The Logic of Internal Rational Agent

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a new four-valued logic which may be viewed as a variation on the theme of Kubyshkina and Zaitsev's Logic of Rational Agent \textbf{LRA} \cite{LRA}. We call our logic $ \bf LIRA$ (Logic of Internal Rational Agency). In contrast to \textbf{LRA}, it has three designated values instead of one and a different interpretation of truth values, the same as in Zaitsev and Shramko's bi-facial truth logic \cite{ZS}. This logic may be useful in a situation when according to an agent's point of view (i.e. internal point of view) her/his reasoning is rational, while from the external one it might be not the case. One may use \textbf{LIRA}, if one wants to reconstruct an agent's way of thinking, compare it with respect to the real state of affairs, and understand why an agent thought in this or that way. Moreover, we discuss Kubyshkina and Zaitsev's necessity and possibility operators for \textbf{LRA} definable by means of four-valued Kripke-style semantics and show that, due to two negations (as well as their combination) of \textbf{LRA}, two more possibility operators for \textbf{LRA} can be defined. Then we slightly modify all these modalities to be appropriate for $\bf LIRA$. Finally, we formalize all the truth-functional $ n $-ary extensions of the negation fragment of $\bf LIRA$ (including $\bf LIRA$ itself) as well as their basic modal extension via linear-type natural deduction systems.