What If? The Exploration of an Idea

  • Graham Priest Philosophy Department, Graduate Center, CUNY


A crucial question here is what, exactly, the conditional in the naive truth/set comprehension principles is. In 'Logic of Paradox', I outlined two options. One is to take it to be the material conditional of the extensional paraconsistent logic LP. Call this "Strategy 1". LP is a relatively weak logic, however. In particular, the material conditional does not detach. The other strategy is to take it to be some detachable conditional. Call this "Strategy 2". The aim of the present essay is to investigate Stragey 1. It is not to advocate it. The work is simply an extended exploration of the strategy, its strengths, its weaknesses, and the various dierent ways in which it may be implemented. In the first part of the paper I will set up the appropriate background details. In the second, I will look at the strategy as it applies to the semantic paradoxes. In the third I will look at how it applies to the set-theoretic paradoxes.


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How to Cite
PRIEST, Graham. What If? The Exploration of an Idea. The Australasian Journal of Logic, [S.l.], v. 14, n. 1, apr. 2017. ISSN 1448-5052. Available at: <https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/view/4028>. Date accessed: 12 aug. 2020. doi: https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v14i1.4028.