Francophobia in the Antipodes: France’s Grab for the New Hebrides and the Dreyfus Affair in New Zealand Newspapers

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Each man of you is equal to ten Frenchmen any day.

Bruce Herald, July 2, 1886, 3

Abstract

This article explores the Francophobia which characterised the coverage in late nineteenth-century New Zealand newspapers of, firstly, France’s attempt to annex the New Hebrides and, secondly, the Dreyfus Affair. The intensity of the Francophobia suggests a French influence in the shaping of New Zealand’s national identity and further illuminates the dual national identity (British and New Zealand) pertaining in New Zealand at the time. The New Hebrides incident provides an example of how this double allegiance played out.

Introduction

The ongoing protests against French nuclear testing in the Pacific from the mid-1960s, the indignation over the sinking, by French government agents, of the Greenpeace vessel the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour in 1985, and the outrage over Buck Shrift’s ravaged scrotum during the so-called “Battle of Nantes” in 1986 (a brutal encounter characterised by foul play where an aggressive French rugby team, many high on amphetamines, beat the All Blacks 16–3) were not the first prompts for anti-French feeling in New Zealand.

This article explores the sustained displays of intense Francophobia which, a hundred years earlier, characterised the coverage in New Zealand newspapers of two incidents towards the end of the nineteenth century, namely France’s attempt in 1886 to annex the New Hebrides (later Vanuatu) and then, several years later, the Dreyfus Affair. While the former is a regional issue and the latter “essentially a French domestic matter of no relevance to New Zealand,” both of them had the potential for far-reaching geopolitical consequences.

The outcome of the Dreyfus Affair had implications for stability in Europe, just as the scuffle over the New Hebrides, yet another example of the longstanding rivalry in the Pacific between competing colonial powers, represented a threat to regional, if not international, security. As Kees van Dijk puts it: “at certain moments, it was even feared that clashes over colonies, protectorates or spheres of influence might escalate into war in Europe, if not into a worldwide conflict.” As it happened, the dire consequences feared did not eventuate in either case, but the concerns were not without foundation.

Both incidents also played out in the context of a fraught Anglo-French relationship studded with “competitive religious and territorial interactions” and the coverage of these two events in the New Zealand newspapers illustrates the extent to which New Zealand embraced the Francophobic British position. In both cases, New Zealand inherited Britain’s relationship with France and the “fit” was good; New Zealand’s interests and Britain’s coincided, even if, in the New Hebrides example, there were glimmers that there were differences between colonial and imperial interests. With France still representing a threat to both Britain and New Zealand, a Francophobic response was de rigueur. This, in turn, provides an opportunity to consider the dual national identity (British and New Zealand) pertaining in New Zealand at the time. Ron
Palenski takes the view that a “sense of identity evolved in New Zealand throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century,” which is “much earlier than most historians have previously thought.” Moreover, the New Hebrides example is a chance to examine what “British” means, when one considers the contribution of the Scottish settlers to New Zealand’s national identity.

The column inches and emotions invested in these two French affairs attest to the presence of France in the New Zealand consciousness and to the possible influence of France on the development of New Zealand’s national identity. In a recent study, Alistair Watts asserts that the importance of France “in international affairs, trade and historical background is worthy of acknowledgement as an influence in the formation of New Zealand’s national identity.” Watts refers to a process of “othering” as an element of defining one’s identity. Francophobia establishes France as an “other,” and there are suggestions in the coverage of the New Hebrides affair that New Zealand could also conceive of Australia as “other.” For Palenski, New Zealand developed “a sense of being its own nation while still tied to Britian in particular and the Australian colonies by blood and mentality.”

Justin Vaïsse reminds us that the “etymological root ‘phobia’ describes fear, rather than disdain or contempt. Other uses of this root, however, present a similar disconnection between their etymology and their meaning, such as ‘homophobia.” He favours “France-bashing” but accepts that does not adequately transmit the “set of stereotypes, prejudices, insults, and ready-made judgments” at the base of Francophobia. The Francophobia seen in New Zealand newspapers is both that which is encompassed by the accepted sense of the term (contempt), predominant in the coverage of the Dreyfus Affair, and by the true meaning (fear), which emerges from the coverage of the New Hebrides incident.

Michael Burns observes that foreign reactions to the Dreyfus Affair “came with their own national chauvinism and racial stereotyping.” While acknowledging the colonial rivalry between France and Great Britain as contributing to a strong anti-French sentiment amongst the British, Ronald K. Huch suggests that “it was not so much the struggle of power politics as it was the belief that Anglo-Saxons were culturally superior that caused Englishmen to be more anti-French than pro-Dreyfus.” Eugen Weber remarks that the “English had always led the parade of France’s critics.” This sense of “Anglo-Saxon” superiority is present in the New Zealand newspapers, where being anti-French was a way of being pro-British.

The strong Francophobia discernible in New Zealand newspapers in their coverage of the New Hebrides conflict and the Dreyfus Affair should not surprise us given the influence of Great Britain on what appeared in New Zealand newspapers at the end of the nineteenth century. Ian F. Grant refers to “cut and paste’ from overseas publications” as part of the standard content of most New Zealand newspapers in the colonial period. For Simon J. Potter, the emergence of an “imperial press system helped to reinforce London’s position as the news hub of the British Empire.” Britain was also the source of the cablegrams; Potter remarks that “a small number of news agencies and newspaper cartels came to exercise overwhelming control over the British Empire’s services of cable news.” Felicity Barnes underlines how technology helped to draw the British colonies together, observing that the “family of empire’ with its ties of kinship, began its meteoric rise in conjunction with the development and widespread adoption of technological innovations, particularly steam and telegraphy.”

