Bayesian confirmation, connexivism and an unkindness of ravens

  • Elisangela Ramirez

Abstract




Bayesian confirmation theories (BCTs) might be the best standing theories of confirmation to date, but they are certainly not paradox-free. Here I recognize that BCTs’ appeal mainly comes from the fact that they capture some of our intuitions about confirmation better than those the- ories that came before them and that the superiority of BCTs is suffi- ciently justified by those advantages. Instead, I will focus on Sylvan and Nola’s claim that it is desirable that our best theory of confirmation be as paradox-free as possible. For this reason, I will show that, as they respond to different interests, the project of the BCTs is not incompatible with Sylvan and Nola’s project of a paradox-free confirmation logic. In fact, it will turn out that, provided we are ready to embrace some degree of non-classicality, both projects complement each other nicely.




Published
2018-07-05
How to Cite
RAMIREZ, Elisangela. Bayesian confirmation, connexivism and an unkindness of ravens. The Australasian Journal of Logic, [S.l.], v. 15, n. 2, p. 449-475, july 2018. ISSN 1448-5052. Available at: <https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/view/4868>. Date accessed: 23 may 2019. doi: https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4868.