In this article, I argue that both tino rangatiratanga and socialism lie at the heart of emancipatory politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. For Māori, the economy has always been a dynamic site of interaction with the state and corporate bodies, and today the Māori economy is celebrated by some as a space where tino rangatiratanga can be realised. For the most part, though, the capitalist economy has been a site of exploitation for Māori. Given the inextricable relations between capitalism and colonialism, I present the case for Māori socialism as an emancipatory response to both. To do so, I employ Erik Olin Wright’s socialist compass, a conceptual tool that points to a variety of economic pathways towards socialism. But there is a major problem with Wright’s compass: it only has three points (state power, economic power, and social power). I extend Wright’s vision for socialism by completing the compass, adding to it a much needed fourth point: tino rangatiratanga. The resulting ‘Aotearoa socialist compass’ can be used to orient us towards Māori socialism—a socialist economy in which tino rangatiratanga is realised.
The assertion of tino rangatiratanga, whether in resistance to, or in collaboration with, the state, has achieved much in political, cultural, and economic spheres. It was through diplomacy, determination, and persistence that rangatira first secured seats in Parliament and Māori representation in both central and local government. Culturally, the ‘Māori renaissance’ of the 1970s and 1980s led to renewed efforts in the revival of te reo Māori, the establishment of Kohanga Reo, and the celebration of Māori identity through the arts and media. In the economic sphere, which is the focus of this article, Treaty settlements and Māori innovation have led to the growth of the Māori economy, now worth around $50 billion.

1  I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank Dylan Taylor and Jack Foster for encouraging me to develop this article and for patiently guiding me through the process.

2  Here, the ‘Māori economy’ refers to a range of corporations, businesses, and employers that self-identify as Māori and are included in official New Zealand economic statistics. See New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘The Māori Economy,’ https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAs-in-negotiations/UK-FTA/The-Maori-Economy_2.pdf. It must be recognised that the definition of the Māori economy espoused in this report, and reflected in this article, is only one way of understanding the Māori economy. The same term might also be used to refer to traditional and diverse economic practices such as koha and manākitanga and reciprocal gift-giving, which were dominant prior to colonisation and continue to exist today.
Despite this progress, however, the devastating legacy of colonisation remains manifest in the lives of far too many Māori whānau today. According to the economist Brian Easton, by the 1970s Māori had become ‘an indicator of what was happening to people who were lowest in the income distribution’. Inequality has only increased since the 1970s and Māori continue to rank among the lowest in income distribution and poverty measures today.

One way Māori inequality has been measured has been by looking at the number of Māori, compared to non-Māori, who are represented in the precariat. The precariat, as conceptualised by Guy Standing, refers to a ‘class in the making’, emerging in the wake of neoliberal economic reform and characterised by job insecurity. In many countries, including Aotearoa New Zealand, the neoliberal ideal of increased labour market flexibility has only transferred insecurity and risk from employers to employees. In the recently published book *Precarity: Uncertain, Insecure and Unequal Lives in Aotearoa New Zealand*, the precariat refers specifically to those who are in temporary work, are unemployed, or are receiving a benefit. Using statistics from the 2014 New Zealand General Social Survey as well as their own research, the authors tell the stories of hundreds of young people, refugees and non-European immigrants, elderly, and many others who make up Aotearoa New Zealand’s precariat. Although they come from diverse backgrounds, the lives of all of these people are characterised by ‘situations and experiences of uncertainty, dependency, powerlessness, perilousness and insufficiency’.

While *Precarity* highlights the diversity of inequality, special attention is paid to the overrepresentation of Māori in the precariat: almost one in

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3 Brian Easton, ‘Māori have been trapped in a poverty cycle,’ *E-Tangata*, 13 May 2018, https://e-tangata.co.nz/korero/brian-easton-maori-have-been-trapped-in-a-poverty-cycle/


four Māori are represented in the precariat compared to almost one in six non-Māori. When comparing Māori and Pākehā deprivation they find that 13 percent of Māori are in temporary work compared to 8.2 percent of Pākehā; similarly, 12.4 percent of Māori are unemployed compared to 4.4 percent of Pākehā. In comparing Māori to Pākehā (as opposed to all non-Māori, as in the first instance), the authors highlight the importance of viewing Māori inequality within the context of colonisation, pointing out that precarity is compounded by experiences of discrimination and cultural isolation. They urge the reader to remember the ‘deeds from this country’s past’, linking current Māori inequality with the historic appropriation of Māori land and natural resources. The key message is that Māori represent more than just a subset of the wider Aotearoa New Zealand precariat; underlying Māori inequality are issues of colonisation which, if not addressed, will continue to impinge on Māori wellbeing.

