IT HAS BEEN SAID, with much truth, that 'A prophet is not without honour, except in his own country'. I have indeed found myself on a somewhat lonely road, especially in the early years of my involvement in the study of Maori land tenure and Maori-settler relations, but I am honoured tonight by the invitation from Professor Vincent O'Sullivan on behalf of the Stout Research Centre to present the Stout Annual Lecture, in this centenary year of Victoria University. It is a moment of particular poignancy to me because this is my own alma mater, and I well recall when I first came into this beautiful room, then the main library of Victoria University College, in 1953, at the age of 17 years, and began my studies in history. I am honoured too, by your presence in such numbers tonight, to hear my lecture on the Treaty of Waitangi and its significance for New Zealand, historically and today.

On Waitangi Day 1993, in the Civic Square in Wellington, I was privileged to participate in a public debate on the Treaty organised by the then Mayor of Wellington, Fran Wilde. Among the speakers in that debate was Councillor Ruth Gottlieb, and she gave a very able speech on the theme of the rights of all citizens before the law, in a parliamentary democracy, with no distinction based upon race, colour, creed or gender. It was an eloquent, highly principled address, reflecting the very best of the European tradition of toleration and mutual respect, across the lines of ethnicity, in particular. God knows, we have seen all too little of the best of the European tradition in this bloody century, but Councillor Gottlieb exemplified, with courage and skill, the ideals of cosmopolitan toleration – ideals borne out of European ethnic conflicts, and the dangers of excessive zeal for ethnic identity and racial pride.

All the while that Councillor Gottlieb spoke, she was challenged by members of the numerous Maori audience at the debate. They heckled, and threw cigarette packets, and one man called out from time to time, 'But you've got all the land!'

Councillor Gottlieb was protected from further anger and possible humiliation by the chairman of the debate, an elder of Ngati Toa, who insisted that the speaker be heard with courtesy. But the exchange between the Councillor and her hecklers represented two views of human history. One was the tradition of the western humanist enlightenment, a universalist and essentially non-racial tradition (which the west Europeans themselves sullied even as they were enunciating it). The other was that of a particular ethnic group, the Maori, for whom such universalist concepts, imported in an age of imperialism, were oppressive. Even though mediated through parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, they represented to many Maori the 'tyranny of the majority'. The complaints of Councillor Gottlieb's hecklers reflected a deep-seated anger at the denial of their distinct identity, their ethnicity, and their marginalisation in a land which they had wholly possessed and controlled in the 1830s.

At the close of this millennium we can hardly be in any doubt of the power and passion of ethnicity. If the horrific events in the Balkans, the dangerous instability of Indonesia, even the recent voting in Scotland and Wales (where the nationalist parties were strongly supported against a more unitary view of the British Isles), teach us nothing else, they surely teach us that proud ethnic groups cannot live easily together in one national polity, except by their common consent.

What is truly remarkable about New Zealand is that, through the Treaty of Waitangi, the Maori
leadership did indeed give their consent to a joint enterprise with the British Crown: the joint enterprise of making a nation-state in these islands, where no nation-state had previously existed.

Let me enlarge on that statement a little. An examination of the historical evidence from the 1830s shows that there was no single, functioning Maori nation before 1840. Sovereignty lay with the many chiefs and tribes 'over their respective Territories as the sole sovereigns thereof', as the words of the Treaty have it. We should note the plural. In 1835, a few years before the framing of the Treaty of Waitangi, the Declaration of Independence of the Confederation of United Tribes of New Zealand, was signed by a number of chiefs in 1835 at the instigation of the British Resident in the Bay of Islands, James Busby. It has assumed great symbolic importance among many Maori today and, in 1835, it reflected a genuine aspiration among Bay of Islands chiefs, and some others who signed later, for a more United Maori nation and government, to stand against pressures from the outside world. But the Confederation was not a functioning government. Even as the chiefs signed they told Busby not to expect any rangatiratanga to put his mana under that of the Confederation. Busby realised that to try to enforce the laws of the Confederation would expose its weakness, and there is no evidence that it was assembled again except to sign away its authority at Waitangi in February 1840.