Two French visitors to New Zealand certainly perceived a prejudice in the cablegrams arriving from London: “According to Professor Louis Vigouroux, the delegate of the Musee Social, who, with his secretary, is at present in New Zealand, these cable messages are a series of
misrepresentations dictated by national bias” (Press, Oct 3, 1898, 3). A Father Servajean, who lectured on the Dreyfus case in Wellington, discerned a pro-Dreyfus stance in the cablegrams, claiming that nine out of ten New Zealanders “reading only the cabled accounts, would say it must be true that he had been wrongfully condemned” (Press, Sept 25, 1899, 5).17 As Watts observes, “French visitors to New Zealand were understandably nonplussed by such strong local opinion that was based on highly prejudicial reporting.”18

The robust Francophobia (in both senses of the term) in the coverage of these two French affairs in New Zealand newspapers presents an opportunity to explore New Zealand national identity at the time. Keith Sinclair remarks that at “the end of the nineteenth century the people were probably willing to regard themselves, as John Ballance said, as ‘New Zealanders and Britons.’”19 Barnes writes that, during the nineteenth century, “Britishness was constantly invoked and reiterated—New Zealand was a ‘greater Britain,’ ‘Britain under the Southern Cross,’ ‘the Britain of the South.’”20 Stephen Constantine says that historians of “the ‘British world’ are now again emphasising the Britishness of this Greater Britain.”21 Kynan Gentry suggests that “Britishness as an identity often meant more in the colonies than it did in Britain itself.”22 New Zealanders were the “even better Britons” of the white settlement colonies. The term “we Britishers,” for example, is frequently to be found in the newspapers, especially in letters to the editor, showing the level of personal identification as British. The examples of Francophobia show clearly that New Zealanders were proud members of the British Empire, the cultural baggage of the British colonists including a “simplistic, adverse view of France as the site of revolution and regicide.”23

Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich discuss the possibility of “concurrent identities”: “The rise of colonial national identities did not contradict or undermine imperial Britishness. One person might have a number of concurrent identities. Just as in Britain one could be a Liverpudlian, Lancastrian, Englishman and Briton, so in New Zealand one might be an Aucklander, North Islander, New Zealander and Briton.”24 Thus, Palenski observes that:

New Zealand and other British Empire settler colonies such as those in Australia and Canada managed such a dual allegiance without any diminution of their sense of self or their sense of belonging. New Zealand national identity developed in tandem with the concept of imperial nationalism under which citizens of New Zealand saw themselves as both New Zealander and British, or at least felt a sense of belonging to both the country in which they lived and the empire of which their country was then a part.25

The role played by the Scottish settlers in New Zealand in the debate over the New Hebrides invites us to consider the designation “British.” For Seán Brosnahan, New Zealand is the “furthest away of all Britain’s white settler-dominated colonies from the homeland, it is arguably the one where the Scots were most numerous in proportion to population, and most influential culturally.”26 Tanja Bueltmann says that with New Zealand positioned firmly in the British imperial world, “acknowledgement of the ethnic background of the country’s pioneers in terms other than ‘British’ was not required. [It] did not require recognition of the Scots, Welsh, and Irish in their national distinctiveness.”27 Angela McCarthy makes a similar point, writing that “scholars have tended to merge the country’s distinctive ethnic components under a broad ‘Pakeha’ label, with Scots often subsumed as British.”28

One important aspect associated with the Scottish settlers in New Zealand was the Presbyterian Church. Brad Patterson, Tom Brooking, and Jim McAloon observe that while not all Scots
were Presbyterians, “they made up a preponderance of the Scottish migrants to New Zealand and their influence was to be long-lasting.”

Stuart Lange remarks:

*The Scottish influence on New Zealand has been substantial. To a very significant extent that Scottish influence was mediated through Scottish presbyterianism, the church tradition with which the majority of Scottish immigrants to New Zealand were in some way associated.*

Bueltmann suggests that the foreign mission movement contributed to the national identity of the Scottish settlers as “missionary societies stressed the role of Scots in the Empire as a means to express ‘a distinctly Scots Presbyterian duty’ at the same time re-cementing ‘a sense of Britishness in the face of other cultures.’” Thus, in response to France’s involvement in the most aptly named New Hebrides, the Auld Alliance was forgotten. The Dunedin-based Scottish settlers were, first and foremost, Presbyterians, and secondly members of the Francophobic British Empire.

Writing about the latent Australian “Gallophobia,” Ivan Barko observes that while in Australia “anti-French reflexes of British origin had something of the vicarious about them”; nonetheless, an inherited mistrust of the French appears to “have survived the journey to the Antipodes.”

The Francophobia which the New Hebrides incident provoked in New Zealand was far from vicarious. Barko says that “although not in a position to colonise the rest of the Pacific, Australians of the nineteenth century dreamt of keeping it a *mare nostrum*, a British sea,” and the New Zealand premier Julius Vogel imagined “an all-British Polynesia, with New Zealand as the governing and commercial headquarters.”

As Robert Aldrich observes, “Australia and New Zealand were particularly sensitive to French activities: their proximity to New Caledonia and the EFO [Établissements Français d’Océanie] and the old oppositions between Catholic and Protestant religions and between Anglo-Saxon and French culture meant symbolic and real differences between France and the British dominions.”

**France in the New Hebrides**

Denise Fisher suggests that France’s desire to establish a presence in the Pacific in the early nineteenth century was “driven principally by its need to protect the interests of its nationals who were Catholic missionaries” who were confronting “non-Catholic European missionaries who had usually arrived there first and were overwhelmingly British—which raised related political rivalries.” Further, Fisher considers that the “religious animosities and resentments on both sides underlie the emotion often attaching to French perceptions of Anglo-Saxons in the Pacific, and vice versa,” both then and now.

In 1886, New Zealand concerns about French colonial expansion in the South Pacific came to a head over the New Hebrides. New Zealand’s interest in the New Hebrides was two-fold. Firstly, as Van Dijk explains, “politicians and a large portion of the general public considered the South Sea their reserve,” and any reports about attempts by “any other nation to establish itself in the South Pacific, which often were not much more than rumours, invariably elicited strong and, at times, almost hysterical responses in Australia and New Zealand.” Secondly, there was the question of the Protestant missions in the Pacific. French Catholicism became another justification for Francophobia. In 1929, Stephen Roberts wrote of the “somewhat noisy and certainly secular agitation of the Presbyterian missionaries,” whose societies, according to Van Dijk, were “powerful pressure groups.”

