Anti-exceptionalism about Logic
Introduction
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Logic has traditionally played a foundational role in many epistemological programmes. But in order to fulfil this role, logic has been given a privileged epistemological status: it is self-evident, wholly a priori, or epistemologically analytic. This exceptional status of logic was famously challenged in W. V. Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Logic, he concluded, is in principle no less revisable than the natural sciences. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists agree with Quine that logical theories can be revised, but often disagree with his naturalist assumptions. Recent work by Graham Priest, Gillian Russell, Timothy Williamson, and others has attempted to replace logic’s exceptional epistemology with a form of theory-choice more akin to that of other sciences.

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