to explain prejudice towards the Chinese but also all kinds of other social movements at this point in New Zealand history.

A relatively minor problem with the Moloughney/Stenhouse theory is that it is very thin. They impart no sense of the history of colonial nationalism, no indication of its antecedents, of when and how it first arose, and what key figures and institutions were responsible for the subsequent course of its development. A more serious problem is the logic of the theory. The authors inferentially deduce that colonial nationalism existed in people's minds from its alleged consequences – the antipathy of colonists towards the Chinese, towards Maori separatists, Irish Catholics, the large estates and so on. But these outcomes do not entail colonial nationalism. Such behaviours could also imply that the elite (like elites anywhere) was preoccupied with social order,\textsuperscript{36} or that colonists wanted to preserve the purity of New Zealand as the Britain of the South.\textsuperscript{37} A related problem is that in its present form the theory does not appear to be testable. Taking parliamentary debates as their source, Moloughney and Stenhouse view colonial nationalism as consistent with such a wide variety of utterances that it is very difficult to think of any that could act as (to use Popper's term) potential falsifiers to their argument. In Australia, perhaps the strongest indication of when colonial nationalism lay behind anti-Chinese feeling is where discrimination was justified with the slogan ‘Australia for Australians'.\textsuperscript{38} Yet the authors cite only one instance where the equivalent New Zealand slogan – ‘New Zealand for New Zealanders’ – crops up in the masses of parliamentary speeches on Chinese immigration in the late nineteenth century.

Like the other explanations so far discussed, the colonial nationalist claim fails to satisfy most of the explanatory power criteria. The authors talk at some length about the elements who defended the Chinese (notably the Christian humanitarians) but their colonial nationalist model does not have a logic which covers exceptions such as these. Furthermore, their theory seems unable to explain trends in attitudes over time; the specific content of any of the images in the anti-Chinese stereotype; why the Chinese were subjected to more intolerance than any other immigrant minority; why extreme measures were never taken against them; why the ill-feeling stopped short of mass hatred; and why the content of the discriminatory legislation took a certain form and no other.

The next explanation is that hostility to the Chinese was ideological in origin, and that it sprang from the general climate of popular racist ideas.\textsuperscript{39} The explanation is based on the assumption, which has become very fashionable with the rise of cultural history, that ideas are not simply
the outgrowth and expression of political, economic and social influences, but are independent of them and may even drive them. The virtue of this explanation is that it ties in with the general hardening of racial attitudes in western societies from about the 1880s, the consequence of the growth of scientific racism that claimed racial differences were immutable, that non-European races were innately inferior, and the mixing of races injurious. The power of the ideas of scientific racism in the New Zealand context is evident in the published census of 1921. It devoted a whole section to the topic ‘Race Aliens’, introduced with the remarks ‘the population of the Dominion is, and always has been, of a high standard of racial purity’, that ‘the importance of racial purity has always been recognised’, and that ‘history has shown that the coalescence of the white and the so-called coloured races is not conducive to improvement in racial types’. The tabulations of ‘race aliens’ included Chinese, along with other non-European ‘races’ (exclusive of Maori, interestingly enough), irrespective of whether they were born in New Zealand, British subjects, or ‘half-castes’.

However, up to the 1880s it is very difficult to say that anti-Chinese feeling was driven mainly, much less solely, by ideas about race. There is no evidence that racist ideas about the Chinese pre-dated the gold rushes in any of the Pacific rim white settler societies, or that prejudice towards the Chinese split over from the racist views of indigenous peoples in any of the same societies. It is possible that ideas about innate Chinese inferiority were carried to New Zealand, Australia and British Columbia by gold miners from California where, according to Charles Price, Chinese indentured labour was negatively associated with black slavery. But whether ideas about innate Chinese inferiority were transferred to New Zealand by this route has not yet been demonstrated. In other respects, the range of explanatory power of the theory is no greater than that of its competitors. It cannot explain the exceptions; the specific content of the derogatory stereotype of the Chinese; why the Chinese experienced more discrimination than other ‘race aliens’; the level of the antipathy; and the specific content of the discriminatory legislation.