There was a perceived need to protect the Protestant missions in the New Hebrides from the French as, according to the *Clutha Leader*, “force has ever been the policy of France to expel
the protestant English-speaking missionaries from the colonies over which they have assumed the protectorate, or which they have annexed” (April 23, 1886, 5). A national campaign, including a significant contribution from the Presbyterian Church in Dunedin “forced the New Zealand Government into definite opposition to any concessions to France.” In the context of the Condominium, Watts remarks that the New Zealand government “may have seen no value in British colonial occupation of the New Hebrides, but publicly advocating for removal of the French was a political necessity to placate New Zealand’s southern Presbyterian voters.”

In its editorial summarising the year 1886, the *Otago Daily Times* wrote that the “two international questions in which the most interest is taken by our people are those of the occupation of the New Hebrides by our French friends, and the Damoclean threat ever held over us by them of flooding the Pacific with the utterscum and refuse of France—the récidivistes” (Dec 31, 1886, 2).

In addition to the threat of the French annexation of the New Hebrides was France’s practice of sending its récidivistes (relapsed criminals) to New Caledonia, which, as Angus Ross reports, “provoked direct opposition in New Zealand, especially after New Zealand had shared the Australian experience of finding that escaped convicts or time-expired liberated men were arriving from the French colonies.” Those who escaped or made their way legitimately to Australia or New Zealand were a “confusing admixture of amnestied Communards, liberated hard-labour convicts, partly pardoned convicts on tickets of leave and escaped convicts.”

The Australasian colonies were worried that France would stock the New Hebrides with récidivistes whom the *Southland Times* described as “the fruits of French philosophy and freethinking,” observing that France “practically refuses to stop exporting her precious fruits” (May 12, 1886, 2). The *Bruce Herald* was even more indignant, charging France with “desecrating some of the earth’s fairest spots by exporting to them the hordes of atrocious villains she has created in her own midst” (July 13, 1886, 2). The *Lyttelton Times* feared the “flood of ruffianism” (May 19, 1886, 4); the *Press* wanted to keep “these seas free from the contaminating influence of French scoundrelism” (Sept 6, 1886, 2); and the *New Zealand Mail* did not wish to see “the Pacific being deluged with the vilest scum of the French criminal population” (Sept 10, 1886, 22). “Let France fling her filth into New Caledonia” was the advice of the *Temuka Leader* (Sept 11, 1886, 2).

It was precisely the prospect of France flinging what the *Temuka Leader* referred to as “filth” into the South Pacific that concerned those in the Australian colonies, whose reactions Briony Neilson describes as “moral panic,” “indignation” and “ire,” terms equally applicable to their New Zealand counterparts. Neilson suggests that Australian colonies used their resistance to France’s penal colonisation “to assert their own relative superiority and arguably helping to foster a feeling of closeness to Britain and a sense of moral connectedness.” The Francophobic outrage expressed by New Zealand newspapers made a similar contribution to national identity by designating France as the inferior “other” to New Zealand’s Britishness. For both Australia and New Zealand, a national identity was developing in response to international events.

The *Otago Daily Times* summarises New Zealand’s concerns about France’s designs on the New Hebrides in an editorial piece, claiming that the “interests of the natives, of humanity, of civilisation, of religion and morality, as well as those of Australasia and of the Empire of which she forms a part, demand that France should not be allowed to annex the New Hebrides” (April 14, 1886, 2). The New Zealand newspapers during this period concentrate on three areas:
France’s poor colonial record, her sharp practice in international relations, and her untrustworthiness. Just as with the Francophobia prompted by the Dreyfus Affair (as we shall see), national chauvinism is combined with racial prejudice, the latter expressed through characterisations of the state rather than of its citizens.

There are repeated references in the New Zealand newspapers to France being a poor coloniser. For the Wanganui Herald, the French “have had colonial possessions galore, but they failed to keep them either in North America or further south” (Sept 24, 1886, 2). The Bruce Herald claims that the “French are not an emigrating people. They cannot found colonies. They prefer France to any other country” (July 13, 1886, 2). The Daily Telegraph states, “we know that the French people do not emigrate if they can help it” (Sept 30, 1886, 2). “They do not make good colonists” concludes the West Coast Times (April 8, 1886, 2).

Further, the French were reportedly poor at dealing with indigenous populations. The Clutha Leader refers to “the known cruelty of France to native races” (April 23, 1886, 5) and the Taranaki Herald says that “France does not govern aboriginal natives according to our ideas of policy” (July 3, 1886, 2). For the New Zealand Herald, the French “system of colonisation will mean the destruction of the native people” (April 3, 1886, 5). The Otago Daily Times concedes that while the “superiority of British colonisation is not an international argument,” “the universal preference of the natives for British rule is. . . . The natives strongly object to French annexation, and are friendly to us” (April 23, 1886, 2). For the Auckland Star, “the instances we have of French administration of colonial possessions are all such as to create distrust of any further extension of French rule in these seas” (April 9, 1886, 1).

In July 1886, France landed troops in the New Hebrides, allegedly to protect French settlers against so-called native outrages, but the move was seen as an annexation by stealth. The supposed attack on the French settlers was, in the view of the New Zealand Times, merely a “convenient pretext for maintaining her occupation of the New Hebrides” (Sept 27, 1886, 2), a territory the Southland Times described as France’s “long coveted prey” (April 3, 1886, 2). “France has most unjustifiably seized a group of Islands which really belonged to England” thundered the Daily Telegraph (Sept 30, 1886, 2). The Otago Daily Times says “it matters little whether there was or was not any provocation for the French intervention in the New Hebrides, though we may be permitted to smile upon the subject” (Sept 11, 1886, 2).

This was the second major ground of criticism of France—pushing the envelope in their international activities, or, as the Otago Daily Times styled it, engaging in “aggressive statesmanship” (Sept 11, 1886, 2). Similarly, the New Zealand Herald speaks of an “unscrupulous aggressiveness” (Sept 30, 1886, 4). For the West Coast Times, this was “not the action of a friendly power—it is more the sharp practice of an unscrupulous trader” (May 13, 1886, 2). “There is something mysterious, if not suspicious, about the whole business,” said the Southland Times (April 3, 1886, 2). The New Zealand Herald alleged that “France is both swift to take and slow to yield any advantage” (April 5, 1886, 4) and later criticised the “audacity of France in stealthily occupying the New Hebrides,” describing it as a “crafty action,” an “unworthy device,” a “reprehensible action” and an “unworthy escapade” (July 26, 1886, 4). The New Zealand Times was a tad more circumspect, observing that France’s action “bears a suspicious resemblance to a flagrant breach of faith” (Sept 11, 1886, 2) and the Bay of Plenty Times saw France as “not exhibiting high statesmanship” in pursuing “so provocative a policy” (Sept 16, 1886, 2). The Daily Telegraph was harsher still, saying that France “finding she could not get the Islands by fair means has taken them by foul” (Sept 30, 1886, 2).
The third main criticism of France was her perceived untrustworthiness. This is a theme to which the Otago Daily Times returns on several occasions; it asserts, for example, that “a French guarantee to our missionaries will not be worth the paper it is written upon, and the promise not to introduce recidivistes is not of much greater value” (Sept 11, 1886, 2). The newspaper asserts that nobody familiar with France’s colonisation of New Caledonia and Tahiti could “believe the assurances of the French Government as to the use they intend to make of the New Hebrides and the protection they will afford to our missionaries and the natives” (April 14, 1886, 2). Another editorial ten days later reminds the readership that the “general history of French colonisation and more especially recent experience in the Loyalty Islands, show that no guarantees can secure the protection of our missions and traders where once the French flag floats” (April 23, 1886, 2). The Evening Star wonders if there is “much faith to be put on treaties concluded by France in reference to the protection of British interests in the New Hebrides” (April 15, 1886, 2). The Clutha Leader says that only “little reliance is to be put upon France fulfilling her treaty arrangements” (May 21, 1886, 5).

Given this negative attitude towards France, the “news that France has been frustrated in her attempt to acquire the New Hebrides will, we believe, give unqualified satisfaction to the vast majority of the Australasian colonists” (Southland Times, July 29, 1886, 2). France was ultimately denied sovereignty over the New Hebrides, an Anglo-French condominium being finalised in 1906 (coincidentally the year of Dreyfus’s rehabilitation). In a flourish of colonial bravado, the Daily Telegraph forecasts that “when necessary Australasia will be strong enough to take the New Hebrides, and drive France out of the Pacific” (Sept 30, 1886, 2). This confirms Aldrich’s suggestion that “many Australians and (perhaps to a lesser extent) New Zealanders objected to the presence of the French in the South Pacific islands in general. . . . They regarded the French as potential enemies rather than as possible allies.”

Watts picks up on this idea as he discusses New Zealand’s attitude towards France, even after having been her ally in the First World War. In his assessment, New Zealand was blinkered by its inherited “negative predisposition towards France, despite evidence that France was ultimately a benevolent presence.” It was, he suggests, still too early for New Zealand to establish an independent relationship with France untainted by British prejudice.

The Francophobia sparked by the New Hebrides affair was a phobia in the true sense of the word—a fear of French colonial expansion in New Zealand’s backyard. Fisher styles France as motivated by national prestige and suggests that its rivalry with “other European powers, mainly the British, and the experience of repeatedly being usurped by other powers in the region, sharpened France’s sense of national assertion.” Certainly this represented a threat to imperial interests, but it was the country of New Zealand which would be more exposed should there be aggressive French expansion in the region.

The tenor of the anti-French commentary in relation to the New Hebrides was, however, more subdued than that during the Dreyfus Affair, perhaps due to an awareness that the New Hebrides issue and the question of the récidivistes were part of a broader diplomatic situation between Britain, France, and other European states. The West Coast Times suggests that New Zealand should be realistic and accept that “what is of the utmost importance to us is of but trifling moment to Britain or the other large European states, and we might find ourselves at any time sacrificed for Imperial considerations” (April 29, 1886, 2). Alexis Bergantz refers to a similar realisation by the Australian colonies of “the limited powers of colonial governments that were dependent on the decisions of a distant imperial authority” when it came to petitioning for a British annexation of the New Hebrides to protect against its becoming another French
penal colony. The colonies of Australia used the New Hebrides affair as an opportunity to assert a view independent of Britain and to flex their colonial muscles—only to discover the limits on their freedom to act.

As if to underline how dutiful a colony New Zealand was and how committed to the empire, the newspapers took a strong line against the belligerent posturing by the colony of Victoria. Its Premier, Duncan Gillies, “went so far as to say that if [France] took possession of the islands, Australia would, when she became strong enough, do her best to regain them”; in the opinion of the South Canterbury Times, “the bellicose attitude adopted by the Victorian Premier is nothing less than ridiculous” (April 6, 1886, 2). The Otago Witness considered the statement “so shockingly bellicose and unfilial” even allowing for Victoria’s being “always singularly trenchant in her language” (April 17, 1886, 18). The Auckland Star scoffed at “the whole army of Australian Jingoes . . . ready to fight for the possession of those islands” (Sept 4, 1886, 5). The Wanganui Herald observed that the New Zealand Cabinet “have very wisely kept quiet over it, and have not made themselves ridiculous in the eyes of the world by threatening to annihilate France if she dared annex a single island of the group” (June 22, 1886, 2).

One can see, in this distancing of New Zealand from the colony of Victoria, a step towards a New Zealand national identity. As Sinclair pointed out, “Pakeha New Zealanders had to decide who they were, but also who they were not. That meant considering their relationships to the British and the Australians.” My suggestion is that in the coverage of France’s grab for the New Hebrides in New Zealand newspapers, we can discern some flickerings of New Zealand’s developing national identity in light of this realisation that her interests would not always coincide with those of Great Britain or Australia.

The Dreyfus Affair

There was no risk, however, of New Zealand making itself ridiculous in the eyes of the world by joining in the international outrage over the Dreyfus Affair. Described by David Murrell as an “international scandal that wracked France, as well as the rest of the world, from 1894 until 1906,” the Dreyfus Affair encompasses a series of military, political, and legal scandals in France in the last decade of the nineteenth century. For the Press, “this most famous of modern ‘causes celebres’ was practically the history of France, and the interest it created was world-wide” (July 14, 1906, 8). A saga rich in dramatic twists and turns, including “attempted assassinations, suicides, perjury, forgeries, invective, stunning reversals, and abortive coups d’état,” the Dreyfus Affair combined with the rise of the modern newspaper and the new cable technology to create a huge, worldwide media phenomenon. Murrell concludes that the “extent of the spread of information was impressive, even by today’s standards.” Further, he identifies the foreign press as being among “the primary engines driving the scandal of the Dreyfus affair.”

Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French army, was arrested in 1894 on charges of espionage and supplying military secrets to Germany. He was the innocent victim of a conspiracy which reached the upper echelons of the French army and government. Convicted by court martial of high treason, he was sentenced to transportation for life on 22 December 1894. On 5 January 1895, he endured the humiliation of a public degradation ceremony before being sent to Devil’s Island (French Guiana) to begin his sentence.

Efforts to clear Dreyfus’s name were greatly helped when, on 13 January 1898, the celebrated novelist Émile Zola wrote an open letter to the President of the French Republic. The letter (entitled “J’Accuse. . .!”) was Zola’s account of the egregious errors committed in the Dreyfus
case and the subsequent cover up. Martin P. Johnson calls the article “perhaps the most sensational media event of the newspaper age in France.” Zola was himself tried for libelling the army and, on 23 February 1898, convicted and sentenced to a hefty fine and a year in prison. But “J’Accuse. . .!” and the Zola trial had blown the Dreyfus Affair wide open and the vast publicity both in France and abroad brought great pressure to bear on the French government. A retrial was ordered for Dreyfus and the second court martial took place in Rennes. To general indignation, Dreyfus was reconvicted on 9 September 1899 and sentenced to ten years. Such was the outcry that ten days later Dreyfus was pardoned, although not fully rehabilitated until 1906.

The Dreyfus Affair in New Zealand

Coverage of the story soon spread to New Zealand, the Grey River Argus reporting that the “now famous Zola case is causing much discussion in the Press of the Colony” (March 5, 1898, 2). “Hardly a New Zealand paper has failed to give its opinion on the finding of the court in the Zola case,” wrote the Western Star (March 5, 1898, 2). The South Canterbury Times observed that “our readers have had a great deal of reading matter during the last few years about the Dreyfus Case” (June 17, 1899, 2). Most days during the trials there would be some detail in the cables and there were frequent editorial comments at key points. Our focus is on the rich pickings of 1898 and 1899.

Readers of New Zealand newspapers were familiar with the main protagonists in the Dreyfus Affair; for those who needed a refresher, however, the New Zealand Times published “A Dreyfus Directory. Persons and Incidents. Guide to a Great Crime” (April 10, 1899, 3). The number of horses in New Zealand named Zola or Dreyfus, the choice of “J’Accuse” as a nom de plume for letters to the editor, as well as the use of “Zola” as a noun for someone who takes a stand against injustice, show the extent to which the Dreyfus Affair entered the New Zealand national consciousness. A further example of the degree of personal engagement by New Zealanders in the Dreyfus Affair is seen in public displays of anti-French sentiment, such as the burning of the French flag after the reconviction of Dreyfus. The Evening Post reported:

The French flag was burned at Te Aroha last night. The proceedings began by singing God Save the Queen after which the leader soaked the Tricolour in kerosene and set it ablaze. Groans for France were lustily given. The New Zealand Natives Association have abandoned the French stall at their carnival as a mark of indignation at the Dreyfus verdict. 58

Individuals also took a stand. Two poems “To France” and “How Long” by H.A., both heavily critical of the conduct of the Dreyfus case, were published in the Christchurch Press (Sept 23, 1899, 8) and, in an action evocative of the more recent renaming of “French fries” as “freedom fries,” the Press reported that as a “result of the sentence on Dreyfus, a New Plymouth man declares he will not grow French beans this year” (Sept 20, 1899, 5).

As far as official responses went, members of both houses of the New Zealand parliament sent a cable expressing their sympathy to Madame Dreyfus after her husband’s reconviction. The Evening Star reports that the cable “was signed by every member of the House except the Premier, Messers Cadman, Hall-Jones, Rolleston, and Captain Russell” (Sept 14, 1899, 2). When asked in the House whether he had any intention of making an official response, the Prime Minister, Richard Seddon, declined to do so. According to the Evening Star’s parliamentary reporter, Seddon “did not think it wise in cases of this kind for the Government to express any opinion on the decision given” and asserted that “it must be borne in mind that France was a foreign Power, and we had no right to interfere with the decisions of her tribunals.
What would we say, under such circumstances, if the French nation were to express such feelings upon any matter in this colony?” (Evening Star, Sept 16, 1899, 3).

The Dreyfus Affair was already convoluted and complex. Newspapers themselves criticised the cablegrams they received: the Oamaru Mail complained that they were “far too erratic and intermittent” (Feb 22, 1898, 1); the Hawke’s Bay Herald found them “fragmentary” (Feb 19, 1898, 2); the Evening Post rated as “meagre” the information they provided (Feb 18, 1898, 4). Likewise, the Colonist described them as “vague” (Jan 20, 1898, 2) and the Feilding Star considered their information “scanty” (Feb 26, 1898, 2). The Otago Daily Times, however, found them sufficient to confirm an anti-French prejudice: “We have only the cablegrams, but these tell quite enough. Collectively they furnish a pretty picture of a French court of justice” (Feb 26, 1898, 4).

The material explored below falls into two groups. The first group contains the titles given to cable news items in New Zealand newspapers—material which is unquestionably home-made. The second is the editorial content which is probably predominantly locally produced but will inevitably contain material derived from British sources. Most of the Francophobia in the cablegram titles and the accounts of the Dreyfus Affair in the New Zealand newspapers is in the accepted sense of the term, namely scoffing at the French character and highlighting cultural and institutional differences, the French judged as being inferior to the “Anglo-Saxon.” There is, however, also material which is Francophobic in the true sense of the word, deriving from a fear of what might occur were France to undergo significant political upheaval, potentially even another revolution.

The Cablegrams
Cable news items generally appeared in a column adjacent to the editorial material on the second page of the newspaper. The following examples are taken from around the trial of Zola and his failed appeal. The headlines chosen for the cable news items by the New Zealand newspapers show, to use Michael Burns’s terms, both racial stereotyping (the French are excitable) and national chauvinism (the British legal system is better).