I believe that the decision made by the chiefs at Waitangi, and by others subsequently, was a considered and deliberate one. The record of the debates shows that the chiefs were well aware of the danger posed by the Crown itself — that the governor and the soldiers would destroy their mana, or enslave them. But the main weight of opinion was that the joint venture should be embarked upon, with the British Crown, to organise against the threat of anarchy brought by unregulated settlement. As I have put it in my recent book:

There was clearly a widespread appreciation that the problems of modernity required more concerted government than was possible at tribal level, and that the Crown should be at the head of it. To that extent, the chiefs and the officials shared a common purpose. Generally speaking, they still do.

(An Unsettled History, p.16).

Yet it was audacious, indeed arrogant, of the officials to assume that Maori would relinquish even part of their autonomy to the British Crown. Just how much autonomy the chiefs considered they were giving up is a difficult and contentious issue. Certainly the evidence suggests that they recognised that the Crown would not just be governing Pakeha; but they made it fairly clear in their speeches that they expected to be supported, not diminished, in their authority among their own people. In other words they did not so much relinquish their chiefly and tribal rangatiratanga as commit it to the new enterprise of nation-building. We can also better appreciate now that the British, overconfident in the universal worth of their culture, were wrong to assume that the Maori people would be content to submerge their identity, their ethnicity, through 'amalgamation' with the settlers, as was official policy for the next 100 years. On the contrary, Maori have made it abundantly clear that they will not accept the status of just one other minority amidst a multi-cultural society. They were the first settlers of these islands and are entitled to claim a special status as such. Prime Minister Norman Kirk put their position thus in 1972, while supporting the retention of the Maori seats in parliament: 'We are not one people, we are two peoples in one nation'.

Mr Kirk was alluding to words used by Governor Hobson in 1840. As each chief signed the Treaty, Hobson shook hands with him and said, 'He iwi tahi tatou' ('We are one people'). Though it is currently un fashionable to say so (and with due respect to Mr Kirk), I believe...
that in a most important sense Hobson was correct. Maori and Pakeha will no doubt retain distinct ethnicity or identity; in that sense we are two peoples. But in another sense we are indeed one people: we are the people of the Treaty. That is why the Treaty is a profoundly important constitutional instrument for this nation. It is the founding political contract between Maori and the Crown to build a single nation-state. Moreover, Maori leaders over subsequent decades reiterated and renewed their consent to the joint venture, in a variety of ways. For example:

- Potatau Te Wherowhero, ariki of Waikato, who declined to sign the Treaty in 1840, nevertheless wrote to Queen Victoria on Hobson’s death in 1842 asking her to send a kindly successor. There was no need to send a hard man, he wrote: ‘Formerly we were a bad people, a murdering people – now [we] are settling peaceably. We have left off the evil’. (Revd Robert Maunsell to the Church Missionary Society, 2 February 1843, microfilm of CMS archives file CN 0/64, Alexander Turnbull Library).

- The Arawa chiefs, who also did not sign the Treaty, nevertheless began to support the Crown’s courts in the 1850s, because they observed that Pakeha were punished for assaults on Maori, as well as vice versa.

- The renewal of the ‘covenant’ of Waitangi at the great conference of chiefs convened by Governor Browne at Kohimarama in 1860.

- The attempt by Wiremu Tamihana (Tarapipipi Te Waharoa) to develop an autonomous Kingitanga – the Maori King Movement – without repudiation of the overarching authority of God and the Queen.

- The pursuit of justice under the Treaty by the Kotahitanga movement, through the national parliament in Wellington in the 1890s, although the Maori parliament movement was itself well-developed.

- The same turning to the national parliament by the Ratana movement in the 20th century, with the request that the Treaty be ratified and honoured.

- A group of Maori men and women obstruct the survey of the road being built by Governor Grey from Auckland towards the Waikato, in 1861-63. ATL, CJ Urquhart Album.

- The same turning to the national parliament by the Ratana movement in the 20th century, with the request that the Treaty be ratified and honoured.

