Consistency and Decidability in Some Paraconsistent Arithmetics

Authors

  • Andrew Tedder Czech Academy of Science

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v18i5.6921

Abstract

The standard style of argument used to prove that a theory is unde- cidable relies on certain consistency assumptions, usually that some fragment or other is negation consistent. In a non-paraconsistent set- ting, this amounts to an assumption that the theory is non-trivial, but these diverge when theories are couched in paraconsistent logics. Furthermore, there are general methods for constructing inconsistent models of arithmetic from consistent models, and the theories of such inconsistent models seem likely to differ in terms of complexity. In this paper, I begin to explore this terrain, working, particularly, in incon- sistent theories of arithmetic couched in three-valued paraconsistent logics which have strong (i.e. detaching) conditionals.

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Published

2021-07-21