This leads directly to the sixth group of explanations, those suggesting what was crucial to the discrimination was the weakness of the Chinese state. China’s deep decline as a world power from the early nineteenth century made its people and their culture appear to be inferior, and, more importantly, prevented it from protecting its overseas subjects from discrimination. The key evidence usually cited for the weak Chinese state argument is that New Zealand government policy on non-white immigration tended overall to be more heavily biased against the Chinese than against the Indians or the Japanese. What made the difference, or so the argument runs, is that as the British and Japanese governments were stronger than the Chinese, they had more power to uphold the rights of their overseas subjects, and therefore the New Zealand government was more ready to listen to them than to the Chinese government.

Robert Huttenback, however, in a comparative study of the immigration policies of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, has lodged a serious objection against this argument: in practice white settler governments took little heed of the protests by the Japanese and British governments over the treatment of their overseas subjects. They did not have to. Certainly, he notes, the British government had the constitutional authority to reserve immigration legislation passed by its self-governing colonies that it found repugnant. Moreover, it initially often took such action in response to protest by the Indian and Japanese governments against legislation that adversely affected their subjects. But the resistance by the British government to racist immigration legislation by its white settler colonies was token, minimal and brief. It accommodated itself to a huge variety of segregationist and exclusionist measures, for instance those taken by the Natal government against Indian immigrants. It encouraged (from 1897) white self-governments to adopt the deceitful policy (the reading test) that gave them the means to exclude non-white immigrants (even if British subjects) while appearing to treat all immigrants equally. It allowed the Australian Commonwealth Government to establish its White Australia policy in 1901, notwithstanding strong protests by the Japanese government, then an ally, and even though the policy violated the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1894 that gave Japanese nationals the liberty to enter, travel and reside throughout the British Empire. Moreover, the British government ultimately conceded authority over immigration matters to the Dominions in 1917, despite knowing full well that they would use it to keep out non-white British subjects.

Besides all this, the weak Chinese state argument cannot explain why some colonists were not hostile to the Chinese; why the derogatory beliefs about the Chinese focused on particular images; why trends in attitudes changed over time in the way they did; why the hostility had certain upper limits; and why the legislation had a certain content.

The explanations for discrimination considered so far have focussed on the role of Europeans. It has been recently argued, however, that this approach ignores the Chinese role; more specifically, that it ignores the effect of the peculiar nature of Chinese agency on relations between Chinese and Europeans. The agency approach can be divided into two claims. The first does not explain discrimination, for its concern is with the Chinese response to it, showing that they were not passive victims but adapted more or less effectively to discrimination. The second is that the Chinese had their own particular goals as immigrants, that these goals led them to be
What Best Explains the Discrimination Against the Chinese?

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exceptionally separatist and transitory, and that the exceptional separatism and transitoriness caused discrimination.\[^{46}\] It is this second claim that will now be examined in depth.

To be sure, the Chinese were not uniquely separatist. Other immigrant ethnic minorities – notably the Hindus, the Lebanese, the Catholic Irish – also kept to themselves and were reluctant to give up many of their folkways. Moreover, the Chinese were by no means alone in being highly transitory. It is wrong to think of them as the only ‘sojourners’ in the population.\[^{49}\] A large proportion of the white gold seekers who poured into New Zealand during the 1860s had also left by the end of the decade.\[^{50}\] There is extensive evidence, nevertheless, that the Chinese were both more separatist and more transitory than any other ethnic minority. This is not making an absolute claim, that they were the only separatist and transitory ethnic minority, but rather a relative claim, that they were the most separatist and transitory of all the non-European immigrant categories. The relative nature of the claim must be borne in mind when it is tested.