It was this reiterated commitment to the Treaty and its principles by the Maori leadership which, more than anything, elevated the Treaty above the attempt by one of the New Zealand Company directors in 1844 to dismiss it as ‘A temporary device to amuse and pacify savages’, and maintain its central importance to the Maori partnership with the Crown inaugurated in 1840. Given this commitment from the Maori side, it is surely incumbent upon the Crown, and successive governments which are heirs to the Crown’s constitutional authority, to honour their side of the bargain.

A survey of New Zealand history quickly reveals, unfortunately, that they have not always done so – that in fact they have repeatedly breached the terms and principles of the Treaty. Moreover, Maori have unceasingly protested about it. There is a widespread misapprehension that Maori protests about Treaty breaches are mostly very recent, that the flow of claims to the Waitangi Tribunal represents a recent ‘grievance industry’ and that it is generating what one critic, Professor Kenneth Minogue, calls a ‘morbid social pathology’ (Waitangi: Morality and Reality, New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1998, p.84). It is true that the particular form in which grievances are being brought, and the sudden concentration of them since 1985, have new features, but it is quite wrong to suggest that Maori protests about breaches of the compact of 1840 are only recent. On the contrary they began soon after 1840 and have persisted for over 150 years, though largely in vain.

The protests began in the 1840s and 1850s over aspects of the Crown’s land purchases: ignoring or by-passing some of the right-owners, neglecting to make promised reserves and so on. The
Crown’s practice of buying from one set of rightowners, letting it be known that a deal had been struck and mopping up the other rightowners later, caused divisions and feuds between Maori. By the late 1850s tribes were organising in big councils – runanganui – in an effort to control the Crown’s divide-and-buy tactics; or they were supporting the great supra-tribal movement to hold the land, the kingitanga, or ‘King movement’ headed by the Tainui confederation. By the early 1860s land purchases in the North Island had virtually ceased, though Maori were willing to admit settlers on leasehold. But the settler governments wanted the freehold and Governor Grey gave them his support. Two government strategies broke the Maori control of the land: first, invasion of Maori ‘rebel’ territory and confiscation of huge areas of the best land; secondly the Native Land Acts, by which the collective hapu titles were converted into so-called individual titles. This did not mean that Maori families got individual family farms (or only rarely so) but rather that owners’ names were listed on titles granted by the Native Land Court and each owner’s signature became individually and severally saleable. This transformation of customary tenure overcame the tribally-based resistance to land-selling. Piecemeal, over the next 80 years, most Maori land in the North Island was acquired by private or Crown purchasers. The Native Land Acts created a form of title which made it very difficult for Maori groups to retain and develop their land, and very easy for individuals to sell their interest in the tribal patrimony, in order to live in a cash economy. Successive partitions of the blocks of land were able to be instigated by the purchasers, through application to the Native Land Court.

What is also not well understood today is that very senior persons in government publicly acknowledged that this process was not in the best interests of Maori, and that it involved breaches of Treaty principles. For example, T W Lewis, an official of the Native Department from the 1860s and its head from 1879, told a Royal Commission in 1890:

The whole object of appointing a Court for the ascertainment of Native title was to enable alienation for settlement. Unless this object is attained the Court serves no good purpose and the Natives would be better off without it, as, in my opinion, fairer Native occupation would be had under the Maori’s own customs and usages without any intervention whatever from outside. (AJHR, 1891, G-1, minutes of evidence, p.145).

In a subsequent debate in parliament, former Premier (and soon to be Chief Justice) Sir Robert Stout, replied to criticism of the Native Land Acts by James Carroll, the part-Maori leader holding the seat of Gisborne:

It is quite correct what the Honourable Member had said – that bit by bit this Treaty [of Waitangi] has been violated. Of course the lands were not taken away from Maori without compensation; but he believed, if they had adopted the Committee system which was provided for by the Act of 1886 [whereby land remained with the hapu, who managed it through elected committees], they would have had greater control over their lands than they now possessed, under what was called the individualising of their titles.

