Collapsing Arguments for Facts and Propositions

  • John Howard Sobel University of Toronto


Kurt Gödel argues in “Russell’s Mathematical Logic” that on the assumption that, contrary to Russell, definite descriptions are terms, it follows given only several “apparently obvious axioms” that “all true sentences have the same signification (as well as all false ones).” Stephen Neale has written that this argument, and others by Church, Davidson, and Quine to similar conclusions, are of considerable philosophical interest. Graham Oppy, responding to this opinion, says they are of minimal interest. Falling between these is my opinion that implications of these arguments for propositions and facts are of moderate philosophical interest, and that these arguments provide occasions for reflection of possible interest on fine lines of several theories of definite descriptions and class–abstractions.


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Author Biography

John Howard Sobel, University of Toronto
How to Cite
SOBEL, John Howard. Collapsing Arguments for Facts and Propositions. The Australasian Journal of Logic, [S.l.], v. 6, nov. 2008. ISSN 1448-5052. Available at: <>. Date accessed: 02 july 2020. doi: