Sylvan's Bottle and other Problems

  • Diane Proudfoot

Abstract




According to Richard Routley, a comprehensive theory of fiction is impossible, since almost anything is in principle imaginable. In my view, Routley is right: for any purported logic of fiction, there will be actual or imaginable fictions that successfully counterexample the logic. Using the example of ‘impossible’ fictions, I test this claim against theories proposed by Routley’s Meinongian contemporaries and also by Routley himself (for what he called ‘esoteric’ works of fiction) and his 21st century heirs. I argue that the phenomenon of impossible fictions challenges even today’s modal Meinongians.




Published
2018-07-03
How to Cite
PROUDFOOT, Diane. Sylvan's Bottle and other Problems. The Australasian Journal of Logic, [S.l.], v. 15, n. 2, p. 95-123, july 2018. ISSN 1448-5052. Available at: <https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/view/4858>. Date accessed: 18 july 2019. doi: https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4858.