(NZPD, 1894, Vol. 85, p. 556)

As a result of sustained and widespread protests by the Kotahitanga movement, and some skilled manoeuvring by East Coast leaders such as James Carroll, Paratene Ngata and his son Apirana Ngata, the ‘Committee system’, and the incorporation of hapu as legal entities, was introduced at the end of the 19th century. Some Maori land incorporations have subsequently worked well on the East
Coast and elsewhere. The alienation of the freehold also slowed because the Maori Land Councils Act of 1900 gave Maori more control over their land. But this clash with a new wave of white settlement, and the law was amended to again facilitate the piecemeal purchase of interests from individuals or sections of the owners. About half of the approximately eight million acres remaining in Maori ownership in 1900 were alienated before the systematic purchase programmes ceased; and this was at a time when the Maori population was known to be increasing. By 1939 Maori retained only about 6% of the total area of New Zealand, and much of it was unfarmable.

Maori protests about the impact of the land laws are not just a recent phenomenon, of the last two or three decades. In addition to the big, general protest movements referred to, almost every major block of land was the subject of petitions to parliament, or litigation by the families or hapu affected. Every Maori family in the North Island, and many in the South Island too, were touched by the Native Land Acts. The files are replete with documentation of their protests. Although (as with the great Crown purchases in the South Island) Maori were themselves caught up in the process, and took payments, the government’s deliberate divide-and-buy strategies, the manipulativeness that the land law facilitated, the sheer scale of the purchases, and their persistence well into the 20th century in the face of the known wishes of the national Maori leadership, do not sit well with the Crown’s Treaty obligations to respect Maori rangatiratanga. It is not just that Maori now lament accepting prices which look miserable in hindsight, because of the rising value of land (as is sometimes suggested), but that in many cases they did not give full and free consent to alienation in the first place.

The sustained programmes of acquisition of Maori land, and the apparent inability of Maori to check it, has left New Zealand with an unsettled history. It has also weakened Maori trust in the parliamentary process and the rule of law. These two most precious of British traditions are necessary and sufficient conditions, in the eyes of most Pakeha, for securing the liberty and dignity of the individual. For many Maori they are necessary but not sufficient. Parliament and the law were used so persistently in the interests of the land grab that they were diminished in the eyes of many Maori. Maori believe that they also need the protection of the Treaty and Treaty principles, if they are to vest confidence in the Crown (that is in the state and central government). Hence the intense focus on ‘honouring the Treaty’ in the modern protest movement, the demand that governments respect the principles of the Treaty in framing and implementing law. Hence too the demand for recognition of some form of ‘tino rangatiratanga’, the tribal autonomy that the Treaty guarantees.

If the Treaty and Treaty principles are so fundamental to the fruitful coexistence of Maori and Pakeha in the nation, it follows that the machinery created to give practical effect to the Treaty and Treaty principles is also of fundamental importance. That machinery today is the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and the Waitangi Tribunal. Both are heavily criticised because the claims are steadily mounting and few seem to have been resolved. This is partly because the sheer scale of the undertaking embarked upon (especially in the amendment of 1985 which allowed claims to be brought for historic grievances stretching back to 1840) was not fully appreciated at the time it was begun. It is, after all, nothing less than a complete review of New Zealand’s colonial history in the light of Treaty principles. Nor was
the complexity of Maori society appreciated at the time, and of how difficult it would be to address claims both at the microlevel of individuals and families and the macrolevel of iwi and whole districts. The Treaty claims process has been the principal cause of the fundamental building-block of Maori society, the hapu, resuming its dynamic role after a century of administrative focus upon the larger unit, the iwi. But these are no reasons for either Maori or Pakeha getting impatient with the process and turning away from it prematurely. As Mr Justice Anderson said recently, in granting an injunction to slow the presentation of the Maori Fisheries Commission’s scheme for distribution of commercial fishing quota, ‘Too many valid grievances of Maori have been perpetuated by systemic impatience’. (CP 395/93 Wgtn, p.12).