The first piece of evidence is that the Chinese rate of out-marriage was extremely low, even by the standards of immigrant Indians and Lebanese, both categories renowned for their endogamy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. From the 1921 census it can be calculated that Chinese ‘half-castes’ made up a mere 4.78 per cent of the total Chinese population. By contrast, Indian half-castes comprised 7.9 per cent of the total Indian population, the Lebanese 12.8 per cent of total Lebanese, and half-castes belonging to all other categories of ‘race aliens’ 90.4 per cent of the total of these other categories. Interestingly, the proportion of half-castes in the Chinese population rises until by 1945 it is three times the 1921 level, but it remained consistently lower than the proportions in the other categories.\[^{51}\]

A further piece of evidence that the Chinese were both exceptionally separatist and transitory is their massive gender imbalance. There was a strong tendency, of course, for every immigrant group to have an excess of males over females, especially amongst the first immigrant waves. But the Chinese gender imbalance was, on the whole, greater than that for any other ethnic group that migrated to New Zealand. Males made up over 99 per cent of the Chinese population in the 1870s and 1880s, as opposed to 70-80 per cent for the immigrant categories with the next highest proportions of males. By 1921 males still comprised over 90 per cent of the Chinese population, just beaten for first place by the Indian male population, about one per centage point larger, not unexpectedly so since Indian immigration was of more recent origin. The extraordinarily high ratio of males to females in the Chinese population, it should be noted, was not unique to New Zealand, but common to all the Pacific rim settler societies. For example, in Australia females born in China made up just 1.6 of the Chinese population in 1901, and in California as late as 1890 females comprised only 0.04 per cent of the Chinese.\[^{52}\] It should be noted, too, that the massive gender imbalance, although perhaps aggravated by the poll tax, was not fundamentally driven by it. The imbalance long pre-dated the poll tax, having been apparent right from the beginnings of Chinese immigration. It was, moreover, common to all occupations (labourers, professional men and merchants). Broadly, the pattern suggests that the Chinese chose to leave their wives at home since they intended to return there.

Also symptomatic of the abnormally high degree to which the Chinese were oriented to their own culture and country is their extremely high return rate. As noted earlier, the New Zealand Chinese population dropped from the 1880s to the late 1930s.\[^{53}\] Their high return rate does not just reflect the intentions of Chinese as immigrants. It also suggests the differential effects of New Zealand’s restrictive immigration legislation, the legislation having a stronger bias against the Chinese than against any other category in the foreign-born population. It is very difficult, however, to allow for the bias, given that the Chinese restrictions were put in place in a piecemeal way over about four decades (1881-1920), and from a much earlier point than was the case with other non-Europeans. Even so, some idea of the relative magnitude of the Chinese return rate can be gleaned from American immigration data for the period 1899-1924, a time of comparative stability in American restrictive immigration legislation. Over those years, the number of Chinese who departed from the United States, each year, was on average equal to about 130 per cent of those who entered – as opposed to 80 per cent for the second highest return rate and an average of 30 per cent for all immigrants.\[^{54}\]

An additional manifestation of Chinese separatism is the remarkable contrast between their ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital, terms coined by the American political scientist Robert Putman to refer to the associations within a category (bonding) and between different categories (bridging).\[^{55}\] The Chinese in New Zealand, as in the other Pacific rim countries, formed extremely close ties with each other, based primarily on the clan. They used these ties to help each other to immigrate to the New World, for mutual aid, finding employment, raising capital, social control, forming business partnerships, work groups, and the like. The ties were not restricted to a locality, but were part of a dense structure of networks that extended back to China itself and embraced the whole Chinese diaspora.\[^{56}\] In sharp contrast to these powerful bonds, the Chinese had minimal bridges with Europeans. To quote James Ng on the Otago Chinese:

When one reads the newspapers of the time it is only too obvious how separate the Chinese remained. Europeans took part in town or rural affairs, in mining, hospital and school committees, and in sports and
exceptionally separatist and transitory, and that the exceptional separatism and transitoriness caused discrimination. It is this second claim that will now be examined in depth.