Given the complexity of the inequality faced by Māori today, it is clear that emancipatory politics in Aotearoa New Zealand must address both colonisation and capitalist exploitation. The concept of Māori socialism, worked through in this article, addresses the need for both tino rangatiratanga and socialism. In section one, I demonstrate the need for Māori socialism by contextualising Māori inequality within the history of colonisation and capitalist exploitation. I then move on to give a brief overview of the different ways Māori authorities and the state have responded to this. In section two, I unpack Erik Olin Wright’s pragmatic approach to socialism as an achievable alternative to capitalism and introduce his concept of the socialist compass. In section three, I complete Wright’s compass by adding a fourth point: tino rangatiratanga. I develop the idea of Māori socialism by extending Wright’s vision to include the emancipatory goals of Māori in line with the vision for tino rangatiratanga outlined in the Matike Mai

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7 Groot et al. Precarity, 116.
8 Groot et al. Precarity, 117.
9 Groot et al. Precarity, 111.
In the final section, with the new compass in hand, I explore the potential of the Māori economy and briefly outline some of the possible pathways towards Māori socialism.

The historical roots of Māori inequality

Prior to European settlement most hapū were resource rich and had well-established trading systems. While not entirely without hierarchy, the social structure of hapū was relatively flat and a strong culture of reciprocity and manaakitanga meant that wealth was evenly distributed. When Europeans did arrive many hapū were quick to adapt to the capitalist market economy. The 1840s and 1850s saw a thriving Māori economy characterised by hapū-driven enterprise and economic expansion. Many hapū, for example, became successful players in the coastal shipping, flourmilling, and farming industries. However, ‘the golden age of Māori enterprise’ was short lived; with the rapid increase of the Pākehā population came a demand for productive land and the subsequent dispossession of Māori from their main source of economic and cultural prosperity. The confiscation of Māori land during and after the Land Wars ‘led directly to the creation of “an almost landless proletariat”’. The proletarianisation of Māori left many dependent on the emerging Pākehā economy for wage

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labour in areas such as farming, gum digging, bush felling, and road making. Land alienation has arguably been the biggest contributor to Māori poverty; alienation continues today in various ways such as the Crown’s claim on the foreshore and seabed and the proposed housing development at Ihumātao.

After the Second World War the ‘long boom’ drew the majority of the Māori population to the cities in search of employment and better standards of living. The Department of Maori Affairs actively encouraged this, relocating 399 families and assisting a further 485 to move ‘of their own accord’ in the early 1960s. Leaving the relative security of the kainga behind, urbanisation meant that whānau became even more dependent on wage labour. While the welfare state provided almost full employment, Māori were largely excluded from professional and managerial positions. Instead, as Evan Poata-Smith points out, Māori were offered precarious blue-collar jobs and treated as expendable in times of economic recession.

The economic crisis of the 1970s had a disproportionately negative impact on Māori employment. As Aroha Harris and Melissa Williams explain, ‘Because Māori workers were concentrated in particular workplaces, often intergenerationally, economic downturns affected whole communities, not just individual families’. The impact of the economic crisis was exacerbated by the punitive labour and welfare reforms introduced by the fourth Labour government in 1984 and continued by successive

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15 In *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou*, 96–97, Walker notes that urbanisation was swift. Before the war, 90 percent of the Māori population lived rurally, but by the 1960s 70 percent had moved to the urban centres.


governments since.\textsuperscript{19} While unemployment increased urban Māori poverty in the 1970s, it was the neoliberal policies in the 1990s that entrenched it.

Two of the defining features of neoliberalism have been labour market deregulation and welfare cuts. As Jane Kelsey notes, while the fourth Labour government was quick to deregulate the market through trade liberalisation, its commitment to the trade union movement made it difficult to deregulate the labour market.\textsuperscript{20} It wasn’t until the National party came into power in 1990 that substantial changes to the labour market were made. The Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) had a massive impact on employment security. The main goals of the ECA were to weaken the collective bargaining capacity of unions and to drive wages down. This meant that workers had little choice but to accept lower wages or face unemployment. To make matters worse, those who did lose their jobs could no longer rely on the welfare state to provide short-term relief—under National benefits were substantially reduced, and universal benefit subsidies were abolished or became means tested. Between 1989 and 1992 the number of people living below the poverty line increased by 35%. Māori were among those most severely impacted by these economic policies.

While the introduction of neoliberalism was a devastating blow for working-class Māori, the 1980s saw the beginning of substantial economic gains at an iwi level. In 1985 the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal, which had been established in 1975, was extended to hear historic claims dating back to the 1840s. Since 1990, 75 iwi have finalised Treaty settlements and now have an asset base worth $9 billion.\textsuperscript{21} Much as during ‘the golden age of Māori enterprise’ in the 1840s and 1850s, many of these iwi have invested wisely, making the most of a neoliberal economy and international trade.


While the economic success of post-settlement iwi has been hard earned, it is not necessarily shared by all who suffer the consequences of colonisation. Poata-Smith draws attention to the growth of inequality within Māori communities, noting that dominant ideas about Māori development empower some groups of Māori, but disenfranchise and marginalise others. Just this year workers at Moana New Zealand, the country’s biggest iwi-owned fishing company, went on strike over low wages. These workers expressed their frustration at a company that makes millions of dollars a year but does not value its workers enough to pay the living wage. Despite economic success at an iwi level, then, many Māori continue to be overrepresented in measures of income and job insecurity.