What is required now is not ‘systemic impatience’ but sober acknowledgment of difficulties, recognition of what must be done to overcome them, renewed commitment to the Treaty, Treaty principles and the Treaty of Waitangi Act, and adequate resourcing of the Tribunal to carry out the tasks with which it has been charged by statute and which the community expects of it.

Maori communities should also be allowed to seek assistance, if they need it, from the courts or from a non-government agency such as an arm of the Electoral Commission in the selection or election of representatives duly accredited to negotiate settlements with the Crown. Otherwise they should be allowed quietly to pursue negotiations, preferably on the basis of a comprehensive Tribunal report.

In fact, though progress seems slow from some perspectives, a great deal of progress has been made since 1985. Treaty principles have been articulated by the Tribunal and by the Court of Appeal in moderate and constructive ways. Much research has been completed with regard to historical Treaty claims and we know a great deal more now about the history of Maori-settler interactions than we did in the early 1990s, when the ‘Crown proposals’ for settling historical claims and the ‘fiscal envelope’ were being developed. Moreover, some benchmark settlements have been negotiated, with regard to commercial sea-fisheries, the Waikato land confiscations and the Ngai Tahu claims — settlements which acknowledge the injuries done in breach of Treaty principles and involve payment of substantial assistance to the tribes’ economic recovery but which are entirely manageable within the national economy.

The major difficulty looming is that there is not going to be enough in the total settlement fund indicated by the government so far to ensure that the tribes coming late in the queue, especially the populous tribes of the north, receive reasonable levels of reparation. The government has acknowledged, in January of this year, on the basis of recent research, that pre-1865 Crown purchases, land confiscations during the Anglo-Maori wars and purchases under the Native Land Acts all involved breaches of Treaty principles. This is a very important step forward. It is no longer necessary to prove precisely how every block of land was alienated. Negotiations for settlement of claims can focus more on how much of its territory a tribe lost and how much it retained. There is a strong case to be made that very
populous tribes which lost relatively smaller areas were just as injured as the less populous tribes who lost more land: for the populous tribes used their scarce acres more intensively and could ill afford to lose any of them. On a per capita basis, by 1940 many of the crowded tribes of the north were left just as land-short as the southern tribes which generally lost far more by area. Moreover, the persistence of systematic acquisition of Maori land in the 20th century, when the tribes’ land shortage was already apparent, is arguably a more gross breach of the Treaty principle of active protection of Maori interests than was the early acquisition of land which was considered surplus to Maori needs. At the very least, these kinds of issues need to be talked through more between government and the national Maori leadership so that broadly agreed principles can guide the approximate levels of remedy appropriate to each tribe or district, having regard to existing benchmarks.

As it is, there are grounds for concern that most of the $1 billion limit originally declared in the ‘Crown proposals’ of 1994 will be soon be committed, mostly on the tribes with the biggest raupatu (confiscation) claims, the commercial fisheries settlement and the Ngai Tahu settlement, leaving a small quotient for the remaining tribes to jostle over. Given the kinds of Crown actions now accepted as Treaty breaches, and given the size of the tribal populations affected, simple arithmetic would suggest that $1 billion is not going to be nearly enough to achieve reasonable levels of settlement for all tribes. This would be a highly unfortunate outcome from a process which has begun well. Nor can it be claimed with certainty that the ‘fiscal envelope’ has already been abandoned. Governments have said it is policy no longer, yet the ‘relativity clauses’ in the Tainui and Ngai Tahu settlements (which mean, in effect, that their settlements are not just $170 million each but 17% of whatever total fund is allocated to the historical claims) make governments reluctant to offer settlements that will lift the total payments over $1 billion and thereby trigger the relatively clauses (which would require further payments to Tainui and Ngai Tahu).

If the ‘relativity clauses’ can be replaced by a single, additional payment to the two tribes concerned, and the fiscal cap truly surpassed, there are plenty of reasons why Pakeha should be prepared to be generous, not grudging, in funding Treaty settlements for all tribes. Reparation payments at the rate of $100 million per year are not trivial but neither are they are serious strain on the national accounts. Moreover it is now apparent that the transfer back to Maori tribes of some of the wealth which they were relieved of during colonisation results in a huge release of energies from the tribes concerned, an expansion of enterprise and productivity which restores pride and confidence and takes Maori out of unemployment and its associated, costly problems. On that kind of cost-benefit analysis alone, Treaty settlements contribute to the well-being of the whole national community, quite apart from their essential function in healing the sense of historical injury felt by Maori and promoting reconciliation between them and the Crown.