There are several references to the stereotype of the emotional Parisian: “Paris Hysterically Excited” (Star, Jan 17, 1898); “A Howling French Mob” (Marlborough Express, Feb 25, 1898); “Paris A Lunatic Asylum” (Hawke’s Bay Herald, Feb 26, 1898); “Savage Exultation Of The Parisians” (Lyttelton Times, Feb 26, 1898); “Zola’s Trial. The Events Of The Day: Accusations, Duels And Rioting” (Southland Times, Feb 16, 1898); and “A Parisian Mob Vindicate French Justice By Threatening To Kill and Rob” (Daily Telegraph, Feb 22, 1898). Likewise, the distinctly non-“Anglo-Saxon” practice of men kissing is considered worthy of note: “M. Zola Kisses His Counsel” (Star, Feb 24, 1898).

Aspersions on the French legal, military, and political systems are freely cast: “Riotous Scenes In The Chamber Of Deputies” (Otago Witness, Jan 27, 1898); “Astounding Scenes In The Court” (Star, Feb 15, 1898); “Free Fights In The Zola Case” (Nelson Evening Mail, Feb 15, 1898); “End Of A Burlesque: Zola Sent To Prison” (Southland Times, Feb 15, 1898); “Disgraceful Scenes In Court” (New Zealand Herald, Feb 16, 1898); “Terrorism Of The Sabre. A Blow To Civilisation” (Star, Feb 26, 1898); “The Sabre As Whitewash Brush” (Daily Telegraph, Feb 26, 1898); “Another Farcical Trial” (Wanganui Herald, April 13, 1898); “Another Tragic Farce In Preparation” (Daily Telegraph, April 13, 1898); and the fine imposed on Zola is reported under the heading: “Another Iniquity Perpetrated” (Wanganui Herald, July 11, 1898).
The titles given to the cablegrams further suggest that such a trial could only happen in France: “Zola’s Trial. Thoroughly French” (Southland Times, Feb 12, 1898); “French Justice” (Poverty Bay Herald, Feb 12, 1898); “France’s Idea Of Fair Play” (Wanganui Herald, Feb 22, 1898); and the contemptuous “The Most Chivalrous Nation In Europe!” (Southland Times, Feb 26, 1898).

**Editorial Material in New Zealand Newspapers**

Beyond the standard clichés such as that of the “loose morality which prevails in France” (Bruce Herald, Oct 5, 1896, 3) and the reminder from the Press that “peculation and corruption have been rife among public men in France” (Sept 12, 1899, 4), or the assertion of the Daily Telegraph that the “crime of chantage, or blackmailing, is almost peculiarly French” (Sept 20, 1898, 2), the cultural stereotype most present in the editorial material is the volatility of the French. The Lyttelton Times is perhaps the most generous, describing the French as “a sensitive and emotional people” (Feb 25, 1898, 4). Other newspapers take it as a commonplace that “the volatile characteristic of the French is proverbial” (Oxford Observer, March 5, 1898, 2). The Marlborough Express refers to the “proverbial fickleness of the French nation” (Sept 7, 1898, 2) and the Evening Post laments the “unfortunate excitability” (Jan 17, 1898, 4) of the French. Not merely excitable, the French are “too excitable” (Grey River Argus, Jan 27, 1898, 2) and even “over-excited” (New Zealand Times, Jan 25, 1898, 2); the Press refers also to the “hasty and excitable Jacques Bonhomme” (June 30, 1900, 6).

The Daily Telegraph identifies the “unreliable nature of the French people” (July 15, 1898, 2) and the Bay of Plenty Times warns of “a country so prone to change as France” (Dec 9, 1898, 2). Likewise, the Evening Post remarks that “public opinion in France is at best capricious and changeable” (Jan 17, 1898, 4), contributing to the nation’s “proverbial instability” (Oamaru Mail, Feb 28, 1898, 1). At the time of Zola’s trial, the Hawke’s Bay Herald claimed that France’s “mercenary people are in a state of agitation that has not been paralleled except at great crises in the national history” (Feb 19, 1898, 2).

Volatility and excitability are symptomatic of a latent madness which may express itself at any time. And indeed, some newspapers used the clinical terminology of insanity. The Otago Witness mentions the “hysterical condition of the nation” (March 3, 1898, 33) while the Nelson Evening Mail offers a blasé reference to “the usual outburst of Parisian hysteria” (March 7, 1898, 2). In an article entitled “A Tragic Farce,” the West Coast Times claims that “the ferment which is at present stirring Parisian society furnishes one of the marvellous instances on record of a people who have suddenly gone mad . . . The antagonism against this victim of official injustice and mob hostility is nothing short of a phase of insanity” (Feb 18, 1898, 2). The Grey River Argus suggests that if a “Frenchman is likely to lose his head in any other direction more than in his thirst for glory, it is patriotism. At the first suspicion of treason he loses all mental control and becomes infuriate almost to madness” (Jan 27, 1898, 2). “Such a race are capable of any folly,” intones the Daily Telegraph (May 11, 1898, 2). In an article with the title “The Doom of France,” the Christchurch Press observes that a “populace that can look on and applaud such a frightful travesty of justice must have nearly reached the bounds of insanity” (Sept 3, 1898, 7). The Southern Cross underlines that this is not at all the “Anglo-Saxon” way: “[it is] sometimes a great relief to turn from stolid impassiveness to hysteric craziness. J. B. furnishes us with an example of the one, and La Belle France of the other. There is something decidedly feminine in the eaters of frogs and snails. Just now they are having comedy and screaming farce over Dreyfus, Zola, and Co.” (Feb 26, 1898, 9).
The most common criticism levelled at France by the international press was the way the French legal system had operated during the trials of Dreyfus and Zola. Robert Tombs summarises the main complaints, identifying as most prominent “criticism of the French judicial system, military and civilian (as in the Zola trial).” He continues: “Lack of protection for the accused . . . , partiality of judges, intimidation of juries, interference by the press and the arbitrary power of the state were all noted unfavourably, but most astonishing of all was the seeming absence of rules of evidence.” Eric Cahm identifies “the common critique of the French legal system” in the responses from England and America to the Dreyfus Affair. New Zealand followed her fellow white settler colonies in this regard, a tone of outraged astonishment common in newspaper accounts of the French legal proceedings, as suggested by the frequent use of terms such as “scandal,” “abomination,” “sensation,” “outrage,” “travesty of justice” and “farce.” An article in the Auckland Star bore the title “The Second Zola Trial. An Even Greater Farce Than The First” (Sept 3, 1898, 12).