**Tino rangatiratanga and the state**

State policies concerning Māori have at different times coincided or conflicted with Māori aspirations for tino rangatiratanga. Tino rangatiratanga, as promised in the Treaty, refers to the right of hapū to practice self-determination. Iwi and hapū actively, and often forcefully, resisted Pākehā appropriation of land and political power. The Land Wars, in which various iwi and hapū united against British troops, began after the forced survey of land in Taranaki. Other forms of pan-tribal organised resistance included the Kingitanga and Kotahitanga movements, established in the 1850s. These movements represented a united effort of iwi and hapū in the assertion of tino rangatiratanga as a response to Crown breaches of the Treaty. While there are also examples of iwi and hapū who fought alongside the British, they did so with the understanding that Māori political and economic aspirations would be met by the newly established

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22 Poata-Smith, ‘Inequality and Māori.’
Pākehā government. However, as land alienation continued unabated into the 20th century, growing poverty and a decreasing population left Māori with little choice but to make compromises with the state in regards to tino rangatiratanga.

The first half of the 20th century saw a closer relationship between Māori leaders and the state. The Labour–Ratana alliance in the 1930s, for example, promoted cooperation and reciprocity in Crown–Māori relations. In 1935 Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage promised to advance Māori welfare in return for Māori support for Labour. Other attempts at state-sanctioned Māori advancement sought to deal with rural Māori poverty through land development. Led by Āpirana Ngata, the Young Māori Party encouraged rural iwi to ‘combine the technological, cultural and other benefits of European civilisation with preserving “the best” of Maori culture’.

Indeed, the preservation of culture became a major focus for the advancement of tino rangatiratanga in the mid-20th century. The Māori Women’s Welfare League and the New Zealand Māori Council, both of which were supported by the state, worked hard to maintain cultural solidarity as Māori urbanised. Both the league and the council were integral in the establishment of the cultural clubs and urban marae which served the cultural needs of Māori at a time when government policy pushed for full assimilation. In 1961 the government had released the Hunn report, which detailed the plight of Māori in health, education, housing, and land development. As a solution to issues of Māori poverty, the report advised that Māori be fully ‘integrated’ under mainstream social welfare policy. In reality, the Hunn report represented the thinly veiled racism of the government’s assimilationist agenda. The idea that New Zealand had ‘the best race relations in the world’ had little to do with the state’s attempt at integration and was based largely on the efforts of Māori leaders who

26 Hill, State Authority, Indigenous Autonomy.
27 Walker, Ka Whawahi Tōnui Matou.
28 Hill, State Authority, Indigenous Autonomy, 44.
mediated between the state and working Māori.\textsuperscript{30}

Crown–Māori relations took a dramatic turn in the 1960s and 1970s with the resurgence of Māori political consciousness and protest. While the struggle against the colonial practices of land alienation and cultural assimilation had never been abandoned, resistance to state oppression was reinvigorated by the global protest and civil rights movements of the late-1960s. The Māori Women’s Welfare League and the Māori Council had resisted cultural assimilation by ‘working in quiet ways to support’ their people without causing too much of a stir.\textsuperscript{31} A more assertive approach was adopted by young Māori activist groups like Ngā Tamatoa, who espoused contemporary methods of resistance such as marches, occupations, and pickets.\textsuperscript{32} These groups were predominantly made up of young, university educated, and left-leaning Māori who recognised the racism underlying the states assimilationist agenda. According to Harris, it was the land occupations (Bastion Point, Raglan, and Pākaitore), the 1975 Land March, and annual Waitangi Day protests of the 1970s that eventually led the government to give greater consideration to its obligations under the Treaty.\textsuperscript{33}

In response to Māori activism, the fourth Labour government sought to appease Māori aspirations for tino rangatiratanga. Poata-Smith explains that this was achieved in two main ways: first, by allowing the Waitangi Tribunal to process historic claims, allowing for economic compensation for breaches of the Treaty; and second, by embracing biculturalism, allowing for greater Māori representation in Parliament and the adoption of Māori models of organisation in the public sector.\textsuperscript{34} As Poata-Smith points out, the opening of the Waitangi Tribunal to historic claims coincided

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\textsuperscript{30} Harris, \textit{Hīkoi}, 20.  \\
\textsuperscript{31} Melissa Williams, \textit{Panguru and the City: Kaīnga Tahi, Kaīnga Rua: An Urban Migration History} (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2014), 118.  \\
\textsuperscript{32} Harris, \textit{Hīkoi}.  \\
\textsuperscript{33} Harris, \textit{Hīkoi}.  \\
\end{flushleft}
with the rise of ‘Maori cultural nationalism’. The main focus of cultural nationalism was the revitalisation of Māori culture, and activists at this time can be credited with the inclusion of language and cultural programs in the education system and the establishment of Kura Kaupapa and Whare Wānanga. While this achieved much for Māori in terms of cultural revival, it distracted activists who had previously challenged capitalism from the economic determinants of inequality. Similarly, the focus on biculturalism in Parliament has been criticised as a token gesture towards the inclusion of Māori culture that has done nothing to alleviate the poverty created by neoliberal policies. In this way, biculturalism can be seen as another form of assimilation: Māori have been allowed to celebrate culture as long as we conform to the capitalist agenda of the state.

