Ontological Syncretistic Noneism


  • Alberto Voltolini University of Turin, Italy




In this paper I want to claim, first, that despite close similarities, noneism (as developed in both Routley 1980 and Priest 20162) and Crane’s (2013) psychological reductionism are different ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial. Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be nonstandardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished from Quinean allism in terms of the different scope of the overall ontological domain on which the only particular/existential quantifier that there is ranges. This may orient a noneist towards a syncretistic view of existence, according to which, appearances notwithstanding, existence as a whole is captured both by means of second-order and by means of first-order related notions.


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Author Biography

Alberto Voltolini, University of Turin, Italy

Department of Philosophy and Education Sciences

Professor, Philosophy of Mind