The affront to fairness and justice is frequently mentioned; for example, the Otago Daily Times claims that “such a monstrous proceeding was contrary to all principles of justice” (Jan 18, 1898, 4) and the Marlborough Express sees in the trials associated with the Dreyfus Affair an “outrageous disregard for common fairness” (Sept 7, 1898, 2). The implication is that justice and fairness are the “Anglo-Saxon” way, the Auckland Star asserting that the proceedings in Dreyfus’s first trial were “equally incomprehensible and irreconcilable with British ideas of justice, impartiality, and decorum” (Feb 26, 1898, 4). According to the New Zealand Times, both Zola’s and Dreyfus’s trials were “conducted in a way that is inexplicably unjust from the British point of view, and would not be tolerated, if any tribunal had the colossal temerity to attempt it, in any British country” (April 5, 1898, 2). The Waikato Argus encourages its readers to acknowledge that “every Briton has reason to thank his lucky stars that the most humble subject of Her Majesty is certain of a fair trial” (Feb 26, 1898, 2).

Other newspapers, however, took a much stronger (and more smug) line, engaging in overt criticism of France. The Lyttelton Times observes that Zola’s trial “seems to be a mixture of farce and riot, and is altogether disgraceful to Government and people” (Feb 19, 1898, 4) and, in an article entitled “The Zola Fiasco,” says that there “are certainly some things that they do not do much better in France, and the administration of justice seems to be one of them” (July 8, 1898, 4). The Daily Telegraph evokes a negative historical parallel, claiming that “Zola has been scandalously betrayed by a Court which has acted in the spirit which once sent men to the Bastille under the lettre de cachet system” (Feb 25, 1898, 2). The North Otago Times alludes to another historical example of procedural unfairness, claiming that “to the Anglo-Saxon mind, [this] is a species of trial that has been delved up from the precincts of the Star Chamber” (Jan 19, 1898, 2). The Marlborough Express wonders at how the Dreyfus Affair could occur in republican France, saying that it “seems a most extraordinary thing to us that in France, nominally the home of the free, under republican form of government which should give all men equality before the law, there should be this persistent denial to give a man a fair trial” (Jan 19, 1898, 2).

Readers were regularly reminded how grateful they should be for living under British law where such affronts to justice were impossible. The New Zealand Times rejoices: “call it smug satisfaction, or any other name you please; but there is cause for profound thankfulness, surely, in the fact that we live under British rule, protected by an administration of justice which, in the main, is pure and impartial. No such thing as that which has happened in France—to the everlasting disgrace of its judiciary and the indelible disgrace of the nation—could ever occur anywhere in the British dominions” (Feb 25, 1898, 2).
Two newspapers, however, saw a measure of hypocrisy in the country’s collective outrage at the operation of the French legal system. The Ashburton Guardian refers to a case where counsel questioned witnesses aggressively: “we observe that the press of Great Britain and her colonies are unanimous in condemning the proceedings in Court during the now famous Zola trial, but as long as unscrupulous counsel are permitted to browbeat and intimidate witnesses in our own courts we do not see that we have much to plume ourselves upon” (Feb 28, 1898, 2).61

Recognition of the potential for real political upheaval—perhaps even revolution—sparked Francophobia in the true meaning of the word. The Evening Post considers that the “possibility of a popular émeute is a cause of anxiety to the European Powers, and, as can easily be understood, not least of all to Great Britain” (Feb 18, 1898, 4). Combining with this genuine Francophobia was the more purely prejudicial variety, whereby the threat of revolution was conceived as little more than French excitability—a changeable temperament taken a bit too far.

New Zealand newspapers referred to the impact of the Dreyfus Affair on French political stability. For the Auckland Star, the “dangerous absolutism of the army and the fanaticism of the lower classes” (Feb 26, 1898, 4) give pause for thought. The Lake Wakatip Mail shares these concerns: “once more we have the spectacle of a Paris mob in league with the army against liberty and justice” (April 8, 1898, 4). Observing that “the popular cry is no longer ‘Vive la République’ but ‘Vive l’Armée,’” the Evening Post asks: “is France once more on the road to a military despotism?” (April 4, 1898, 4). The same newspaper, two months earlier, had suggested that France was particularly susceptible to the destabilising effects of a public scandal, observing that “less than the present trouble has sufficed to wreck Governments, and even dynasties” (Feb 18, 1898, 4).

For the New Zealand Times, “at the present moment there is every reason to fear for the stability of the Republic” (Jan 24, 1898, 12). In an article entitled “A National Danger,” the Evening Post claims that Paris is in a state of ferment, “and every new development brings out more forcibly the dangers that threaten the present French system of government” (August 31, 1898, 4). Under the heading “France’s Internal Foes,” the analysis of the Thames Advertiser is that “everything in France—and more particularly in Paris—is tending towards an eventual explosion. . . . France is coming closer every day to the brink of the precipice” (Oct 25, 1898, 2). An article in the Colonist with the heading “The Troublous State Of France” suggests that “unhappily, France seems to be drifting towards disaster, without a capable pilot, and without an anchor” (Oct 28, 1898, 2). The Daily Telegraph laments: “Unhappy France! With such a mob, such a soldiery, and such a judicature it could provide the end of the nineteenth century with a new edition of the Terror which horrified the world a hundred years ago” (Feb 21, 1898, 2).