Since the signing of Te Tiriti, Māori have consistently asserted tino rangatiratanga and much has been achieved politically, culturally, and economically. However, a huge number of Māori continue to live lives marked by insecurity and hardship. As Poata-Smith points out, many iwi leaders have turned to neoliberal economic policy in the interests of advancing tino rangatiratanga:

While many still look to constitutional change to reform the worst excesses of the system, a number of powerful tribal executives and corporate warriors have argued . . . that the welfare system has held Māori back and that real self-determination and liberation for Māori can only be achieved under unrestrained, free-market capitalism.

Like Poata-Smith, I disagree with this sentiment. Participation in the capitalist economy does not challenge the neoliberal policies that keep Māori poor; Māori liberation cannot be achieved under capitalism as we know it.

35 Poata-Smith, ‘He Pokeke Uenuku i Ō Ai,’ 106.
36 Poata-Smith, ‘He Pokeke Uenuku i Ō Ai’; Harris, Hīkoi.
38 Poata-Smith, ‘He Pokeke Uenuku i Ō Ai,’ 98.
Faced with the issue of Māori poverty, it is necessary to consider emancipatory alternatives to capitalism that remain sensitive to issues of colonisation. Socialism, in its various configurations, has long been seen on the Left as a plausible alternative to capitalism. While Māori socialist activism has decreased significantly since the 1970s and 1980s, it has not disappeared; Māori aspirations for socialism are still alive and well today. While there is no cohesive Māori socialist movement, there are a variety of groups and organisations that prioritise people and the environment over profit and who advance the case for tino rangatiratanga. Perhaps the most noteworthy example today is Save Our Unique Landscape (SOUL), a collective who are campaigning for the land at Ihumātao to be returned to mana whenua.\(^\text{39}\)

Given the complexity of socio-economic inequality, our history of colonisation, and the diversity of Left politics, socialism must not be posited as a monolithic economic alternative to capitalism. What is needed on the Left is a variety of socially empowered pathways that provide people with more control over and within the economy so that we can eventually to transform it.

### The socialist compass

In *Envisioning Real Utopias*, Erik Olin Wright offers an inclusive and broad vision for socialism, based on social empowerment.\(^\text{40}\) In working through proposals for a ‘radical democratic egalitarian alternative to capitalism’, he argues that there is no single path towards socialism; rather, multiple paths may be pursued as long as they are oriented towards social empowerment.\(^\text{41}\) Given the ‘empirical variability’ of economic systems, there is no such

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39 While they are not a self-proclaimed socialist group, their values (kotahitanga, manaakitanga, aroha, kaitiakitanga, rangimarie, and whakapono), goals, and actions are compatible with a socialist agenda. To support this kaupapa, and for more information, see their website: [https://www.protectihumatao.com/](https://www.protectihumatao.com/)


41 Wright, *Envisioning Real Utopias*, 110.
thing as pure socialism or pure capitalism.\textsuperscript{42} Instead, economic systems are hybrid in nature and differ depending on how power is organised.\textsuperscript{43} Wright develops a socialist compass with three points: state power, economic power, and social power. These points are used to navigate the pathways towards socialism. Before developing the socialist compass, Wright defines the conceptual vocabulary on which it is based. His definitions of power, ownership, the state, the economy, and civil society are vital to an understanding of the compass. I summarise them below.

Power is broadly defined as ‘the capacity of actors to accomplish things in the world’.\textsuperscript{44} The capacity to act depends both on the ownership of resources and the socio-structural conditions under which actions take place. Under capitalism, for example, the owner of a factory is empowered both by the economic structure which alienates workers from the means of production and by the state which enforces contracts and protects property rights. Wright argues that power does not always require domination. For example, a group of people, acting together cooperatively, has the capacity to accomplish tasks without coercion. Power therefore takes different forms depending on the social relations on which it is based. Wright identifies three types of power: state, economic, and social, which derive from the state, the economy, and civil society respectively.

Wright’s definition of ownership is a little more complex and involves three dimensions. First, the \textit{agents} of ownership: people who hold ownership rights. These can be individuals, organisations, families, the state, or even abstract entities such as society.\textsuperscript{45} Second, the \textit{objects} of ownership: the things which can or cannot be owned. Third, the \textit{rights} of ownership: the right to use things in different ways, the right to destroy things, and the right to sell, lend, or give things away.

While acknowledging the conceptual difficulties involved in defining ambiguous terms such as state, economy, and civil society, Wright keeps

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Wright, \textit{Envisioning Real Utopias}, 111.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Wright, \textit{Envisioning Real Utopias}, 123.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Wright, \textit{Envisioning Real Utopias}, 111.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Wright, \textit{Envisioning Real Utopias}, 113.
\end{itemize}
his definitions relatively simple. The state is ‘the cluster of institutions, more or less coherently organized, which imposes binding rules and regulations over a territory’. 46 The economy is ‘the sphere of social activity in which people interact to produce and distribute goods and services’. 47 In capitalism this involves capitalist firms and market exchange. Finally, civil society is ‘the sphere of social interaction in which people voluntarily form associations of different sorts for various purposes’. 48 Some associations are formal organisations such as churches, clubs, or labour unions, while others are looser associations of informal networks and communities. Based on these definitions, Wright constructs the conceptual points of his socialist compass: state power, economic power, and social power.

