Paraconsistent Vagueness: Why Not?

  • Dominic Hyde University of Queensland
  • Mark Colyvan Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney

Abstract

The idea that the phenomenon of vagueness might be modelled by a paraconsistent logic has been little discussed in contemporary work on vagueness, just as the idea that paraconsistent logics might be fruitfully applied to the phenomenon of vagueness has been little discussed in contemporary work on paraconsistency. This is prima facie surprising given that the earliest formalisations of paraconsistent logics presented in Jáskowski and Halldén were presented as logics of vagueness. One possible explanation for this is that, despite initial advocacy by pioneers of paraconsistency, the prospects for a paraconsistent account of vagueness are so poor as to warrant little further consideration. In this paper we look at the reasons that might be offered in defence of this negative claim. As we shall show, they are far from compelling. Paraconsistent accounts of vagueness deserve further attention.

Author Biographies

Dominic Hyde, University of Queensland
Mark Colyvan, Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney
Published
2008-11-26
How to Cite
HYDE, Dominic; COLYVAN, Mark. Paraconsistent Vagueness: Why Not?. The Australasian Journal of Logic, [S.l.], v. 6, nov. 2008. ISSN 1448-5052. Available at: <https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/view/1798>. Date accessed: 21 sep. 2019. doi: https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v6i0.1798.