Paraconsistent games and the limits of rational self-interest
AbstractIt is shown that logical contradictions are derivable from natural translations into first order logic of the description and background assumptions of the Soros Game, and of other games and social contexts that exhibit conflict and reflexivity. The logical structure of these contexts is analysed using proof-theoretic and model-theoretic techniques of first order paraconsistent logic. It is shown that all the contradictions that arise contain the knowledge operator K. Thus, the contradictions do not refer purely to material objects, and do not imply the existence of inconsistent, concrete, physical objects, or the inconsistency of direct sensory experience. However, the decision-making of rational self-interested agents is stymied by the appearance of such intensional contradictions. Replacing the rational self-interest axioms with axioms for an appropriate moral framework removes the inconsistencies. Rational moral choice in conflict-reflexive social contexts then becomes possible.
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How to Cite
DAYNES, Arief et al. Paraconsistent games and the limits of rational self-interest. The Australasian Journal of Logic, [S.l.], v. 12, n. 1, jan. 2015. ISSN 1448-5052. Available at: <https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/view/2021>. Date accessed: 23 jan. 2020. doi: https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v12i1.2021.