Wright refers to state power as the state’s capacity to impose rules over a territory. He notes that while this includes its ability to exert force over its subjects, this is not always the dominant feature. For example, state power also relies on such things as ‘the ideological commitments of citizens to obey rules and commands’ and its effectiveness in solving social problems. 49 Economic power refers to the capacity of social actors to make use of and control the means of production and distribution. Social power is the capacity of associations in civil society to organise and act collectively on a voluntary basis.

With these conceptual tools in hand, Wright provides a ‘typology of economic structures’, defining socialism in contrast to capitalism and statism. 50 Unlike some socialist theorists, Wright does not view socialism as a ‘binary contrast to capitalism’ in which the state is privileged as a source of anti-capitalist power. 51 Rather, socialism is separate from both capitalism and statism. Under capitalism, the means of production are privately owned by individuals or corporations and capitalist firms exercise

46 Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 118.
47 Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 119.
48 Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 119.
49 Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 119.
50 Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 120.
51 Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 111.
economic power in the market economy. Statism is an economic system in which the means of production are owned and controlled by the state and in which economic activity is conducted through the exercise of state power. Socialism, then, is an economic system in which the means of production are collectively owned by various associations in civil society and is underpinned by social power.

While Wright sets clear parameters around capitalism, statism, and socialism, he stresses that these are ideal types that do not exist in reality—they 'live only in the fantasies (or nightmares) of theorists'. He emphasises instead the hybrid nature of economic systems. For example, while economic power dominates in most capitalist societies, the state usually plays a significant role in regulating the economy. Similarly, even authoritarian statist economies rely on informal social networks that lie outside of state power. Thus, capitalism, statism, and socialism are variables:

The more the decisions made by actors exercising economic power determine the allocation and use of resources, the more capitalist is an economic structure. The more power exercised through the state determines the allocation and use of resources, the more the society is statist. The more power rooted in civil society determines such allocations and uses, the more the society is socialist.

In emphasising the hybridity of the economy, the task becomes not so much to overthrow capitalism but to ground economic activity in social power and therefore orient ourselves towards socialism.

With state, economic, and social power as compass points, Wright is able to work through seven different scenarios of economic organisation—different pathways to socialism. Each pathway links social power with economic activity. This is either direct, through social ownership of the means of production and social control over production, consumption, and the allocation of resources, or indirect, through various configurations of socially empowered state regulation or socially empowered forms of

52  Wright, *Envisioning Real Utopias*, 123.
state-free capitalism. There is no space to pursue all seven pathways here; instead, I briefly outline the four that I extend on in the next section.

Statist socialism refers to an economy where economic activity is controlled directly by a socially empowered state. The vision here is of a democratic state in which state power is subordinate to social power. Economic power is marginalised, meaning that ‘it is not by virtue of the direct economic ownership and control over assets that people have power to organize production; it is by virtue of their collective political organization in civil society and their exercise of state power’.54 Wright gives the example of associational councils or parties that draw on social power to influence state institutions.55

Social democratic statist economic regulation also involves a socially empowered state acting on the economy. The difference here is that instead of acting directly on the economy, the state serves as a regulator of economic power (the power held by owners of capital). The state would intervene in the labour market by upholding such things as workers’ rights, pollution control, and product safety standards. Unlike statist socialism, all three forms of power inform the economy. This vision includes the possibility of private ownership; however, both state and economic power are subordinate to social power.56

Social capitalism is where state power is marginalised and social power acts directly on economic power to shape the economy. Wright gives the example of labour unions who draw on their capacity to organise workers to influence economic power through collective bargaining. He acknowledges

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54 Wright, *Envisioning Real Utopias*, 131.

55 Wright notes that statist socialism lies at the heart of traditional Marxist revolutionary socialism but has remained largely theoretical. In practice, statist socialism has tended to end up with a concentration of power in a single party. He calls this ‘authoritarian statism’ and differentiates it from statist socialism as described above. Wright argues that it is likely that the state will continue to play a major role in the provision of public goods such as healthcare and education; therefore, statist socialism (as described above) remains an important emancipatory pathway. The goal for socialists is to work to bring state institutions under the control of democratically empowered civil society.

that social power is still fairly limited in this situation and suggests the more radical alternative of worker representation on firms’ boards of directors. This would include the replacement of shareholder boards with ‘stakeholder boards’ giving workers a voice in decision making.\(^{57}\)

The social economy sees both state power and economic power marginalised. The social economy involves the direct ownership of the means of production by voluntary associations. Workers would have authority over the allocation of resources and control over production and distribution. In this scenario, work operates outside of the capitalist market. The purpose of work would be to meet the needs of the workers (and their dependents) rather than being oriented towards profit-maximisation. Wright gives the example of Wikipedia, which produces knowledge and distributes it for free. Wikipedia’s infrastructure is funded by donations from its supporters, meaning it can operate independently from state or economic power.\(^{58}\)

While Wright acknowledges that none of these pathways provide sufficient challenges to capitalism by themselves, he argues that ‘substantial movement along all of them taken together would constitute a fundamental transformation of capitalism’s class relations and the structures of power and privilege rooted in them’.\(^{59}\) Thus, he offers a hopeful vision for socialism which does not require an all-or-nothing socialist revolution. However, Wright’s concept of socialism has been developed outside of the Aotearoa New Zealand context, meaning it is not sensitive to the issues of colonisation in this country. As such, the socialist compass must be extended and adapted so that it takes into account the structures of power unique to Aotearoa New Zealand.