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They seldom intermarried and only with partners from as modest a social background as themselves. They preferred working with their own countrymen, preferably kith and kin, seldom entered into partnership with Europeans, and rarely hired European employees. Thus the Chinese did not form a significant degree of interlocking relationships with Europeans, in family, community, business or leisure . . . . As aliens outside the commonalty of interest, despite their good qualities, they laid themselves wide open to the charges of being ‘useless’ (as permanent settlers) and ‘jackals’ and ‘locusts’. One of the few ways they did participate in community affairs was to donate to local causes, notably the annual fund-raising for hospitals which they used themselves.57

Finally, what indicates that the transitory and separatist tendencies of the Chinese were unusually strong is their low rate of literacy in English (only 2.0 per cent and 13.5 per cent could read and write English in 1881 and 1901 respectively); their low levels of land ownership (0.45 per cent in 1882 as opposed to 50 per cent for all adult males in the New Zealand population); and their limited uptake of naturalisation (a total of only 488 took the opportunity between 1852 and 1907, equal to just 20 per cent of the 1906 Chinese population).58

It is possible, of course, that all these actions were adaptive responses to the hostility expressed towards the Chinese by the white majority. For instance, they may have left their wives behind and failed to commit themselves to the new society in the belief that whites would never let them make New Zealand their home. Yet, though the hypothesis cannot be ruled out, it would, if true, only partly account for Chinese separatism and transitoriness created a classic instance of what games theorists in the philosophy of social science variously call the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, the ‘free loader problem’, the ‘problem of public goods’, the ‘tragedy of the commons’, or a ‘deficiency in social capital’.59 The ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ is a model of the paradox that results when self-interest is rationally pursued in a collective setting. The point is neatly illustrated with Garrett Hardin’s parable of the tragedy of the commons. The story starts with the problem that the common land of the village is overgrazed. Consequently, it is in the self-interest of every villager to co-operate to solve the problem; namely, by agreeing with all the other villagers to reduce his or her stocking rate. However, every villager has an incentive not to agree to reduce the number of stock he or she grazes. Why? Because every villager knows that if he or she does reduce his or her rate, it is in the self-interest of the other villagers to take advantage of this action and increase their own rates. Therefore, paradoxically, it is not in the rational self-interest of any villager to agree to reduce his or her stocking rate.

The prisoner’s dilemma for the Chinese and Europeans stemmed from the exceptionally high rate of Chinese re-emigration. The Chinese had no incentive to collaborate with Europeans because they knew they would probably not be around to receive the benefits; and Europeans had no incentive to collaborate with the Chinese because they had no confidence the Chinese recipients would be around to return favours. Instead, both sides mistrusted the other, each knowing it could exploit the other on first contact since there would probably be no subsequent contacts at which paybacks could be made. To put this in a counterfactual way, had there been frequent contact between the Chinese and Europeans (an iterative prisoner’s dilemma), Chinese and white settlers would have been able to engage in reciprocity, to co-operate to their mutual benefit, with, say, the Chinese agreeing not to under-price their labour and the whites agreeing to let the Chinese enter the
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The unusually strong separatist and transitory traits of the Chinese generated hostility in two respects. In the first place, as Charles Price has explained, the traits made them less willing and able than any other ethnic minority to fit in, to assimilate. In consequence, they antagonised the European majority to an exceptional degree because they went further in refusing to modify the elements of their way of life which Europeans found offensive and irritating. Often cited examples include their opium smoking and gambling, their lack of social duty, their lack of competence in English, and ‘heathen’ religion. According to some historians, Europeans were particularly sensitive to these refusals, coming as they did from societies which did not have strong pluralistic traditions and were intolerant of difference (for instance, the attitudes of the English towards Roman Catholics). The Chinese regarded themselves as belonging to a superior civilisation.60