There is therefore much to be done, by way of general discussion and planning between Maori leadership and government to shape the process equitably for all tribes. There are also good reasons that this shaping of the process should have priority over a spate of new settlements with particular tribes. Wide agreement on the general principles shaping settlements will be the best guarantee that apparently ‘full and
final’ settlements will not be challenged by a later generation. Moreover, claimants coming late in the queue need to be given the assurance that Treaty settlements will proceed on the basis of comparable reparation for comparable injuries, in order that they will patiently complete their research and their Tribunal hearings, and await their turn for negotiations. If this assurance can be given, on the basis of principles worked out over the next year or so, one could feel reasonably confident that all major historical claims could be settled by about the year 2015, and that there should be no need to revisit them. In other words, if the job is done well now, the nation should be able to look forward to the end to the historical claims process. No doubt minor issues would remain to be adjusted, within and between tribes as much as between Maori and the Crown. But neither Maori nor Pakeha will benefit from a constant scratching at old wounds. Maori do need to have their historical injuries acknowledged, in order to be able to put them behind, but provided that settlements in the current process are principled and generous, there is no reason why New Zealand’s history should become a permanent bleeding sore.

This is not to say that there will not be a role for the Waitangi Tribunal, or a body like the Tribunal, in its contemporary jurisdiction. As I indicated in my earlier remarks, for two races to retain their separate identities but live together in one nation requires that each must work at the relationship, in perpetuity. New Zealanders should get used to that idea, and see at as fruitful and mutually enriching, rather than harking back to a period of supposed near-uniformity. The Crown’s sovereignty or kawanatanga under Article 1 of the Treaty is the basis of our living together under a single national parliament and legal system; the rights of tino rangatiratanga accorded to Maori under Article 2 offer necessary safeguards to Maori against ‘the tyranny of the majority’. But as the Court of Appeal acknowledged in the famous ‘Maori Council case’ or ‘Lands case’ of 1987, there is always the potential for conflict between the Article 1 rights of the Crown and the Article 2 rights of Maori – a situation which requires that each party must deal with the other reasonably and in the utmost good faith. Those principles lie at the heart of the relationship between Maori and Pakeha. Neither statutes nor the courts have made the Treaty into a general law superior to all other law – fortunately in my view, for to do so would be to draw the Treaty constantly into litigation, make it excessively contentious and ultimately diminish it. But the Tribunal and the Court of Appeal have rightly referred to the spirit of the Treaty, acknowledging it as the document which embodies the founding political contract between Maori and the Crown and helps to guide the interpretation of law. It is a fine balance and one unique to New Zealand as far as I am aware. How it will apply exactly in particular situations as the future unfolds only the future can tell. But a forum such as the Tribunal, where Maori can bring claims of unreasonable actions by the Crown which breach Treaty principles, have them investigated and reported on, for the guidance of claimants and Crown alike, will be an essential part of New Zealand’s constitutional machinery.

It would therefore be a mistake to dismiss the Treaty of Waitangi Act as the New Zealand Company tried to dismiss the Treaty itself – as merely a ‘temporary device to amuse and pacify savages’. On the contrary, the best legacy that our political leaders could leave us, in this election year which closes the millennium, is a reaffirmation of the Treaty, of Treaty principles, of the Treaty of Waitangi Act and the work of the Waitangi Tribunal. More helpful than a round of hurried settlements would be renewed dialogue with the Maori leadership nationally, with a view to widespread agreement on guidelines for fair settlements for all tribes. Such a legacy from our leaders of 1999 – including Maori leaders as well as the Government and Opposition – would enable us to embrace the new millennium with confidence that we can patiently and systematically resolve the grievances of the past and build the future in the spirit of the original compact which brought us together. 

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