\(^{57}\) Wright defines stakeholders as ‘all people whose lives are affected by the use of [the] means of production’: Envisioning Real Utopias, 177.

\(^{58}\) Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 140–143.

\(^{59}\) Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 114.
The Aotearoa Socialist Compass

Like Wright, I propose a socialist alternative to capitalism. It is not enough for Māori to have tino rangatiratanga in an economy that continues to exploit the most vulnerable. In imagining an emancipatory future for Māori, whose lives continue to be impacted by colonisation and poverty, I propose a socialist alternative to capitalism. Iwi, hapū, and urban Māori authorities might have a unique way of achieving this and notions of tino rangatiratanga are not the same as Wright’s idea of social power. In developing the Aotearoa New Zealand socialist compass, therefore, a working definition of tino rangatiratanga, as a form of power, is required.

Tino rangatiratanga as power

One of the many manifestations of tino rangatiratanga has been the ongoing struggle for constitutional transformation based on Te Tiriti o Waitangi. When Māori signed Te Tiriti, they did so with the understanding that tino rangatiratanga ‘over their lands, their villages and all their treasured possessions’ would be recognised by the Crown. The Crown failed to uphold this agreement. Since 1840 Māori have persisted with the struggle to have the Crown recognise Te Tiriti and more recently to have it enshrined in constitutional law. This vision took a hopeful leap forward in 2010 with the establishment of Matike Mai Aotearoa, the independent working group on constitutional transformation. In 2016 Matike Mai released a report documenting the conversations from 252 hui on constitutional transformation in Aotearoa New Zealand.

After establishing that constitutional transformation was the desire of the people, the report outlined what this might actually look like. Based on model two at the end of the report, governance in Aotearoa New Zealand could be undertaken within three independent ‘spheres of influence’: the kāwanatanga sphere, under the authority of the Crown; the tino

62 He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa.
rangatiratanga sphere, under the authority of an assembly of iwi, hapū, and urban Māori authorities (henceforth referred to as IHU authorities); and the relational sphere, where the two would interact and negotiate. Based on the constitutional vision of Matike Mai, and specifically on model two in the report, I define tino rangatiratanga as a form of power derived from IHU authorities. Specifically, tino rangatiratanga is the capacity of IHU authorities to exercise authority over their territories and ‘all their treasured possessions’, as promised by Te Tiriti.

To make sense of tino rangatiratanga as power alongside the three forms elaborated by Wright, the social structures of IHU authorities must be differentiated from both civil society and the state. According to Wright, civil society refers to ‘the sphere of social interaction in which people voluntarily form associations of different sorts for various purposes’. While people can choose whether or not they affiliate with their iwi or hapū, it is usually not seen as a voluntary association. Rather, iwi and hapū are social structures based on whakapapa and one belongs by birthright. While a person cannot simply choose to belong to any iwi or hapū, many people belong to more than one and there may be some level of choosing which to primarily associate with.

IHU authorities are also not equivalent to Wright’s definition of the state (‘the cluster of institutions, more or less coherently organized, which imposes binding rules and regulations over a territory’). Despite never ceding sovereignty, IHU authorities are currently under the jurisdiction of the state. Prior to European arrival, there was no single governing body that incorporated all iwi and hapū. While there was relationship between various iwi and hapū, each exercised full authority over the stretches of

63 He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 9.
64 Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 119.
65 Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 118.
66 There are, of course, countless examples of Māori communities rejecting state control and asserting tino rangatiratanga. Two current examples are the protectors of Ihumātao, who are occupying the land despite being served eviction notices, and Ngāti Kahu, who have banned the Endeavour replica from their shores on the grounds that they are the sole authority in their rohe.
land, waterways, and coastal areas that they worked. Similarly, the Matike Mai report does not envision a single governing body with jurisdiction over all iwi and hāpu. Instead, model two proposes ‘an assembly made up of Iwi, Hapū and other representation including Urban Māori Authorities’ to form the tino rangatiratanga sphere. They do not go into detail about who exactly would make up this assembly or if/how they would be elected. However, as democracy is emphasised as an important value throughout the report, it would seem safe to assume that some kind of democratic arrangement is envisaged.

