Translatable Self-Reference

  • Hartley Slater University of Western Australia

Abstract

Stephen Read has advanced a solution of certain semantic paradoxes recently, based on the work of Thomas Bradwardine. One consequence of this approach, however, is that if Socrates utters only ‘Socrates utters a falsehood’ (a), while Plato says ‘Socrates utters a falsehood’ (b), then, for Bradwardine two different propositions are involved on account of (a) being self-referential, while (b) is not. Problems with this consequence are first discussed before a closely related analysis is provided that escapes it. Moreover, this alternative analysis merely relies on quantification theory at the propositional level, so there is very little to question about it. The paper is the third in a series explaining the superior virtues of a referential form of propositional quantification.

Author Biography

Hartley Slater, University of Western Australia
Published
2011-05-19
How to Cite
SLATER, Hartley. Translatable Self-Reference. The Australasian Journal of Logic, [S.l.], v. 10, may 2011. ISSN 1448-5052. Available at: <https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/view/1824>. Date accessed: 18 july 2019. doi: https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v10i0.1824.