The other mechanism that produced bad relations between the Chinese and white settlers was the outcome of Chinese extreme transitoriness.61 Although not invoked by historians of the Chinese in settler societies, their transitoriness created a classic instance of what games theorists in the philosophy of social science variously call the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, the ‘free loader problem’, the ‘problem of public goods’, the ‘tragedy of the commons’, or a ‘deficiency in social capital’.62 The ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ is a model of the paradox that results when self-interest is rationally pursued in a collective setting. The point is neatly illustrated with Garrett Hardin’s parable of the tragedy of the commons. The story starts with the problem that the common land of the village is overgrazed. Consequently, it is in the self-interest of every villager to co-operate to solve the problem; namely, by agreeing with all the other villagers to reduce his or her stocking rate. However, every villager has an incentive not to agree to reduce the number of stock he or she grazes. Why? Because every villager knows that if he or she does reduce his or her rate, it is in the self-interest of the other villagers to take advantage of this action and increase their own rates. Therefore, paradoxically, it is not in the rational self-interest of any villager to agree to reduce his or her stocking rate.

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country on the same terms as everyone else. In other words, the argument is that the bad relations between Chinese and Europeans were inherent in the situation. They would have arisen with any foreign migrant labour force with an equally high rate of geographical mobility, though not necessarily to the same degree. Indeed, a very similar situation did arise with permanent transient rural labourers and the settled core in localities in the late colonial period, stimulating a general crackdown by the authorities on vagrancy.

Is the argument that has just been advanced the best explanation for discrimination against the Chinese in New Zealand? It seems so, mainly because it has more explanatory and unifying power than the rival explanations. To begin with, it also fits the cases of Australia, British Columbia and California: they have the same pre-conditions and outcomes as the New Zealand case. Just as in New Zealand, so in these locations too the Chinese were not only exceptionally transitory and separatist but also subjected to a high level of discrimination. In addition, that given on average the Chinese were more separatist and transitory than other ‘race aliens’, the theory solves the problem of why the Chinese were more oppressed than other ethnic out-groups, notably the Indians and the Lebanese. As well, the argument can account for many of the exceptions: the instances where Europeans respected and accepted the Chinese. James Ng’s research suggests that these instances frequently occurred where Europeans knew individual Chinese who had settled permanently in the same locality and/or had adopted European ways of life. In other words, what made European exceptions were Chinese exceptions – Chinese who were much less separatist and transitory than most of their peers.

On top of this, the explanation has some potential to explain the two key trends in attitudes towards the Chinese; that is, the hostility from the 1870s to the 1920s, and its waning from the mid-1930s. The hostility correlates with a long period of minimal assimilation and high return rates. The waning coincides with the attenuation of these factors. From the 1920s the New Zealand Chinese were increasingly cut off from their homeland and forced to develop ties to New Zealand as a result of the internal upheavals in China, the civil war, the Japanese invasion in 1937, war in the Pacific, and the communist takeover in 1949.

Moreover, the explanation can account for much of the content in the derogatory stereotype of the Chinese. True, it cannot account for the image that the Chinese were swamping New Zealand. But it explains the belief that the Chinese had no sense of ‘social duty’ (which was generally true in respect to their relations with Europeans, but quite untrue in respect to themselves), also convictions that the Chinese engaged in unfair economic competition with Europeans. It explains the perception of Chinese preoccupation with gambling and opium smoking (also largely true, arising from the Chinese refusal to assimilate European norms). More indirectly, it explains why the Chinese were believed to be corrupters of young European women, their massive gender imbalances inevitably giving rise to this suspicion. Equally, the primitive and congested accommodation that the Chinese were often prepared to accept as the price for achieving their goals as immigrants, might have given some foundation to the European belief that the Chinese were dirty, unhygienic and carriers of disease. Finally, the theory has the capacity to fit a major theme in New Zealand history – the nature and development of its social cement, including atomisation from the 1850s to the 1880s and the development of social capital thereafter.