The revival of the Māori economy

While tino rangatiratanga relates to self-determination, people interpret this in different ways. In documenting the rise of cultural nationalism, Poata-Smith points out that ‘agreement on the vision of tino rangatiratanga is far from unanimous. It can simultaneously be identified with Maori capitalism, Maori electoral power, cultural nationalism or revolutionary activity’. Indeed, one of the ways Māori measure tino rangatiratanga today is through the success of the Māori economy. According to a report released by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, the Māori economy is now valued at $50 billion. It is made up of corporate iwi entities such as Ngāi Tahu’s investment branch, Ngāi Tahu Capital, as well as small Māori businesses. In an interview with The Spinoff, Hēmi Rolleston, the sector manager for Callaghan Innovation’s Māori unit, spoke of the reason for the upsurge in Māori businesses: ‘Māori have a lineage of exploring, navigating, and entrepreneurship. Having tino rangatiratanga over your life and income is appealing too. Māori in business is a natural

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67 Anderson, ‘Emerging Societies: AD 1500–1800.’
68 He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 104–105.
69 Poata-Smith, ‘He Pokeke Uenuku i Tu Ai,’ 98.
The capacity for Māori to achieve tino rangatiratanga through economic advancement (that is, by becoming less dependent on the state for income) is certainly something to be celebrated. However, as argued above, the same neoliberal policies which help the Māori economy to grow are trapping a large proportion of Māori in poverty.

Anake Goodall, former chief executive of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, seeks a more empowering alternative to capitalism. He argues that post settlement, iwi have strayed from the guidance of traditional values: ‘While [iwi boards] do have distinctive indigenous icons, it often seems their traditional values—their true North Star—are unnecessarily left at the boardroom door as the price of entry’. He also notes that the success of the Māori economy exists in tension with intergenerational Māori poverty. Despite this, Goodall has hope that the Māori economy will be able to move beyond capitalism; he advocates ‘investments by Māori entities in alternative models, rooted in community, that might genuinely be described as being “of the people, by the people, for the people”’. He asks why today’s Māori enterprises have not engaged in economic activities such as bartering, crowdsourced funding, or credit unions. Perhaps the answer to his question can be found in Wright’s observation that there is an ‘absence of a comprehensive institutional design for a radical democratic egalitarian alternative to capitalism’. Perhaps the vision for tino rangatiratanga in the Māori economy needs to be paired with a socialist vision to achieve liberation for all Māori, not just the elite.

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72 Anake Goodall, ‘Back to the Māori Future?’ in Inequality, 159.

73 Goodall, ‘Back to the Māori Future?’ 162.

74 Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 110.
Māori socialism: Emancipatory pathways

In a similar fashion to Wright, I use the Aotearoa New Zealand socialist compass to point to pathways leading towards a socially and tino rangatiratanga empowered economy. The following pathways, adapted from the four outlined above, represent a theoretical vision for Māori socialism. It must be emphasised that this is not an exhaustive list of viable alternatives and that these pathways can exist alongside one another. The intention here is to demonstrate how the compass may be used to envision potential alternatives to the dominance of the capitalist economy.

**Iwi socialism (statist socialism)**

This would require a socially empowered state (kāwanatanga sphere) and socially empowered IHU authorities (tino rangatiratanga sphere), both of which would have control over different parts of the economy. In this vision, economic power is marginalised, meaning capitalists would not have direct power over the economy. Instead, socially empowered (i.e. democratic) IHU authorities would have control over their means of production and the allocation of resources. The extent to which economic activity would be regulated by the assembly of IHU authorities and how much would be regulated by individual iwi and hapū themselves would be determined democratically. In this scenario, the kāwanatanga sphere would also operate democratically, with interaction between the two occurring in the relational sphere. For example, arrangements around trade regulations (both domestic and international) and currency would need to be agreed on. A discussion of the technical and political specifics of what this could look like is not possible here; the core point is that the Crown would have no jurisdiction over IHU authorities.

**Iwi economic regulation (social democratic statist economic regulation)**

This pathway also requires a socially empowered state and socially empowered IHU authorities. In this case, however, economic power
is included and acts on the economy. This scenario allows for private ownership. While traditionally the concept of private ownership was foreign to Māori, it is not the case now and this needs to be considered when contemplating emancipatory futures. However, in line with Wright’s vision for socialism, economic power would be subordinate to state power and/or tino rangatiratanga (depending on where individuals and firms are situated in respect to the kāwanatanga and tino rangatiratanga spheres). Thus, IHU authorities would be able to regulate (to some degree) the economic activity of individual economic players within their jurisdiction. Again, the Crown would have no jurisdiction over the tino rangatiratanga sphere and there would be interaction between the two. For example, laws regulating economic power so as to ensure the protection of workers and the environment might be agreed upon in the relational sphere. The core difference between this pathway and Wright’s equivalent is that instead of just the state regulating economic power there would also be an independent assembly of IHU authorities, which, in turn, would recognise the autonomy of individual IHU authorities.