The newspapers point out that there is historical precedent in France for political upheaval at the hands of an “adventurer.” Should Dreyfus be found innocent, the Oamaru Mail predicts that the government will “fall to pieces like a card castle” and that in the “consequent confusion the first plausible adventurer ready and able to take occasion by the hand, and quick to weld the molten mass of public opinion, will have all France in his grip” (Feb 22, 1898, 4). The Daily Telegraph makes the same forecast with an agricultural metaphor: “then will come the time of the adventurer and of the bitter harvest which France must reap as the reward of her own sowing” (Feb 25, 1898, 2).
Many newspapers mention the fear-laden dog-whistle word of “revolution”—perhaps associated, in the “Anglo-Saxon” consciousness, more closely with France than any other country. The Nelson Evening Mail observes that France is the “land of revolutions” (Sept 6, 1898, 2). The Western Star predicts that if “justice can be travestied as it has been in the Zola trial, another French revolution should eventuate at no distant date” (March 5, 1898, 4). The Lyttelton Times wonders whether “a national revolution may yet result” (Feb 25, 1898, 4), and the Wanganui Herald remarks that France is “in the throes of a political convulsion, which may lead to another revolution” (Oct 27, 1898, 2). Towards the end of 1898, the Bay of Plenty Times observed that “the Dreyfus case continues to drag France nearer to the brink of a revolution” (Dec 9, 1898, 2). The Otago Daily Times reckons that a revolution is about due, according to “the established periodicity of French affairs” (Feb 26, 1898, 2). The Temuka Leader points out that France “has gone through several revolutions during the last 100 years, and it seems now almost ripe for another” (Oct 25, 1898, 2).

This attitude is reflected in other white settler colonies of the British Empire. Tombs sees the Dreyfus Affair as a “further step in confirming on both sides of the Atlantic a growing belief in ‘Anglo-Saxon’ solidarity and common values.”62 Cahm views the response of the anglophone Canadian press to the Dreyfus Affair as reflecting the position taken by the London newspapers.63 His analysis of the American newspapers identifies a focus on procedural and substantive unfairness in the trials of both Dreyfus and Zola—one of the main points made in the British press.64 Likewise, the American papers underlined a French tendency to excitability and unpredictability—the historic image of France being one of violence and revolution.65 The Francophobia apparent in the New Zealand newspapers shows that New Zealand adopted the British position and endorsed it with enthusiasm, in the home-made titles ascribed to the cable news items. It would seem that New Zealand was happy to stand with her Francophobic imperial mother and bask in the glow of British superiority.

**Conclusion**

The coverage in the New Zealand newspapers of France’s grab for the New Hebrides and of the Dreyfus Affair illustrates two types of Francophobia; the former, the *fear* which is closer to the true meaning of the word; the latter, the *contempt* which is closer to its commonly understood meaning. Perhaps the fear engendered by the New Hebrides debate strengthened the contempt displayed in response to the later scandal. Certainly, the anti-French feeling seen in New Zealand newspapers during the Dreyfus Affair may be partly explained by the *Schadenfreude* of seeing a recently minted national (as opposed to imperial) enemy having a hard time of it. The New Hebrides affair gave New Zealand her own grounds to look with suspicion upon her imperial mother’s proverbial rival; that is, the situation revealed an awareness that New Zealand might have national interests independent of, and perhaps even in conflict with, imperial ones.

The newspaper coverage of these two French affairs shows the coexistence of two facets of New Zealand national identity at the end of the nineteenth century. In the New Hebrides case, it was the New Zealand or colonial element which dominated, albeit with an acute awareness of the country’s position as a colony whose interests were ultimately secondary to those of the British Empire as a whole. In the Dreyfus Affair, it was the British or imperial component which came out on top, the gleeful titling of the cable news items showing a local enthusiasm to engage in the Francophobia sanctioned by Britain and transmitted (not just literally by cablegram) to her colonial charges.
Whichever way one defines New Zealand national identity—New Zealand, British (with perhaps a wee measure of pure Scotch), “Anglo-Saxon”—in relation to the New Hebrides case or the Dreyfus Affair, it features Francophobia. This supports Watts’s view that a French influence, albeit negative in these two instances, resonated in New Zealand and contributed to the shaping of the nation’s identity. And perhaps there is at least one sphere in which “France-bashing” (of the more literal variety) continues to help define this identity in our national newspapers and on the world stage—the rugby pitch.

3 Watts, New Zealand’s France, 301.
5 Palenski, 2.
6 Watts, New Zealand’s France, 310. Alexis Bergantz makes a similar point about French convicts who escaped from New Caledonia to Australia, suggesting that they “played a more important role in the development of Australian Federation and nationalism than has been acknowledged”; Alexis Bergantz, “‘The Scum of France’: Australian Anxieties towards French Convicts in the Nineteenth Century,” Australian Historical Studies 49 (2018): 152.
7 Palenski, The Making of New Zealanders, 129.
9 Vaïsse, 33.
17 On Servajean’s own lecture, Colin Thornton-Smith says: “this extraordinary mishmash of misinformation again illustrates the way in which the case against Dreyfus, baseless from the beginning, was propped up by a whole series of ostensibly authoritative pieces of confidential information, some of them carefully angled towards a particular public”; Colin Thornton-Smith, “Reactions of the Australian Catholic Press to the Dreyfus Case,” Australian Jewish Historical Society Journal 14, no. 1 (1997): 73.
18 Watts, New Zealand’s France, 100.
23 Watts, New Zealand's France, 301.
31 Bueltmann, Scottish Ethnicity, 28.
33 Barko, 50.
37 Fisher, 22.
38 Van Dijk, Pacific Strife, 44.
39 Van Dijk, 25.
41 Van Dijk, Pacific Strife, 49.
42 Ross, “New Zealand Aspirations,” 225. Concessions were made, however, by London.
43 Watts, New Zealand's France, 223.
45 Bergantz, “The Scum of France,” 158.
49 Watts, New Zealand’s France, 301–2.
50 Fisher, France in the South Pacific, 32.
51 Bergantz, “The Scum of France,” 162.
52 Sinclair, A Destiny Apart, 94.
54 Martin P. Johnson, The Dreyfus Affair (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999), ix.
Murrell, 69.


“Hysterical Sympathy in Auckland,” *Evening Post*, Sept 16, 1899, 5. An impromptu addition to a theatrical performance featuring the ripping to shreds of the French flag was met with a “storm of applause” (*New Zealand Times*, Sept 14, 1899, 6).


The *Bay of Plenty Times* (March 7, 1898, 2) makes a similar point in respect of outrageous judicial bias in the summing up of a case.