However, the theory that discrimination against the Chinese was caused by the extraordinary attachment the Chinese had to their own culture and country is not a perfect theory. Although it can satisfy more of the seven explanatory power criteria than competing theories, it by no means solves all of the problems. For one thing, it cannot account for the specific content of the discriminatory legislation. For another, it does not seem able to account for the full extent of the hostility expressed towards the Chinese. Their high levels of separateness and re-immigration undoubtedly created mistrust between themselves and Europeans; but arguably the negative feelings that Europeans had towards the Chinese were stronger than mistrust.

In conclusion, this paper has attempted to provide a framework for the comparative appraisal of explanations for Chinese discrimination. It has also tried to show that the best explanation for discrimination is that the Chinese had a far more powerful orientation to their home country and their culture than any other migrant group. Why the Chinese were different in this respect is not something which the paper has sought to explain. This is a matter that can only be addressed through a systematic comparative analysis of the cultural backgrounds of the various non-European ethnic minorities that migrated to New Zealand, and such an analysis will not proceed until historians abandon their present habit of examining the Chinese and other ethnics in isolation from each other. Given that the Chinese were different, their history in New Zealand cannot be properly understood until they are studied in a comparative context.

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country on the same terms as everyone else. In other words, the argument is that the bad relations between Chinese and Europeans were inherent in the situation. They would have arisen with any foreign migrant labour force with an equally high rate of geographical mobility, though not necessarily to the same degree. Indeed, a very similar situation did arise with permanent transient rural labourers and the settled core in localities in the late colonial period, stimulating a general crackdown by the authorities on vagrancy.

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What Best Explains the Discrimination Against the Chinese?


[2] The White Peril; Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to Australasia and North America, 1919-71; Marrickville, 1996; R.A. Huttenback, 


[5] As a good idea of day-to-day discrimination can be gleaned from some of the oral testimonies in Manying Ip, 


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[8] Huttenback, 

[9] Race and Empire; Price, The Great White Walls are Built. 


[11] Huttenback, 

[12] Huttenback, 

[13] Huttenback, 

[14] Huttenback, Racism and Empire, pp.57, 280. Note, however, that some boroughs and counties in New Zealand banned Chinese from contracting for public works; see Ng, 

[15] Huttenback, Racism and Empire, documents all these measures thoroughly 

[16] Huttenback, Racism and Empire, pp.197ff; Markus, Fear and Hatred, pp.225-6, 258ff. 

[17] Lionel Terry was an upper class Englishman who, without provocation, shot and killed an elderly male Chinese invalid in central Wellington, who he did not know, saying he wanted to save New Zealand from the yellow peril. The case was the centre of huge press interest. Although finding him guilty, the jury asked that he be treated with mercy. Soon after the trial, he was granted clemency on the grounds of insanity and committed to a mental asylum. He escaped several times, receiving considerable public support on each occasion. Frank Tod, 'Terry, Edward Lionel 1873 – 1952', in Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, updated 16 December 2003, URL: http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/

[18] See, for example, the vituperation heaped on Seddon in public by his political enemies in R.M. Burdon, King Dick: a Biography of Richard John Seddon, Christchurch, 1955. 

[19] See, for example, A. Curthoys, ‘ “Chineseness” and Australian Identity’, in Chan, Curthoys, and Chiang (eds), The Overseas Chinese in Australasia, p.27. 


[31] For example Markus, Fear and Hatred, pp.149-51. 

[32] Ibid., especially chpt.13. 

[33] For the preoccupation of the trade unions with regulating the labour supply as a means of preventing unemployment see, for example, M. Nolan, Breading Winning: New Zealand Women and the State, Christchurch, 2000; E. Olssen, Building the New World; Work, Politics and Society in Caversham, 1880-1920, Auckland, 1996. 


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Hutenback, Racism and Empire; Markus, Fear and Hatred; Price, The Great White Walls are Built.


J. Ng, Windows on a Chinese Past, vol.1, pp.207-8, 249-50, 276, 325-8, 343 fn.170; vol.II, pp.116-8, 250. See also Price, The Great White Walls are Built, pp.221ff on Chinese accepted by Europeans as community leaders in Australia.

