Logical Truth

  • Paal Fjeldvig Antonsen

Abstract

On the model-theoretic account, a sentence is logically true just in case it is true on all possible semantic interpretations. We dierentiate four ways one can interpret the modality 'possible' in this definition, and argue that one of these readings is not subject to the criticism levelled against the model-theoretic account by Etchemendy. By explicating the four readings we also draw some consequences for what linguistic evidence a selection of logical theories should be sensitive to.

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Published
2019-11-18
How to Cite
ANTONSEN, Paal Fjeldvig. Logical Truth. The Australasian Journal of Logic, [S.l.], v. 16, n. 7, p. 187-201, nov. 2019. ISSN 1448-5052. Available at: <https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/view/5914>. Date accessed: 25 oct. 2020. doi: https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5914.