Modal Meinongianism and Object Theory

A Reply to Bueno and Zalta

  • Francesco Berto University of Amsterdam
  • Filippo Casati University of Kyoto
  • Naoya Fujikawa Tokyo Metropolitan University
  • Graham Priest CUNY Graduate Center

Abstract




We reply to various arguments by Otavio Bueno and Edward Zalta (‘Object Theory and Modal Meinongianism’) against Modal Meinongianism, including that it presupposes, but cannot maintain, a unique denotation for names of fictional characters, and that it is not generalizable to higher-order objects. We individuate the crucial difference between Modal Meinongianism and Object Theory in the former’s resorting to an apparatus of worlds, possible and impossible, for the representational purposes for which the latter resorts to a distinction between two kinds of predication, exemplification and encoding. We show that encoding has fewer forerunners in the history of philosophy than Bueno and Zalta want, and that there’s a reason why the notion has been found baffling by some.




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Published
2020-04-07
How to Cite
BERTO, Francesco et al. Modal Meinongianism and Object Theory. The Australasian Journal of Logic, [S.l.], v. 17, n. 1, p. 1-21, apr. 2020. ISSN 1448-5052. Available at: <https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/view/4814>. Date accessed: 02 july 2020. doi: https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v17i1.4814.