**Tino rangatiratanga capitalism (social capitalism)**

This pathway marginalises the role of the state. That is not to say there is no state; rather, it recognises that if firms and corporations have sufficient worker representation there will be no need for state regulation. This goes for both the kāwanatanga and the tino rangatiratanga spheres. In this scenario, Māori capitalist firms would be free to compete in the market. However, economic power would be informed by socially empowered individuals and groups. As with Wright’s description, this would include stakeholder boards in which all members of the IHU association have the right to have their voice heard. This vision is already realised in some areas of iwi corporatism. Anake Goodall, for example, notes that Māori land trusts and ownership structures combine ‘in single entities the interests of shareholders and stakeholders, citizens and investors and social agents, and—most fundamentally—close family members’. The key here

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75 Goodall, ‘Back to the Māori Future?’ 159–160.
would be to ensure stakeholder interests were prioritised and represented democratically. While Māori would certainly be free to directly influence economic power, there may be times when it is more appropriate for individuals to work through the structures of iwi and hapū. This scenario highlights the complexity of tino rangatiratanga and how it differs from state power and social power. Tino rangatiratanga can assume the role of both the state and civil associations but is not equal to either.

The social economy

This final scenario does not differ from Wright’s description for a social economy. Here it is recognised that not all Māori can, or indeed want to, affiliate with an IHU authority. This scenario recognises the diversity in Māori society and the extension of tino rangatiratanga to individuals; it makes space for Māori who wish to form associations outside of IHU authorities. As with Wright’s social economy, this pathway operates outside the capitalist market and does not require the state; instead, people are able to engage directly in economic activity. A local example is the Wellington Timebank where people swap knowledge and skills for credit which can then be traded for other services in the community.\(^{76}\) The concept of mahi aroha, the manifestation of love through work, is another example.\(^{77}\) Mahi aroha is akin to volunteering one’s services. Underlying the concept, however, is the idea of reciprocity. People who engage in mahi aroha do so with the knowledge that they are contributing to a community that nurtures them in various ways. It is understood that one’s services might not be reciprocated immediately, indeed, it may not even happen in one’s lifetime (for example, caring for the environment for the benefit of your grandchildren). It must be noted that the social economy is not currently strong enough to ensure that whoever provides their services for free will receive sufficient reciprocation. Most people are at least somewhat

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\(^{76}\) For more information, see http://www.wellingtontimebank.org.nz/

\(^{77}\) See Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector, *Mahi Aroha: Māori Perspectives on Volunteering and Cultural Obligations* (Wellington: Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector, 2007).
dependent on the capitalist market and the social economy runs the risk of exploiting unpaid work in the same way that capitalism does.

Pursuing institutional change along these (and other) emancipatory pathways would serve to undermine the dominant economic and state structures that currently keep Māori poor. IHU authorities, operating free from state power, would have the freedom to side-step the neoliberal policies that have been so detrimental to many Māori whānau. As Wright points out, substantial movement along all of these pathways would begin to transform economic institutions, making a radical, democratic, egalitarian, tino rangatiratanga alternative to capitalism possible.

**Conclusion**

The overrepresentation of Māori in the precariat is an enduring feature of Aotearoa New Zealand society. Throughout history, Māori struggles for tino rangatiratanga have been diverse and at times contradictory, ranging from the Land Wars to Māori capitalism. In the early years of colonisation, tino rangatiratanga was manifest in direct and forceful opposition to the Pākehā state. By the early 1900s, however, many Māori leaders began to seek ways of working alongside the state to achieve economic and cultural aspirations. Since the 1980s one of the major ways tino rangatiratanga has been realised has been through the transfer of substantial economic power through Treaty settlements. Bringing claims before the Waitangi Tribunal has demanded much of rangatira both past and present, and the hard-earned fruits of this mahi should be celebrated. However, investment in a neoliberal capitalist economy has proven to be a shallow and limited emancipatory project where the Māori precariat are concerned.

Margaret Mutu, Moana Jackson, and all those involved in the Matike Mai project offer a more hopeful vision for Māori. They envision a future where tino rangatiratanga is taken seriously and the Crown can no longer assert state power over iwi, hapū, and urban Māori authorities. This vision is hopeful, achievable, and should lie at the heart of emancipatory Māori politics. I have argued that Māori socialism must be part of this vision
too. Unless tino rangatiratanga takes a socialist bent there is little hope that those represented in the precariat will ever be free from the poverty resulting from capitalist colonisation. This is a vision that all on the Left, Māori and non-Māori alike, can get behind. In developing the Aotearoa socialist compass, I have provided a conceptual framework with which we can orientate ourselves towards a socialist future where tino rangatiratanga is a reality.

More research is required to develop the concept of Māori socialism further. Each of the pathways above (as well as new ones) could be developed by looking into existing models, businesses, and economic practices (including those outside normative definitions of the economy). Another avenue worth exploring would be using empirical research to model what the Māori economy would look like under the Matike Mai kaupapa. Would it suffer, as other economies have, when a formally colonised state gains its independence? Would the Crown have an obligation under the Treaty to ensure the stability of the Māori economy? Would this separation spell economic disaster for both economies?

That there is a need for radical economic and constitutional transformation in this country is beyond doubt. The obstacles to achieving such transformation can at times seem insurmountable. But this does not mean that we need limit our imaginations and political goals to what is achievable under the status quo. We do not have to have a fixed map of where we are going to know where we want to be, and we do not have to know all the possible roadblocks in advance. The Aotearoa socialist compass can be used to guide us in the right direction and to reorient ourselves when the unexpected happens.