Semantics for Counterpossibles

Abstract

The object of this paper is to examine two approaches to giving non-vacuous truth conditions for counterpossibles, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. I first develop modifications of a Lewis-style sphere semantics with impossible worlds. I argue that this approach sanctions intuitively invalid inferences and is supported by philosophically problematic foundations. I then develop modifications of certain ceteris paribus conditional logics with impossible worlds. Tableaux are given for each of these in an appendix and soundness and completeness results are proved. While certain of the latter systems are shown to have similar problems to logics from the first approach, at least one relatively weak system appears to offer an adequate uniform semantics for counterpossibles and counterfactuals.

Published
2017-12-12
How to Cite
WEISS, Yale. Semantics for Counterpossibles. The Australasian Journal of Logic, [S.l.], v. 14, n. 4, p. 383-407, dec. 2017. ISSN 1448-5052. Available at: <https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/view/4050>. Date accessed: 23 may 2019. doi: https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v14i4.4050.