Ng, Windows on a Chinese Past, vol.I, p.105; Price, The Great White Walls are Built, pp.102, 224; Markus, Fear and Hatred, pp.96, 201, 238.

Nigel Murphy, ‘The Legislative Response to Chinese Immigration’, p.85, points out that the Chinese were exempt from the reading test imposed against non-European and non-British immigrants in 1899, but this exemption was abolished in 1907.

The poll tax was a head tax payable by each immigrant when entering the country. The tonnage restrictions prescribed the number of Chinese who could enter New Zealand by ship relative to its weight.


For examples, see Ng, Windows on a Chinese Past, vol.I, pp.169, 207-8, 325-7, 343.

Hutenback, Racism and Empire, Price, ‘The Great White Walls are Built. The New Zealand Chinese could vote in general elections as long as they were British subjects; the ban on naturalisation from 1908 to 1952, of course, made it impossible for those not British subjects to vote.

Hutenback, Racism and Empire, pp.57, 280. Note, however, that some boroughs and counties in New Zealand banned Chinese from contracting for public works; see Ng, Windows on a Chinese Past, vol.I, p.231.

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D. Ng, ‘Ninety Years of Chinese Settlement’, p.96.


Ibid., pp.434-5.

Price, The Great White Walls are Built, pp.234ff.


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37 This is, of course, the major theme in Belich, Paradise Reforged.
38 See cartoon in the Worker, 31 July 1897, reprinted in Markus, Fear and Hatred, p.215.
39 Belich, Paradise Reforged, pp.228-32 links anti-Chinese feeling to the ideology of Aryanism, but also conjectures it was related to an ‘identity crisis’ New Zealand went through around 1900, p.229.
40 Census of New Zealand, 1921, Part VI, ‘Race Aliens’.
41 This is convincingly demonstrated by Markus, Fear and Hatred.
42 Price, The Great White Walls are Built.
44 Huttenback, Racism and Empire.
48 Price, The Great White Walls are Built, takes this position though not referring to ‘agency’. Moloughney and Stenhouse, ‘‘Drug-besotten, Sin-begotten Fiends of Filth’’ do not quite come to this conclusion, but the logic of their argument implies it.
49 A lot of ink has been spilt on whether or not the Chinese were sojourners; see, for example, the historiographical discussion in Moloughney and Stenhouse, ‘‘Drug-besotten, Sin-begotten Fiends of Filth’’, pp.54-6. But the discussion misses the point; sojourner and settler should not be regarded as dichotomous; there are degrees or gradations of each. Because the term ‘sojourner’ when applied to the Chinese has become so controversial, I will use it as little as possible to avoid any possible misunderstanding that it is being used in an absolute sense.
50 There are no data specific to goldminers, but there are for total immigrants and emigrants for the 1861-70 period when migration was dominated by the gold rushes. From these data it can be calculated that departures were equal to 42 per cent of arrivals; see Statistics of New Zealand, 1877.
53 Moreover, the high return rate is reflected in the remarkably large proportion of Chinese (42 per cent) who had lived in New Zealand for less than five years in 1921; Census, 1921, ‘Race Aliens’, p.7.
56 See for example Moloughney and Stenhouse, ‘‘Drug-besotten, Sin-begotten Fiends of Filth’’; Price, The Great White Walls are Built, pp.54 ff.
59 Price, The Great White Walls are Built, p.144.
60 Ng, Windows on a Chinese Past, vol.I, pp.206-7, admits that ‘Chinese sojournism was also largely responsible for the failure to develop better relationships’, though does not invoke prisoner’s dilemma as the mechanism.
62 What made an additional difference in the Lebanese case is that they were mostly Roman Catholics.
64 See, for example, the accounts in Ip, Home Away from Home, pp.58, 64, 110. Sedgwick, ‘The Politics of Survival’, p.124 says that another reason why some stayed is that their lineages died out in China.


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